# 1NC

### 2

#### Debt will pass, but the plan destroys Obama’s finite leverage with House Republicans

Easley, 9/18 (Jason, 9/18/2013, “Obama’s Genius Labeling of GOP Demands Extortion Has Already Won The Debt Ceiling Fight,” <http://www.politicususa.com/2013/09/18/obamas-genius-labeling-gop-demands-extortion-won-debt-ceiling-fight.html)>)

Obama use of the term extortion to describe the House Republican debt ceiling demands was a step forward in a strategy that has already made it a near certainty that he will win this standoff.

President Obama effectively ended any Republican hopes of getting a political victory on the debt ceiling when he called their demands extortion. Nobody likes being extorted. The American people don’t like feeling like they are being shaken down. The White House knows this, which is why they are using such strong language to criticize the Republicans. Obama is doing the same thing to House Republicans that he has been doing to the entire party for the last few years. The president is defining them before they can define themselves.

Obama is taking the same tactics that he used to define Mitt Romney in the summer of 2012 and applying them to John Boehner and his House Republicans. While Republicans are fighting among themselves and gearing up for another pointless run at defunding Obamacare, the president is already winning the political battle over the debt ceiling. His comments today were a masterstroke of strategy that will pay political dividends now and in the future. If the president is successful anytime a Republican talks about defunding Obamacare, the American people will think extortion. Republicans keep insisting on unconstitutional plots to kill Obamacare, and the president is calling them out on it.

Republicans haven’t realized it yet, but while they are chasing the fool’s gold of defunding Obamacare they have already lost on the debt ceiling. By caving to the lunatic fringe in his party, John Boehner may have handed control of the House of Representatives back to Democrats on a silver platter.

While Republicans posture on Obamacare, Obama is routing them on the debt ceiling.

#### **The plan destroys obama’s agenda and the link turns the case**

LeoGrande, 12

William M. LeoGrande School of Public Affairs American University, Professor of Government and a specialist in Latin American politics and U.S. foreign policy toward Latin America, Professor LeoGrande has been a frequent adviser to government and private sector agencies, 12/18/12, http://www.american.edu/clals/upload/LeoGrande-Fresh-Start.pdf

The Second Obama Administration Where in the executive branch will control over Cuba policy lie? Political considerations played a major role in Obama's Cuba policy during the first term, albeit not as preeminent a consideration as they were during the Clinton years. In 2009, Obama's new foreign policy team got off to a bad start when they promised Senator Menendez that they would consult him before changing Cuba policy. That was the price he extracted for providing Senate Democrats with the 60 votes needed to break a Republican filibuster on a must-pass omnibus appropriations bill to keep the government operating. For the next four years, administration officials worked more closely with Menendez, who opposed the sort of major redirection of policy Obama had promised, than they did with senators like John Kerry (D-Mass.), chair of the Foreign Relations Committee, whose views were more in line with the president's stated policy goals. At the Department of State, Assistant Secretary Arturo Valenzuela favored initiatives to improve relations with Cuba, but he was stymied by indifference or resistance elsewhere in the bureaucracy. Secretary Hillary Clinton, having staked out a tough position Cuba during the Democratic primary campaign, was not inclined to be the driver for a new policy. At the NSC, Senior Director for the Western Hemisphere Dan Restrepo, who advised Obama on Latin America policy during the 2008 campaign, did his best to avoid the Cuba issue because it was so fraught with political danger. When the president finally approved the resumption of people-to-people travel to Cuba, which Valenzuela had been pushing, the White House political team delayed the announcement for several months at the behest of Debbie Wasserman Schultz. Any easing of the travel regulations, she warned, would hurt Democrats' prospects in the upcoming mid-term elections.43 The White House shelved the new regulations until January 2011, and then announced them late Friday before a holiday weekend. Then, just a year later, the administration surrendered to Senator Rubio's demand that it limit the licensing of travel providers in exchange for him dropping his hold on the appointment of Valenzuela's replacement.44 With Obama in his final term and Vice-President Joe Biden unlikely to seek the Democratic nomination in 2016 (unlike the situation Clinton and Gore faced in their second term), politics will presumably play a less central role in deciding Cuba policy over the next four years. There will still be the temptation, however, to sacrifice Cuba policy to mollify congressional conservatives, both Democrat and Republican, who are willing to hold other Obama initiatives hostage to extract concessions on Cuba. And since Obama has given in to such hostage-taking previously, the hostage-takers have a strong incentive to try the same tactic again. The only way to break this cycle would be for the president to stand up to them and refuse to give in, as he did when they attempted to rollback his 2009 relaxation of restrictions on CubanAmerican travel and remittances. Much will depend on who makes up Obama's new foreign policy team, especially at the Department of State. John Kerry has been a strong advocate of a more open policy toward Cuba, and worked behind the scenes with the State Department and USAID to clean up the "democracy promotion" program targeting Cuba, as a way to win the release of Alan Gross. A new secretary is likely to bring new assistant secretaries, providing an opportunity to revitalize the Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs, which has been thoroughly cowed by congressional hardliners. But even with new players in place, does Cuba rise to the level of importance that would justify a major new initiative and the bruising battle with conservatives on the Hill? Major policy changes that require a significant expenditure of political capital rarely happen unless the urgency of the problem forces policymakers to take action.

#### Failure to resolve debt ensures nuclear war and turns all impacts

O’Hanlon 12 — Kenneth G. Lieberthal, Director of the John L. Thornton China Center and Senior Fellow in Foreign Policy and Global Economy and Development at the Brookings Institution, former Professor at the University of Michigan, served as special assistant to the president for national security affairs and senior director for Asia on the National Security Council, holds a Ph.D. from Columbia University, and Michael E. O'Hanlon, Director of Research and Senior Fellow in Foreign Policy at the Brookings Institution, Visiting Lecturer at Princeton University, Adjunct Professor at Johns Hopkins University, holds a Ph.D. from Princeton University, 2012 (“The Real National Security Threat: America's Debt,” *Los Angeles Times*, July 10th, Available Online at http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2012/07/10-economy-foreign-policy-lieberthal-ohanlon, Accessed 07-12-2012)

Why is this situation so serious? First, we are headed for a level of debt that within a decade could require us to spend the first trillion dollars of every year's federal budget servicing that debt. Much less money will be left for other things. That is a prescription for a vicious cycle of underfinancing for our infrastructure, national education efforts, science research and all the other functions of government that are crucial to long-term economic growth. Robust defense spending will be unsustainable too. Once we get in this rut, getting out will be very hard.

Second, such a chronic economic decline would undercut what has been 70 years of strong national political consensus in favor of an activist and engaged American foreign policy. One reason the United States was so engaged through the Cold War and the first 20 years of the post-Cold War world was fear of threats. But the other reason was that the strategy was associated with improvements in our quality of life as well. America became even more prosperous, and all major segments of society benefited.

Alas, globalization and automation trends of the last generation have increasingly called the American dream into question for the working classes. Another decade of underinvestment in what is required to remedy this situation will make an isolationist or populist president far more likely because much of the country will question whether an internationalist role makes sense for America — especially if it costs us well over half a trillion dollars in defense spending annually yet seems correlated with more job losses.

Lastly, American economic weakness undercuts U.S. leadership abroad. Other countries sense our weakness and wonder about our purported decline. If this perception becomes more widespread, and the case that we are in decline becomes more persuasive, countries will begin to take actions that reflect their skepticism about America's future. Allies and friends will doubt our commitment and may pursue nuclear weapons for their own security, for example; adversaries will sense opportunity and be less restrained in throwing around their weight in their own neighborhoods. The crucial Persian Gulf and Western Pacific regions will likely become less stable. Major war will become more likely.

When running for president last time, Obama eloquently articulated big foreign policy visions: healing America's breach with the Muslim world, controlling global climate change, dramatically curbing global poverty through development aid, moving toward a world free of nuclear weapons. These were, and remain, worthy if elusive goals. However, for Obama or his successor, there is now a much more urgent big-picture issue: restoring U.S. economic strength. Nothing else is really possible if that fundamental prerequisite to effective foreign policy is not reestablished.

### 3

#### *The aff interacts with a flagrant human rights violator - Moral duty* to shun.

Beversluis 89 — Eric H. Beversluis, Professor of Philosophy and Economics at Aquinas College, holds an A.B. in Philosophy and German from Calvin College, an M.A. in Philosophy from Northwestern University, an M.A. in Economics from Ohio State University, and a Ph.D. in the Philosophy of Education from Northwestern University, 1989 (“On Shunning Undesirable Regimes: Ethics and Economic Sanctions,” *Public Affairs Quarterly*, Volume 3, Number 2, April, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via JSTOR, p. 17-19)

A fundamental task of morality is resolving conflicting interests. If we both want the same piece of land, ethics provides a basis for resolving the conflict by identifying "mine" and "thine." If in anger I want to smash your [end page 17] face, ethics indicates that your face's being unsmashed is a legitimate interest of yours which takes precedence over my own interest in expressing my rage. Thus ethics identifies the rights of individuals when their interests conflict. But how can a case for shunning be made on this view of morality? Whose interests (rights) does shunning protect? The shunner may well have to sacrifice his interest, e.g., by foregoing a beneficial trade relationship, but whose rights are thereby protected? In shunning there seem to be no "rights" that are protected. For shunning, as we have seen, does not assume that the resulting cost will change the disapproved behavior. If economic sanctions against South Africa will not bring apartheid to an end, and thus will not help the blacks get their rights, on what grounds might it be a duty to impose such sanctions? We find the answer when we note that there is another "level" of moral duties. When Galtung speaks of "reinforcing … morality," he has identified a duty that goes beyond specific acts of respecting people's rights. The argument goes like this: There is more involved in respecting the rights of others than not violating them by one's actions. For if there is such a thing as a moral order, which unites people in a moral community, then surely one has a duty (at least prima facie) not only to avoid violating the rights of others with one's actions but also to support that moral order. Consider that the moral order itself contributes significantly to people's rights being respected. It does so by encouraging and reinforcing moral behavior and by discouraging and sanctioning immoral behavior. In this moral community people mutually reinforce each other's moral behavior and thus raise the overall level of morality. Were this moral order to disintegrate, were people to stop reinforcing each other's moral behavior, there would be much more violation of people's rights. Thus to the extent that behavior affects the moral order, it indirectly affects people's rights. And this is where shunning fits in. Certain types of behavior constitute a direct attack on the moral order. When the violation of human rights is flagrant, willful, and persistent, the offender is, as it were, thumbing her nose at the moral order, publicly rejecting it as binding her behavior. Clearly such behavior, if tolerated by society, will weaken and perhaps eventually undermine altogether the moral order. Let us look briefly at those three conditions which turn immoral behavior into an attack on the moral order. An immoral action is flagrant if it is "extremely or deliberately conspicuous; notorious, shocking." Etymologically the word means "burning" or "blazing." The definition of shunning implies therefore that those offenses require shunning which are shameless or indiscreet, which the person makes no effort to hide and no good-faith effort to excuse. Such actions "blaze forth" as an attack on the moral order. But to merit shunning the action must also be willful and persistent. We do not consider the actions of the "backslider," the [end page 18] weak-willed, the one-time offender to be challenges to the moral order. It is the repeat offender, the unrepentant sinner, the cold-blooded violator of morality whose behavior demands that others publicly reaffirm the moral order. When someone flagrantly, willfully, and repeatedly violates the moral order, those who believe in the moral order, the members of the moral community, must respond in a way that reaffirms the legitimacy of that moral order. How does shunning do this? First, by refusing publicly to have to do with such a person one announces support for the moral order and backs up the announcement with action. This action reinforces the commitment to the moral order both of the shunner and of the other members of the community. (Secretary of State Shultz in effect made this argument in his call for international sanctions on Libya in the early days of 1986.) Further, shunning may have a moral effect on the shunned person, even if the direct impact is not adequate to change the immoral behavior. If the shunned person thinks of herself as part of the moral community, shunning may well make clear to her that she is, in fact, removing herself from that community by the behavior in question. Thus shunning may achieve by moral suasion what cannot be achieved by "force." Finally, shunning may be a form of punishment, of moral sanction, whose appropriateness depends not on whether it will change the person's behavior, but on whether he deserves the punishment for violating the moral order. Punishment then can be viewed as a way of maintaining the moral order, of "purifying the community" after it has been made "unclean," as ancient communities might have put it. Yet not every immoral action requires that we shun. As noted above, we live in a fallen world. None of us is perfect. If the argument implied that we may have nothing to do with anyone who is immoral, it would consist of a reductio of the very notion of shunning. To isolate a person, to shun him, to give him the "silent treatment," is a serious thing. Nothing strikes at a person's wellbeing as person more directly than such ostracism. Furthermore, not every immoral act is an attack on the moral order. Actions which are repented and actions which are done out of weakness of will clearly violate but do not attack the moral order. Thus because of the serious nature of shunning, it is defined as a response not just to any violation of the moral order, but to attacks on the moral order itself through flagrant, willful, and persistent wrongdoing. We can also now see why failure to shun can under certain circumstances suggest complicity. But it is not that we have a duty to shun because failure to do so suggests complicity. Rather, because we have an obligation to shun in certain circumstances, when we fail to do so others may interpret our failure as tacit complicity in the willful, persistent, and flagrant immorality.

### 4

#### Neoliberal engagement with Latin America causes environmental collapse, poverty, and inequality – moral obligation to prioritize the impacts of Western hypocrisy

**Makwana 6** (Rajesh, STWR, 23rd November 06, <http://www.stwr.org/globalization/neoliberalism-and-economic-globalization.html>, ZBurdette)

Neoliberalism and Economic Globalization

The goal of neoliberal economic globalization is the removal of all barriers to commerce, and the privatization of all available resources and services. In this scenario, public life will be at the mercy of market forces, as the extracted profits benefit the few, writes Rajesh Makwana.

The thrust of international policy behind the phenomenon of economic globalization is neoliberal in nature. Being hugely profitable to corporations and the wealthy elite, neoliberal polices are propagated through the IMF, World Bank and WTO. Neoliberalism favours the free-market as the most efficient method of global resource allocation. Consequently it favours large-scale, corporate commerce and the privatization of resources.

There has been much international attention recently on neoliberalism. Its ideologies have been rejected by influential countries in Latin America and its moral basis is now widely questioned. Recent protests against the WTO, IMF and World Bank were essentially protests against the neoliberal policies that these organizations implement, particularly in low-income countries.

The neoliberal experiment has failed to combat extreme poverty, has exacerbated global inequality, and is hampering international aid and development efforts. This article presents an overview of neoliberalism and its effect on low income countries.

Introduction

After the Second World War, corporate enterprises helped to create a wealthy class in society which enjoyed excessive political influence on their government in the US and Europe. Neoliberalism surfaced as a reaction by these wealthy elites to counteract post-war policies that favoured the working class and strengthened the welfare state.

Neoliberal policies advocate market forces and commercial activity as the most efficient methods for producing and supplying goods and services. At the same time they shun the role of the state and discourage government intervention into economic, financial and even social affairs. The process of economic globalization is driven by this ideology; removing borders and barriers between nations so that market forces can drive the global economy. The policies were readily taken up by governments and still continue to pervade classical economic thought, allowing corporations and affluent countries to secure their financial advantage within the world economy.

The policies were most ardently enforced in the US and Europe in the1980s during the Regan–Thatcher–Kohl era. These leaders believed that expanding the free-market and private ownership would create greater economic efficiency and social well-being. The resulting deregulation, privatization and the removal of border restrictions provided fertile ground for corporate activity, and over the next 25 years corporations grew rapidly in size and influence. Corporations are now the most productive economic units in the world, more so than most countries. With their huge financial, economic and political leverage, they continue to further their neoliberal objectives.

There is a consensus between the financial elite, neoclassical economists and the political classes in most countries that neoliberal policies will create global prosperity. So entrenched is their position that this view determines the policies of the international agencies (IMF, World Bank and WTO), and through them dictates the functioning of the global economy. Despite reservations from within many UN agencies, neoliberal policies are accepted by most development agencies as the most likely means of reducing poverty and inequality in the poorest regions.

There is a huge discrepancy between the measurable result of economic globalization and its proposed benefits. Neoliberal policies have unarguably generated massive wealth for some people, but most crucially, they have been unable to benefit those living in extreme poverty who are most in need of financial aid. Excluding China, annual economic growth in developing countries between 1960 and 1980 was 3.2%. This dropped drastically between 1980 and 2000 to a mere 0.7 %. This second period is when neoliberalism was most prevalent in global economic policy. (Interestingly, China was not following the neoliberal model during these periods, and its economic growth per capita grew to over 8% between 1980 and 2000.)

Neoliberalism has also been unable to address growing levels of global inequality. Over the last 25 years, the income inequalities have increased dramatically, both within and between countries. Between 1980 and 1998, the income of richest 10% as share of poorest 10% became 19% more unequal; and the income of richest 1% as share of poorest 1% became 77% more unequal (again, not including China).

The shortcomings of neoliberal policy are also apparent in the well documented economic disasters suffered by countries in Latin America and South Asia in the 1990s. These countries were left with no choice but to follow the neoliberal model of privatization and deregulation, due to their financial problems and pressure from the IMF. Countries such as Venezuela, Cuba, Argentina and Bolivia have since rejected foreign corporate control and the advice of the IMF and World Bank. Instead they have favoured a redistribution of wealth, the re-nationalization of industry and have prioritized the provision of healthcare and education. They are also sharing resources such as oil and medical expertise throughout the region and with other countries around the world.

The dramatic economic and social improvement seen in these countries has not stopped them from being demonized by the US. Cuba is a well known example of this propaganda. Deemed to be a danger to ‘freedom and the American way of life’, Cuba has been subject to intense US political, economic and military pressure in order to tow the neoliberal line. Washington and the mainstream media in the US have recently embarked on a similar propaganda exercise aimed at Venezuela’s president Chavez. This over-reaction by Washington to ‘economic nationalism’ is consistent with their foreign policy objectives which have not changed significantly for the past 150 years. Securing resources and economic dominance has been and continues to be the USA’s main economic objective.

According to Maria Páez Victor:

“Since 1846 the United States has carried out no fewer than 50 military invasions and destabilizing operations involving 12 different Latin American countries. Yet, none of these countries has ever had the capacity to threaten US security in any significant way. The US intervened because of perceived threats to its economic control and expansion. For this reason it has also supported some of the region’s most vicious dictators such as Batista, Somoza, Trujillo, and Pinochet.”

As a result of corporate and US influence, the key international bodies that developing countries are forced to turn to for assistance, such as the World Bank and IMF, are major exponents of the neoliberal agenda. The WTO openly asserts its intention to improve global business opportunities; the IMF is heavily influenced by the Wall Street and private financiers, and the World Bank ensures corporations benefit from development project contracts. They all gain considerably from the neo-liberal model.

So influential are corporations at this time that many of the worst violators of human rights have even entered a Global Compact with the United Nations, the world’s foremost humanitarian body. Due to this international convergence of economic ideology, it is no coincidence that the assumptions that are key to increasing corporate welfare and growth are the same assumptions that form the thrust of mainstream global economic policy.

However, there are huge differences between the neoliberal dogma that the US and EU dictate to the world and the policies that they themselves adopt. Whilst fiercely advocating the removal of barriers to trade, investment and employment, The US economy remains one of the most protected in the world. Industrialized nations only reached their state of economic development by fiercely protecting their industries from foreign markets and investment. For economic growth to benefit developing countries, the international community must be allowed to nurture their infant industries. Instead economically dominant countries are ‘kicking away the ladder’ to achieving development by imposing an ideology that suits their own economic needs.

The US and EU also provide huge subsidies to many sectors of industry. These devastate small industries in developing countries, particularly farmers who cannot compete with the price of subsidized goods in international markets. Despite their neoliberal rhetoric, most ‘capitalist’ countries have increased their levels of state intervention over the past 25 years, and the size of their government has increased. The requirement is to ‘do as I say, not as I do’.

Given the tiny proportion of individuals that benefit from neoliberal policies, the chasm between what is good for the economy and what serves the public good is growing fast. Decisions to follow these policies are out of the hands of the public, and the national sovereignty of many developing countries continues to be violated, preventing them from prioritizing urgent national needs.

Below we examine the false assumptions of neoliberal policies and their effect on the global economy.

Economic Growth

Economic growth, as measured in GDP, is the yardstick of economic globalization which is fiercely pursued by multinationals and countries alike. It is the commercial activity of the tiny portion of multinational corporations that drives economic growth in industrialized nations. Two hundred corporations account for a third of global economic growth. Corporate trade currently accounts for over 50% of global economic growth and as much as 75% of GDP in the EU. The proportion of trade to GDP continues to grow, highlighting the belief that economic growth is the only way to prosper a country and reduce poverty.

Logically, however, a model for continual financial growth is unsustainable. Corporations have to go to extraordinary lengths in order to reflect endless growth in their accounting books. As a result, finite resources are wasted and the environment is dangerously neglected. The equivalent of two football fields of natural forest is cleared each second by profit hungry corporations.

Economic growth is also used by the World Bank and government economists to measure progress in developing countries. But, whilst economic growth clearly does have benefits, the evidence strongly suggests that these benefits do not trickle down to the 986 million people living in extreme poverty, representing 18 percent of the world population (World Bank, 2007). Nor has economic growth addressed inequality and income distribution. In addition, accurate assessments of both poverty levels and the overall benefits of economic growth have proved impossible due to the inadequacy of the statistical measures employed.

The mandate for economic growth is the perfect platform for corporations which, as a result, have grown rapidly in their economic activity, profitability and political influence. Yet this very model is also the cause of the growing inequalities seen across the globe. The privatization of resources and profits by the few at the expense of the many, and the inability of the poorest people to afford market prices, are both likely causes.

Free Trade

Free trade is the foremost demand of neoliberal globalization. In its current form, it simply translates as greater access to emerging markets for corporations and their host nations. These demands are contrary to the original assumptions of free trade as affluent countries adopt and maintain protectionist measures. Protectionism allows a nation to strengthen its industries by levying taxes and quotas on imports, thus increasing their own industrial capacity, output and revenue. Subsidies in the US and EU allow corporations to keep their prices low, effectively pushing smaller producers in developing countries out of the market and impeding development.

With this self interest driving globalization, economically powerful nations have created a global trading regime with which they can determine the terms of trade.

The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) between the US, Canada, and Mexico is an example of free-market fundamentalism that gives corporations legal rights at the expense of national sovereignty. Since its implementation it has caused job loss, undermined labour rights, privatized essential services, increased inequality and caused environmental destruction.

In Europe only 5% of EU citizens work in agriculture, generating just 1.6% of EU GDP compared to more than 50% of citizens in developing countries. However, the European Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) provides subsidies to EU farmers to the tune of £30 billion, 80% of which goes to only 20% of farmers to guarantee their viability, however inefficient this may be.

The General Agreement on Trade and Services (GATS) was agreed at the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1994. Its aim is to remove any restrictions and internal government regulations that are considered to be "barriers to trade". The agreement effectively abolishes a government’s sovereign right to regulate subsidies and provide essential national services on behalf of its citizens. The Trade Related agreement on International Property Rights (TRIPS) forces developing countries to extend property rights to seeds and plant varieties. Control over these resources and services are instead granted to corporate interests through the GATS and TRIPS framework.

These examples represent modern free trade which is clearly biased in its approach. It fosters corporate globalization at the expense of local economies, the environment, democracy and human rights. The primary beneficiaries of international trade are large, multinational corporations who fiercely lobby at all levels of national and global governance to further the free trade agenda.

Liberalization

The World Bank, IMF and WTO have been the main portals for implementing the neoliberal agenda on a global scale. Unlike the United Nations, these institutions are over-funded, continuously lobbied by corporations, and are politically and financially dominated by Washington, Wall Street, corporations and their agencies. As a result, the key governance structures of the global economy have been primed to serve the interests of this group, and market liberalization has been another of their key policies.

According to neoliberal ideology, in order for international trade to be ‘free’ all markets should be open to competition, and market forces should determine economic relationships. But the overall result of a completely open and free market is of course market dominance by corporate heavy-weights. The playing field is not even; all developing countries are at a great financial and economic disadvantage and simply cannot compete.

Liberalization, through Structural Adjustment Programs, forces poorer countries to open their markets to foreign products which largely destroys local industries. It creates dependency upon commodities which have artificially low prices as they are heavily subsidized by economically dominant nations. Financial liberalization removes barriers to currency speculation from abroad. The resulting rapid inflow and outflow of currencies is often responsible for acute financial and economic crisis in many developing countries. At the same time, foreign speculators and large financial firms make huge gains. Market liberalization poses a clear economic risk; hence the EU and US heavily protect their own markets.

A liberalized global market provides corporations with new resources to capitalize and new markets to exploit. Neoliberal dominance over global governance structures has enforced access to these markets. Under WTO agreements, a sovereign country cannot interfere with a corporation’s intentions to trade even if their operations go against domestic environmental and employment guidelines. Those governments that do stand up for their sovereign rights are frequently sued by corporations for loss of profit, and even loss of potential profit. Without this pressure they would have been able to stimulate domestic industry and self sufficiency, thereby reducing poverty. They would then be in a better position to compete in international markets.

#### Vote negative to interrogate the assumptions of the 1AC to create space for alternatives to neoliberal engagement

**Munck**, professor of Globalization and Social Exclusion, **3** (Ronaldo, Department of Sociology, Social Policy & Social Work Studies and Globalisation and Social Exclusion Unit, University of Liverpool, “Neoliberalism, necessitarianism and alternatives in Latin America: there is no alternative (TINA)?”, Third World Quarterly, Vol 24, No 3, pp 495–511, 2003, <http://www-e.uni-magdeburg.de/evans/Journal%20Library/Trade%20and%20Countries/Neoliberalism,%20necessitarianism%20and%20alternatives%20in%20Latin%20America.pdf>, ZBurdette)

Taking as its point of departure the position that there are or must be alternatives to neoliberalism, this article explores the issue in relation to some examples from Latin America. The 2001–02 virtual collapse of the economy of Argentina and the recent victory of Workers Party candidate, Lula, in Brazil highlight, in very different ways, the need for a viable alternative democratic economic strategy for Latin America. Many progressive analysts seem to be paralysed by a false ‘necessitarianism’ which grants more coherence an d solidity to the neoliberal project than it merits. Argentina puts paid to that illusion. Will the exciting experience of Porto Alegre’s ‘participatory budget’ in Brazil now be scaled up to the national level or does ‘globalisation’ block this option? Do the old questions of imperialism and dependency now come to the fore again after being left dormant under the spell of globalisation? We may not have all the answers yet but Latin America is back in the foreground of thinking and practice around alternative economic theories.

There is no alternative (TINA) was an oft-repeated expression of Margaret Thatcher’s, used to dismiss any plausible alternatives to her brand of hard-nosed neoliberalism. One imagines that her friend General Pinochet, with whom she shared tea during his enforced stay in London, would agree with her. What is more surprising is the influence the TINA philosophy has had on social science analysis of neoliberalism in Latin America since Pinochet. What I propose is a radically anti-necessitarian approach to neoliberalism, inspired by the work of Roberto Mangabeira Unger. Things are not always how they are because they have to be so. There is life beyond neoliberalism. There are alternatives taking shape all the time at all levels of society in Latin America. The so-called Washington Consensus is no longer so consensual even in Washington and there is growing recognition that globalisation requires global governance. We therefore need to return to the rise of neoliberalism and globalisation in a nonnecessitarian spirit and examine the whole horizon of possibilities that is now opening up in Latin America as elsewhere. If the virtual collapse of Argentina in 2001–02 shows that ‘actually existing’ neoliberalism simply does not work even on its own terms, the exciting but also challenging prospects now opening up in Brazil under Lula underline the urgency of developing a credible and viable alternative to its policies.

### 5

#### Chavez’s death means Pink tide at a cross road

\*Chavez was critical to petro diplomacy which funded the pink tide, but maduro doesn’t have the same leverage that he did

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The death of Chávez and the succession of Lula by Dilma Rousseff in Brazil leaves a big vacuum in the Latin American left. Even if, as likely as it is, Nicolás Maduro wins the presidency in Venezuela in April, he is no Chávez and will not have the resources that Chávez had to promote his petro-diplomacy. Three years into her first term in office, Rousseff remains highly popular in Brazil and will be a strong candidate for re-election in 2014. But she does not have the same presence as Lula in Latin America and her foreign policy priorities are rather different than those of her political mentor. Moreover, Venezuela is in a dire economic situation and Brazil’s economic growth has been lacklustre over the past two years.¶ The death of Chávez and the absence of Lula from frontline regional politics do not mean that the Pink Tide is necessarily coming to an end. But together with the retake of economic growth and the election of Peña Nieto in Mexico, the strong economic performance of Colombia, Peru and Chile and the emergence of the Alianza Pacifico as an alternative to Mercosur, suggest the unfolding of a much more complex and diverse process of regional change than encapsulated by the narrative of the rise of the left.

The plan kills US resolve and funds the pink tide

\*embargo is key to resolve

Removing it will not solve relations and it will give money to legitimize the Cuban regime and allow them to partner with other socialist or anti-american countries

Brookes ‘9 (Peter – Heritage council, Senior Fellow, Brookes is serving his third term as a congressionally appointed member of the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission. He previously served in the administration of President George W. Bush as deputy assistant secretary of defense for Asian and Pacific affairs. In this post, he was responsible for U.S. defense policy for 38 countries and five bilateral defense alliances in Asia, Brookes was a professional staff member with the House International Relations Committee. He also served with the CIA and the State Department at the United Nations. In the private sector, he worked in the defense and intelligence industries.¶ A decorated Navy veteran, Brookes served on active duty in Latin America, Asia and the Middle East in aviation and intelligence billets, Brookes, now a retired Navy commander, served as a reservist with the National Security Agency, Defense Intelligence Agency, Naval Intelligence, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Office of the Vice President, Brookes is pursuing a doctorate at Georgetown University. He is a graduate of the U.S. Naval Academy (B.S.); the Defense Language Institute (Russian); the Naval War College; and the Johns Hopkins University (M.A.). He also has taught at the National Defense University and studied German and Polish, National Security Affairs, “Keep the Embargo, O” – April 16 – http://www.heritage.org/research/commentary/2009/04/keep-the-embargo-o)

Of course, the big empanada is the US economic embargo against Cuba, in place since 1962, which undoubtedly is the thing Havana most wants done away with -- without any concessions on Cuba's part, of course.¶ Lifting the embargo won't normalize relations, but instead legitimize -- and wave the white flag to -- Fidel's 50-year fight against the Yanquis, further lionizing the dictator and encouraging the Latin American Left.¶ Because the economy is nationalized, trade will pour plenty of cash into the Cuban national coffers -- allowing Havana to suppress dissent at home and bolster its communist agenda abroad.¶ The last thing we should do is to fill the pockets of a regime that'll use those profits to keep a jackboot on the neck of the Cuban people. The political and human-rights situation in Cuba is grim enough already.¶ The police state controls the lives of 11 million Cubans in what has become an island prison. The people enjoy none of the basic civil liberties -- no freedom of speech, press, assembly or association.¶ Security types monitor foreign journalists, restrict Internet access and foreign news and censor the domestic media. The regime holds more than 200 political dissidents in jails that rats won't live in.¶ We also don't need a pumped-up Cuba that could become a serious menace to US interests in Latin America, the Caribbean -- or beyond. (The likes of China, Russia and Iran might also look to partner with a revitalized Cuba.)¶ With an influx of resources, the Cuban regime would surely team up with the rulers of nations like Venezuela, Nicaragua and Bolivia to advance socialism and anti-Americanism in the Western Hemisphere.¶ The embargo has stifled Havana's ambitions ever since the Castros lost their Soviet sponsorship in the early 1990s. Anyone noticed the lack of trouble Cuba has caused internationally since then? Contrast that with the 1980s some time.¶ Regrettably, 110 years after independence from Spain (courtesy of Uncle Sam), Cuba still isn't free. Instead of utopia, it has become a dystopia at the hands of the Castro brothers.¶ The US embargo remains a matter of principle -- and an appropriate response to Cuba's brutal repression of its people. Giving in to evil only begets more of it. Haven't we learned that yet?¶ Until we see progress in loosing the Cuban people from the yoke of the communist regime, we should hold firm onto the leverage the embargo provides.

#### Castro-led pink tide causes US-Russia military confrontations.

\*with petro power they will pay Russia to guarantee their security which brings the US and Russia into confrontation

Walser ‘8 (Ray Walser, Senior Policy Analyst for Latin America at the Heritage Foundation – Chávez, Venezuela, and Russia: A New Cuban Missile Crisis? – WebMemo #2064 -- September 15th http://www.heritage.org/Research/LatinAmerica/wm2064.cfm)

Like his iconic mentor, Fidel Castro, Chávez thrives on mounting tensions and confrontation with the U.S. It is through confrontation that he attains political identity and larger-than-merited international standing. Like Fidel Castro, Chávez aspires to build and lead an anti-U.S., anti-Western coalition. Unlike Castro, however, Chávez is in possession of significant petroleum power and has varied sources of international support. There is danger that Chávez, like Castro, will invite Russia to serve as a guarantor of Venezuela's security and subsequently draw Russia, either willingly or unwillingly, into additional confrontations with the U.S. At present, Venezuela represents the single most difficult diplomatic and security challenge facing the U.S. in the immediate future. How the U.S. chooses to deal with this challenge will say much about the direction the next Administration will take as it shapes its policy toward America's neighbors in the hemisphere.

#### Small US-Russia conflicts can escalate or cause nuclear miscalc

\*US and Russia tensions are unpredictable which increases the risk of miscalc and the US or Russia would launch on warning causing nuclear war

Gottemoeller ‘8 (Rose Gottemoeller was sworn in as the United States Department of State's Assistant Secretary for Arms Control, Verification, and Compliance on April 6, 2009. She was the chief negotiator of the follow on for the Strategic Arms Reductions Treaty otherwise known as the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) with the Russian Federation. Since 2000, she had been with the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace – “U.S.-Russia Cooperation on Iran: Aftermath of the Summer War in Georgia,” Carnegie Moscow Center, August- July 2008. PLESE NOTE – THIS CARD APPEARS IN A HOST OF CURRENT OPEN-SOURCE DEBATE DOCS AND THE URL THAT APPEARS ON THOSE CARDS MISDIRECTS TO A DIFFERENT Gottemoeller ARTICLE. The website below redirects to her October article: http://www.scribd.com/doc/13031239/RussianAmerican-Security-Relations-After-Georgia)

No holds barred, no rules—the United States and Russia may be heading to a confrontation more unpredictable and dangerous than any we have seen since the Cuban missile crisis. A confrontation today would be different—the two countries are in constant and intense communication, unlike the situation in 1962—but if those exchanges provoke mutual anger and recrimination, they have the potential to spark a dangerous crisis. This effect is especially dangerous because both countries are in presidential transitions. Russia, whose government is riven by corruption, internal competition, and disorder, is attempting an unprecedented tandem leadership arrangement. The United States is in the midst of its quadrennial election season, with both political parties competing to show that their man is more skilled and tough on national security issues than his opponent. The unpredictability of these two transitions stokes the potential for misunderstanding and descent into crisis. We must avoid such a crisis, because we have never succeeded in escaping the nuclear existential threat that we each pose to the other. We never even came close to transforming the U.S.–Russian relationship into one that is closer to that which the United States has with the United Kingdom or France. What if Russia had refused to confirm or deny that no nuclear weapons were on the bombers it flew to Venezuela? Our nuclear weapons are still faced off to launch on warning of an attack, and in a no-holds-barred confrontation between us, we could come close to nuclear catastrophe before we knew it.

### 6

#### Increase in US influence in Latin America directly trades off with Chinese influence

Ellis 12

Dr. R. Evan Ellis is a professor of national security studies, modeling, gaming, and simulation with the Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies, with a research focus on Latin America’s relationships with external actors, including China, Russia, and Iran. holds a Ph.D. in political science with a specialization in comparative politics. May 2012- The Inter-American Dialogue - “The United States, ¶ Latin America and China: ¶ A “Triangular Relationship”?” http://www.thedialogue.org/PublicationFiles/IAD8661\_China\_Triangular0424v2e-may.pdf

At the political level, US engagement with Latin American ¶ countries has impacted the ability of the PRC to develop ¶ military and other ties in the region. Although journalistic ¶ and academic accounts often suggest that the 19th century ¶ Monroe Doctrine continues to be pursued by contemporary ¶ US policymakers, with a presumed desire to “keep China out” ¶ of the region,26 official US policy has repeatedly met Chinese ¶ initiatives in the hemisphere with a cautiously welcoming tone.27 Nonetheless, Latin America’s own leadership has ¶ responded to Chinese initiatives with a view of how engagement with China could damage its relationship with the United ¶ States. Colombia’s close relationship with the United States, for ¶ example, made the military leadership of the country reluctant ¶ to procure major military items from the PRC.28¶ The same logic has also applied to countries such as ¶ Venezuela, Ecuador and Bolivia, for whom embracing the ¶ PRC politically and economically signaled displeasure with ¶ the United States. The degree to which a “bad” relationship ¶ with the United States has propelled a “positive” relationship with China has increasingly gone beyond symbolism. The desire of Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez to ¶ diversify away from Venezuelan dependence on the United ¶ States as the nation’s primary oil export market, for example, opened the door for massive loan-backed Chinese ¶ construction projects, the purchase of Chinese commercial goods and greatly expanded participation by Chinese ¶ oil companies.29 US refusal to sell F-16 fighter aircraft and ¶ components to Venezuela in 2006 prompted Venezuela to ¶ engage with China, and other countries, to procure military ¶ hardware. Similarly, Bolivia purchased Chinese K-8s after ¶ the United States blocked it from acquiring a comparable ¶ aircraft from the Czech Republic.30

#### Chinese influence is key to Chinese growth

Armony 12(Ariel Armony is Weeks Professor in Latin American Studies, Professor of International Studies and Director of the Center for Latin American Studies (CLAS) at the University of Miami. Spring 2012 “What Is China to Latin America”, http://lacc.fiu.edu/hemisphere/hemisphere\_vol\_21.pdf nkj) Note—Please excuse the capitalization issues—the article wouldn’t copy right

What is China to Latin America? Among other things, China represents a market, a partner and a competitor. China’s need for primary commodities to feed its manufacturing growth and unprecedented urbanization entails a vast demand for everything from soybeans to copper as well as higher prices for such commodities in the international market. Latin American exports to China have skyrocketed in response to this demand in the last decade. High commodity prices and ample revenues are helping to sustain economic growth and strengthen fiscal accounts in several countries. As mentioned above, however, Chinese demand mainly benefits commodity producers in South American countries such as Brazil, Chile, Argentina and Peru. The smaller countries of Central America and the Caribbean cannot benefit from trade with China unless they find a niche market (such as Costa Rican coffee). The reliance on primary commodities also entails the risk of resource dependency for exporting nations. This pattern of trade has clear limitations for long-term development. Among other limitations, it is not a big job creator and it does not contribute by itself (that is, without state intervention) to alleviate poverty and inequality. In brief, China is a market for Latin America, and one with great potential, but a shift from “fairy tale” to realism will have to occur if the region wants sustained benefits in the long run. Is China a partner for Latin America? China has the potential to collaborate with Latin American countries in a number of ways: in the realms of technology, infrastructure, poverty reduction and educational programs; as a source of foreign investment and aid; and as an ally on the diplomatic front. as Juan Gabriel tokatlian has argued, for example, China’s model of international diplomacy entails some attractive notions for Latin America: multilateral politics, noninterference in domestic affairs, sovereign integrity, horizontal collaboration between “equals” and pragmatism. a concrete potential for partnership exists in this realm. China conceives of its national security as a three-pronged approach: “national sovereignty” (territorial integrity and national reunification), “comprehensive security” (preservation of its political and economic system and cultural heritage), and “security in the global system” (terms of insertion in the international system). to guarantee terms of insertion that could satisfy the Chinese leadership’s demand for “equality, fairness, and justice,”

#### That solves global economic collapse and nuclear lashout

Buzan and Foot 04 **–** professor of International Relations at the London School of Economics and Political Science; professor of International Relations at St. Anthony College, (Barry and Rosemary, “Does China Matter? A Reassessment: Essays in Memory of Gerald Segal”, ed., Questia, p. 145-147, USC Libraries)//JK

China, East Asia and the world The underlying argument in this section is that there is a strong link between the global standing of a major power and the way that power relates to the other states in its home region. As a general rule, the status of great power, and more so superpower, requires not only that the state concerned be able and willing to project its political influence beyond its immediate region, but that it also be able in some sense to manage, and perhaps lead, its region (Buzan and Wæver, 2003). The U.S. clearly does this in North America, and more arguably for the Western hemisphere as a whole, and the EU does it in Europe. The Soviet Union did it from 1945 to 1989, and the possible inability of Russia to do it (and its desperation to do so) explain the current question marks around its status. India's failure to do it is a big part of what denies it the great-power recognition it craves. During the Cold War, and up to a point still, Japan could exploit its political geography to detach itself from much of Asian politics, and float free as a kind of economic great power. China does not have that kind of geopolitical option. Like Russia and India, it cannot escape regional politics. China's global standing thus depends crucially on what kind of relationship it has with its neighbours. If China is able to reassert some form of hegemony over twenty-first century Asia - getting most or all of its neighbours to bandwagon with it - then its global standing will be hugely enhanced. But if China inspires fear in its neighbours - causing them to balance against it - then like India, and possibly Russia, it will be locked into its region, and its global standing will be diminished. Since the U.S. is strongly present in Asia, its influence also plays into this equation. Indeed, if China is at odds with its neighbours then its position will be worse than that of Russia and India. In their immediate regions, those two have only to deal with powers much smaller than themselves. In China's region there are several very substantial powers whose antagonism would be a real burden. The importance of regional relations for a major power's global standing is easily shown by two extreme scenarios for China's future. In the first, China's development provides it with the strength and the identity to become the central hub of Asia, in the process largely displacing the U.S.. It projects an acceptable political and economic image, and its neighbours bandwagon with it out of some combination of fear, prudence, admiration and hope for economic advantage. Its economy becomes the regional locomotive, and in political and military terms it is acknowledged as primus inter pares by Japan, Korea and the ASEAN states. Japan takes up a similar subordinate relationship with China to that it now has with the U.S., and China is able to use the regional institutions created by ASEAN rather as the U.S. uses the Organization of American States. If the other Asian states fear to antagonize China, and don't balance against it, then China is both free to play a larger global role, and is insulated against pressure from the West. And if China succeeds in positioning itself at the centre of an Asian economy, then it can claim 'locomotive' status along with the U.S. and the EU in the global economy. In the second scenario, China inspires fear in its neighbours. Japan's alliance with the U.S. deepens, and India, Southeast Asia, Japan and possibly Russia coordinate their defences against China, probably with U.S. support. Under the first set of conditions, China acquires a stable regional base which gives it both the status and the capability to play seriously on the global political stage. Under the second set of conditions, China may still be the biggest power in East Asia, but its ability to play on the global stage would be seriously curtailed. The task for this section is thus to examine the social and material forces in play and ask how they might support or block a move in either of these directions. Is it likely that China will acquire hegemony in East Asia, or is its rise to power more likely to produce U.S.-backed regional balancing against it? I will examine the factors playing into this question on three levels: China's capabilities and the trajectory of its internal development; China's relations with its Asian neighbours; and its relationships with the U.S. and the other great powers. China's capabilities and the trajectory of its internal development Debates about China's capability and prospects for development can be placed within a matrix formed by two variables: • Does China get stronger (because its economic development continues successfully) or weaker (because its development runs into obstacles, or triggers socio-political instability)? • Does China become a malign, aggressive, threatening force in international society (because it becomes hypernationalist or fascist), or does it become more benign and cooperative (because economic development brings internal democratization and liberalization)? If China's development falters and it becomes weak, then it will neither dominate its region nor project itself on to the global stage. Whether it is then politically benign or malign will be a much less pressing issue in terms of how others respond to it in the traditional politico-military security domain. What could happen in this scenario is that a breakdown in the socio-political order, perhaps triggered by economic or environmental troubles, might well trigger large-scale migrations, political fragmentations, or wider economic crises that would pose serious threats to China's neighbours. A major political collapse in China could also pose threats at the global level, via the scenario of a failed nuclear weapon state. But, if China becomes strong, then the malign or benign question matters a great deal. The benign and malign options could be alternative paths, or could occur in sequence, with a malign phase giving way to a benign one, as happened with Germany and Japan during their comparable phases of industrialization. The likelihood of just such a sequence was what underpinned Gerry's concern to promote constrainment.

#### Near term Latin American engagement ensures TPP – causes Chinese economic containment – a credible signal of engagement from Obama is key to negotiations

Padgett 5/13/13 (Padgett is a Miami-based journalist and TIME contributor “The Obama Administration Looks to Latin America After Years of Neglect,” http://world.time.com/2013/05/13/has-washington-finally-discovered-latin-america/)

So why this sudden spate of south-of-the-border schmoozing? Even Biden calls it “the most active stretch of high-level engagement on Latin America in a long, long time.” Maybe the U.S. feels it can show its face in the region again a year after a posse of Secret Service agents was caught partying with prostitutes in Cartagena, Colombia, on the eve of the Summit of the Americas. But the serious explanation is economics: after a decade of boom in Latin America, the Administration has finally figured out that many of the region’s economies are strong enough global players now to be useful to the U.S. as bloc partners in its bid to stay ahead of China’s burgeoning trade and financial power. By incorporating dynamos like Chile, Peru and Mexico (countries with whom the U.S. already has free-trade agreements) into major new free-trade initiatives like the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), Washington hopes to flex more muscle when it engages formidable regions like Asia. On the one hand, this development ought to make Latin America’s day. For once the region can feel as though Washington is approaching it from a standpoint of pragmatism instead of paternalism — “not out of geopolitical security fears or some sense of First World noblesse oblige,” says Christopher Sabatini, senior director of policy at the Americas Society and Council of the Americas in New York City, “but out of a realistic sense that it needs closer ties to these Latin American markets.” Trade between the U.S. and Latin America, in fact, is hitting record highs: $843 billion in goods alone last year, a 6% increase over 2011. Latin America purchases 25% of U.S. exports; Mexico alone buys 75% more from the U.S. than China does. The U.S., meanwhile, has inked free-trade pacts with more than a third of the hemisphere’s nations. Analysts now see the U.S. waking up to the fact that it can leverage its links with other hemispheric markets to fashion what Sabatini calls “a stronger hinge to help it project itself more effectively, especially to the Pacific and Asia.” As Ed Gerwin, senior fellow for trade-and-economic policy at the Third Way think tank in Washington, D.C., pointed out recently for GE’s Ideas Lab, it makes Economics 101 sense for the U.S. Under NAFTA, for example, “Exports from Canada and Mexico often contain an extraordinarily high level of ‘embedded’ U.S. content,” Gerwin writes. “Because of this significant integration, the U.S. often wins when Canada and Mexico succeed in global markets.” That’s a big reason the U.S. brought those next-door neighbors into TPP negotiations last year — and although it doesn’t share that degree of integration with other countries in the Americas, their sheer proximity as well as growing economic clout are an impetus for, as Biden puts it, greater high-level engagement than Washington usually accords the region. On the other hand, Latin America can also be excused if it’s a little irked — if it’s asking the U.S., Why did you wait so long to make this outreach, if you really are making a genuine outreach? Washington feels more urgency to look south at the moment largely because of China’s increasing incursion into the hemisphere: annual China–Latin America trade exceeds $200 billion today compared with less than $10 billion in 2000. U.S.–Latin America trade may be robust. But this month Sabatini’s publication, Americas Quarterly, lays out striking evidence of U.S. decline: in 1995, for example, the U.S. sent Brazil, Latin America’s largest economy and now the world’s sixth largest, more than a fifth of that country’s imports; by 2011 it was 15%, the same share sent from China. Ditto with regard to Brazil’s exports: in 1995 the U.S. bought 21%, but just 10% in 2011, while for China it was 17%. China, as a result, surpassed the U.S. as Brazil’s top trading partner in 2009. What’s more, business with the Americas as a share of total U.S. trade has actually dropped over the past decade. The investment tally is even more striking: in 1995, the U.S. accounted for 37% of Brazil’s foreign direct investment vs. 10% in 2011 — less than China’s. Granted, it’s good for Latin America to be less dependent on the U.S. But it’s hardly unreasonable to conclude that Washington wouldn’t be facing this China syndrome in its own hemisphere if it had simply taken “high-level engagement on Latin America” more seriously a decade or more ago. Or even four years ago, when Obama took office pledging a more benign U.S. foreign policy toward the region and then used that, say critics, as an excuse for benign neglect. Obama’s aides argue that distractions like the 2009 Honduras coup and the relentless anti-Yanqui noise from Venezuela’s now deceased President Hugo Chávez, not to mention U.S. wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, made more substantive dealings harder in his first term — and that factors like the Latin American left’s current weakness (including last month’s slim election victory for Chávez’s handpicked successor, Nicolás Maduro) make it easier in his second. If Obama really has embarked on a more attentive Latin America strategy (a wait-and-see approach is best at this point), “I think it could be one of the more interesting things the U.S. has done post–Cold War,” says Sabatini. Better late than never.

#### That ensures China containment

Barfield 1/10 (James, American Enterprise Institute, East Asia Forum, January 10, 2013, “Crunch time for the TPP,” <http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2013/01/10/crunch-time-for-the-tpp/>, alp)

During President Obama’s recent trip to Asia, TPP nations set a deadline of October 2013 to conclude the negotiations. TPP members have blown past a previous deadline of November 2011: should they fail again at the end of 2013 there is the real danger that the talks will unravel, and East Asian nations will turn to alternatives, pushed strongly by China. On 18 November, as President Obama embarked on the highly symbolic trip to Asia, his top security and economic adviser, Thomas Donilon, asserted that the TPP agreement is ‘the most significant negotiation currently underway in the international trading system’. It is also the central lynchpin of the Obama administration’s much touted diplomatic and security ‘pivot’ to Asia. Thus, should the negotiations falter or fail, the result would be not only a severe economic setback, but also a dramatic symbolic defeat for US leadership in the region. Positively, in an era in which the United States is deeply divided over globalisation and free trade initiatives, the TPP enjoys unusual bipartisan support. Launched under the Bush administration, the agreement has been taken up as a signature accomplishment for President Obama’s second term. During the 2012 presidential campaign, however, Republican Party candidate Mitt Romney also voiced strong support for the pact. Since the election, Texan Republican Kevin Brady, who heads the all-important House trade subcommittee, has urged the president to ‘go big’ on trade during his second term, and complete the TPP in 2013. Just what is the TPP and why is it so significant? The current negotiations grew out of a four-nation agreement concluded in 2006 by Chile, New Zealand, Brunei and Singapore. Subsequently, Australia, Peru, Vietnam and the United States signed on, followed in 2010 by Malaysia, and most recently by Mexico and Canada. Detailed negotiations began in early 2010, and since then there have been 15 formal sessions. The ultimate goal of the TPP is to include all of the nations in the APEC forum. At the present time, should the 11-nation negotiation be successful, the TPP would encompass a free trade area covering some 658 million people, and almost US$21 trillion in economic activity. If South Korea and Japan join the negotiations, as many expect in 2013–14, the free market territory would expand to a combined GDP of US$26 trillion, constituting 30 per cent of world exports. The TPP has been called the first ‘21st-Century Agreement’. If successful, it will put in place international trade rules to lower or eliminate behind-the-border domestic barriers to foreign competition. Among the 29 chapters under negotiation will be rules to open government procurement contracts to foreign competitors; rules to liberalise service sectors, such as telecommunications, banking and accounting; non-discriminatory health and safety regulations; fair competition with state-owned enterprises; and a level playing field for foreign investment. Despite the emphasis on 21st-century regulatory reform, there are also longstanding 20th-century trade issues that will prove difficult to resolve. For the United States, the greatest challenges stem from sugar, dairy and cotton protection and subsidies; textile and so-called rules of origin that hamper clothing supply chains; and, finally, union demands for interference with the labour laws of TPP trading partners. In the end, the key to success will come down to trade-offs between 21st-century liberalisation and old-fashioned 20th-century protectionism. The urgency to successfully conclude TPP negotiations is heightened by the appearance of an alternative path for Asian regionalism that does not include the United States. At the November 2012 East Asia Summit, ASEAN leaders, as well as Australia, China, India, Japan, New Zealand and South Korea, formally announced that they would begin negotiations in 2013 for a Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), with the goal of concluding the pact by 2015. Much of the impetus for this launch came from China, which has long pressed for an exclusive, intra-Asian regional economic architecture. Given the diversity of the membership (including still-closed economies, such as India and Indonesia, and less-developed economies, such as Laos and Cambodia) and an uncertain timetable, RCEP is not an immediate challenge to the TPP. But should the US-led pact dissolve into contentious, even intractable, conflicts that defy resolution, China’s preferred option of the RCEP will provide a hard-to-resist alternative. Thus, much is riding on the ability of the Obama administration to advance TPP liberalisation goals, while crafting compromises that are acceptable both to other TPP partners and to the US Congress and business community.

#### That causes miscalc and nuclear war

Gross 2012 (Donald Gross, a Pacific Forum CSIS Senior Associate, is a former White House and State Department official whose new book, The China Fallacy: How the U.S. Can Benefit from China’s Rise and Avoid Another Cold War, was published in October by Bloomsbury.)

Now is the time to rethink America’s policy toward China. The United States can benefit economically from China’s rise, strengthen Chinese advocates of human rights and democracy, and avoid a new Cold War. We urgently need a national debate about U.S.–China policy to prevent doing permanent damage to American interests in Asia. Fortunately, this is a propitious period to have that debate. In the United States, President Barack Obama will shortly embark on his second term in office, so will be able to guide American foreign policy without the ever-present political pressures of a re-election campaign. In China, a new generation of leaders are coming to power with a mandate to address the country’s daunting domestic challenges—including corruption and cronyism within the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), environmental degradation, frequent “mass incidents” of social unrest, inflation, and glaring social inequalities. The leaders who take office in March—including President Xi Jinping and Premier Li Keqiang—know firsthand some of the worst excesses of the CCP. They were victims of Mao’s Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, when an entire generation of young people—many from prominent families—were “sent down” to rural areas to perform backbreaking manual labor for years. Having experienced and survived the widespread human rights abuses that occurred between 1966 and 1976, the year of Mao’s death, China’s new leadership will be more receptive to calls for political reform from the country’s middle class and liberal intellectuals, who are highly critical of increasing corruption and cronyism within the CCCP. China’s new leaders will welcome overtures from the United States that aim to assist China in meeting its challenges. But harsh American trade measures or heightened military pressure will likely be met with a tough response, as the new leaders seek to prove their mettle and their capability to defend China’s national interests. Increased tensions with China could have dire consequences. They could lead to a military conflict over Taiwan’s political status, over whether Japan or China holds sovereignty to a group of uninhabitable islands and offshore energy resources in the East China Sea or over the ownership of small islands and energy resources in the South China Sea. In a worst case scenario, those conflicts could escalate, by accident or by design, to a nuclear exchange. It is essential to remember that China’s rise strengthens America’s economy and future prosperity. Today, China is the largest growth market in the world for U.S. goods and services. Trade with China, America’s third-largest export market and the leading market for U.S. agricultural products, has helped America’s recovery from the global financial crisis.

### 7

#### Text: The United States federal government should substantially reduce its tariffs and subsidies that protect the US agricultural industry, should open its market to Brazilian commodities, especially soy and sugar, should yield on issues stalling the Free Trade Agreement of the Americas, should scale back its military operations in Colombia, and should not build military bases in Colombia.

#### Solves multilat – that’s the 1AC Grandin ev.

### 1NC Multilat

#### Domestic politics blocks multilat/sopo

Grandin 10 – teaches history at New York University and is a member of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences (Greg, “Empire's Senescence: U.S. Policy in Latin America,” *New Labor Forum*, 19:1, Winter 2010, pg. 14-23)//SJF

It’s not going to happen. Efforts to implement any one of the above policy changes would be blocked by powerful domestic interests. Take biofuels. The idea to liberalize the U.S. agricultural market—and have the rhetoric of free trade somewhat match the reality—is recommended by all mainstream think tanks, including the Council on Foreign Relations and the Brookings Institution, as an important step to win back Brazil. Obama recognizes the importance of Brazil, having nominated George W. Bush’s outgoing assistant secretary of state for Latin America, Thomas Shannon—respected in establishment circles as, according to the journal Foreign Policy, “the most talented and successful individual” to serve as Washington’s envoy to Latin America “in at least two decades”—as its ambassador. Yet Shannon’s confirmation had been threatened by Senator Chuck Grassley, representing the agro-industry state of Iowa, who objected to the then-nominee’s comment during his confirma- tion hearings that removing a fifty-four-cent per gallon tariff on imported ethanol would be good for U.S. foreign policy. The White House immediately declared that it had no plans to change tariff policy, and Grassley allowed the confirmation to proceed.5 The White House’s quick buckling probably has to do with its fruitless attempt to win over Grassley for health care reform, a further indicator of how foreign policy is held hostage by domestic politics. Similar obstacles stand in the way of other foreign policy reforms. The Cuban lobby, along with the broader conservative Right, prevents a normalization of relations with Havana. Fear of the National Rifle Association halts a renewal of the assault weapons ban. As to the “War on Drugs,” the Democratic Party is deeply committed to “Plan Colombia,” the centerpiece of that war. It is, after all, a legacy of Bill Clinton’s foreign policy, and much of the $6 billion spent to fight it thus far goes directly into the coffers of corporate sponsors of the Democratic Party like Connecticut’s United Technologies and other northeastern defense contractors (it was Bill Clinton who in 1997, acting on behalf of Lockheed Martin, lifted a twenty-year ban on high-tech weapons sales to Latin America, kicking off an arms build-up, in which Colombia, Chile, and Brazil have taken the lead).6 As to immigration reform—also recom- mended by influential establishment groups to improve U.S. standing in Latin America— Obama, in Mexico, said it would have to wait until next year. He has a near-filibuster-proof majority in the Senate and a large majority in the House, yet he says there aren’t enough votes and “there is not, by any means, con- sensus across the table.”7 Obama could easily assemble a majority coalition on this issue—comprised of business interests who want cheap labor, Hispanics, progressives, social justice Catholics, and members of the labor movement (who long ago signaled their support for immigration reform)—yet fear of a backlash fueled by a contracting economy has led him to back- burner the issue. The same conditions that make Latin America the best venue in which to modernize U.S. diplomacy—namely that there is no immediate threat emerging from the region, no equivalent of North Korea or Iran on the verge of acquiring a nuclear bomb, no insurgency bogging down U.S. troops as in Afghanistan, and no conflict threatening access to vital resources (Washington’s main antagonist in the region, Venezuela, continues to sell most of its oil to the U.S.)—also mean that there are no real incentives for Obama’s fledgling foreign policy coalition to expend political capital on trying to improve policy there. Analysts of the American empire—from Charles A. Beard in the 1930s to William Appleman Williams in the 1960s and 1970s— have emphasized the U.S.’s unique ability to subsume competing economic, ideological, and sectional interests into a flexible and vital diplomacy in defense of a general “national interest,” which has led America to unprec- edented global power.8 Yet now—confronted with a sustained economic contraction, the fallout from a disastrous overleveraging of military power in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the emergence of a post-Cold War, post-neoliberal world with multiple power centers—expansion has given way to involution. The U.S. political system seems to be literally devouring itself from within, paralyzing the ability of foreign policymakers to adjust to a rapidly changing world. Unable to leverage its soft, smart power even in its own hemisphere, Washington is ever more dependent on the military and corporate mercenary forces that have transformed Colombia into a citadel of U.S. hard power in the Andes. As a candidate, Obama—referring to Bush’s decision to invade Iraq—said he wasn’t opposed to all wars, just stupid ones. Washington’s “War on Drugs” in Latin America is the stupid- est war one can imagine. As the centerpiece of that war, “Plan Colombia”—a program, established by Bill Clinton and extended by George W. Bush and Barack Obama, that has provided Colombia with billions of dollars of aid, mostly for the military’s counternarcotic and counterinsurgent operations—has served to entrench paramilitary power, enrich pri- vate contractors (such as the Virginia-based DynCorp), and turn more than four million Colombians into refugees.9 It has also fore- closed the possibility of a negotiated, regionally brokered solution to the crisis and inflamed a conflict that has already once spilled beyond national borders—in March 2008, Colombian troops launched a military raid into Ecuador to assassinate members of the insurgent Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia. And, while it has not lessened narcotics exports to the United States, the drug war has spread the violence associated with the illegal narcotics trade up through Central America and into Mexico, accounting for the staggeringly high number of homicides in the region. Much like the wars in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan, Washington’s militarization of the drug problem in Latin America has worsened what it sought to solve, thus pro- viding an excuse for even more militarism. Thus Southcom—which runs the Department of Defense’s South American operations—is expanding its presence in Colombia, recently brokering a deal that will give the U.S. military access to at least seven bases, running from the Caribbean to the Andes. Colombia and the U.S. insist that this expansion is directed to ensure Colombia’s internal security; but Brazil’s military is concerned that the bases give the U.S. the ability to project its power deep into South America. Colombia serves as the anchor of a broader strategic shift on the part of the U.S., one that reflects its position as a declining hegemon. Throughout much of the twentieth century, the U.S.— confident of its ascension as a world power—treated Latin America largely as a unified region, working through inter-American organizations set up via the Good Neighbor Policy and during World War II, such as the OAS and the Rio Pact (a mutual defense treaty that became the model for NATO). When one or another country tried to break out of its dependent relationship with the U.S.—i.e., Cuba in the 1960s, Chile in the early 1970s, or Nicaragua in the 1980s—the U.S. took independent, often covert steps either to isolate it or bring it back into the fold. Yet throughout the Cold War (and for about a decade following the Cold War), Washington continued to view the region as a single administrative zone. But today, the U.S. is increasingly relying on a strategy of divide and rule. Washington’s relationship with Colombia is the centerpiece of this new approach, and the Andean country functions as something like Latin America’s Israel: a heavily militarized U.S. ally that allows Washington to project its power into a hostile region. Like Israel, its preemptive, unilateral actions are encouraged by Washington in the name of national security. Colombia’s reckless raid into Ecuador in 2008—denounced by every South American country—was endorsed not just by George W. Bush but by then- U.S. presidential candidates Hillary Clinton, John McCain, and Barack Obama. Like Israel, Colombia’s security forces serve as a model and a resource for wars elsewhere. Admiral Mike Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has commented that “many of us from all over the world can learn from what has happened with respect to the very successful develop- ments of ‘Plan Colombia,’” and suggested that it be franchised “specifically to Afghanistan.”10 Some of private military contractor Xe’s—née Blackwater—best recruits are retired Colombian soldiers, trained for Middle East operations on Colombian military bases; before taking control of the murderous Iraq Special Operations Forces, U.S. brigadier gen- eral Simeon Trombitas served in Colombia.11 Recently, Colombian paramilitaries have been recruited as mercenaries by Honduran plantation owners, to protect their property in the wake of the crisis unleashed by the coup.12 Colombia also boasts one of the most sophisticated intelligence apparatuses in its region—bolstered by massive infusions of U.S. dollars—capable of carrying out not just widespread surveillance but covert operations, including attempts to destabilize neighboring Venezuela.13 On the diplomatic circuit, an embassy posting in Colombia has become a way station toward a more prominent role in the Great Game. Current ambassadors to Afghanistan and Pakistan—William Wood and Anne Paterson, respectively—previously served as Bush’s envoys to Colombia. Like Israel, Colombia inspires many who see it as an exemplar of how to balance democracy—a place that offers relatively free elections, with three independent (at least in principle) branches of government—and security. “Colombia is what Iraq should eventually look like, in our best dreams,” writes influen- tial Atlantic contributor Robert Kaplan. “Colombian President Alvaro Uribe has fought—and is winning—a counterinsurgency war even as he has liberalized the economy, strengthened institutions, and improved human rights.”14 The Council on Foreign Relations has put aside its earlier strong criticism of “Plan Colombia” and now hails it as a success for having established a state presence in “many regions previously con- trolled by illegal armed groups, reestablishing elected governments, building and rebuilding public infrastructure, and reaffirming the rule of law.” The Council recommends a similar solution for violence-plagued Mexico and Central America.15 Throughout Latin America, a resurgent Right looks to Colombia for inspira- tion and Uribe as its standard bearer, a backstop against Hugo Chávez-style populism. As Forrest Hylton has argued, Uribe’s suc- cess at consolidating power rests on an alliance between death-squad paramilitaries—who have used “Plan Colombia” as a cover to execute an enormous land grab and to establish their rule in the countryside—and drug traffickers who have decided to stop fighting the state and become part of it. Medellín, the showcase city of Latin America’s New Right, has the eighth highest murder rate in the world; Uribe himself has deep ties to both paramilitaries and drug cartels.16 Colombia also serves as an anchor to a new geopolitics, an attempt by Washington to build a “security corridor” running from Mexico, through Central America, and into Colombia. Under the auspices of such programs as the Merida Initiative, “Plan Puebla-Panama,” and the Security and Prosperity Partnership, the objective is to integrate the region’s trans- portation and communications infrastructure, energy production and distribution network, and, most importantly, its military capacities. Call it top-down, transnational state forma- tion, an attempt to coordinate the region’s intelligence agencies, militaries, and police (as well as mercenary corporations like DynCorp), subordinated under the direction of the U.S. military. Thomas Shannon, Bush’s envoy to Latin America and now Obama’s ambassador to Brazil, described it in a moment of candor as “armoring NAFTA.” In other words, the U.S. is retrenching, pulling back from efforts to preside over the entirety of Latin America, instead consolidating its authority over a circumscribed territory, with a deepening reliance on applied military power. This shift is significant, and could unleash a period of heightened instability. One consequence of Washington’s past strategy of treating Latin America as a single unit was that inter-state conflicts were contained; since the 1930s, most bloodletting was internally directed, aimed at trade unionists, peasant activists, intellectuals, reformist politicians, and progressive religious leaders demanding a more equitable share of economic and political power. But now, with a waning superpower banking its authority on “armoring” one region in order to contain another, that might be changing—as evinced by Colombia’s 2008 raid into Ecuador and recent tensions caused by U.S. plans to expand its military footprint in the Andean country. As Adam Isacson, of the Center for International Policy, says of Washington’s new Colombian bases, the U.S. is “creating a new capability in South America, and capabilities often get used.”17 Adding to the potential for instability is the regrouping of the Right. Political scientist Miguel Tinker-Salas notes that “for some time, the Right has been rebuilding in Latin America; hosting conferences, sharing experiences, refining their message, working with the media, and building ties with allies in the United States. This is not the lunatic right-wing fringe, but rather the mainstream Right with powerful allies in the middle-class that used to consider themselves center, but have been frightened by recent Left electoral victories and the rise of social movements.”18 This nascent reaction has been buoyed by the June 2009 Honduran coup, which the right-wing sees as the first successful rollback of populism since the 2004 overthrow of Aristide, as well as by recent victories at the ballot box: in May, a conservative millionaire won the presidency in Panama. In Argentina, Cristina Fernández’s center-left Peronist party has recently suffered a midterm electoral defeat and lost control of Congress. And polls show that presidential elections coming up in Chile and Brazil will be close, possibly dealing further losses to progressives, containing the South American Left to Venezuela, Bolivia, and Ecuador, and the Central American Left to El Salvador and Nicaragua. Two broad arcs of crises have defined U.S.-Latin American relations. The first began in the early nineteenth century and paralleled the first, youthful phase of U.S. territorial and economic expansion. Latin American intellectuals, politicians, and nationalists reacted with increasing hostility toward not only the growing influence of U.S. capital—which both displaced European economic interests and subordinated aspiring domestic elites—but toward ever more frequent and threatening military interventions: the Mexican-American War; the Spanish-American War; the creation of Panama; and invasions and occupations throughout the Caribbean basin. The second round coincided with the advent of the Cold War and marked the U.S.’s maturity as a global power. It intensified with Eisenhower’s over- throw of Guatemala’s democratically elected government in 1954, and continued with the 1959 Cuban Revolution and the series of right- wing coups in the 1960s and 1970s, culminating with the violent repression of Central American insurgencies in the 1980s, which paved the way for the neoliberal restructuring of the 1990s. It seems we are entering a third period of conflict—this time driven less by the tendency toward expansion that marked the U.S.’s global ascension than by a frantic attempt to hold on to what it has left as it enters its senescence—as domestic ideologues, unchecked corporate power, and political paralysis quicken the U.S.’s fall.

#### multilat fails- no consensus can be reached

Tharoor 9/8

(Ishaan, Time World, 8/8/13, “After the G-20, Should the U.S. Turn to an Alliance of Democracies?”, <http://world.time.com/2013/09/08/after-the-g20-should-the-u-s-turn-to-an-alliance-of-democracies/>, ddy)

The G-20 summit drew to a close this weekend in St. Petersburg shadowed by the same dark clouds that loomed when it started on Thursday. Deep divisions over whether to punish the Syrian regime for its alleged use of chemical weapons dominated media coverage of the meeting, with U.S. President Barack Obama and Russian President Vladimir Putin both remaining intransigent.¶ Putin maintained his skepticism that the government of his ally, Syrian President Bashar Assad, could have been responsible for an Aug. 21 strike that killed hundreds of civilians in a suburb of Damascus. “We hear one another and understand the arguments, but we don’t agree. I don’t agree with his arguments, he doesn’t agree with mine,” said the Russian President of his American counterpart. Meanwhile, Obama and the leaders of 10 other countries attending the summit issued a joint statement on Friday, demanding a “strong response” to the Assad regime’s alleged violation of international norms. “The world cannot wait for endless failed processes that can only lead to increased suffering in Syria,” read the statement.¶ With little resolved in St. Petersburg, the question begs: Is the G-20 one of those “failed processes”?¶ There was a time not so long ago when the G-20 was the proverbial cool new kid on the bloc. Formed at the turn of the millennium, the geopolitical grouping offered a departure from the country clubs of the 20th century — the G-7, the G-8, NATO, the U.N. Security Council — in which global policy remained the province of a handful of former 19th century imperial powers and the victors of World War II. Here was a body that represented great developing economies from every continent (including China, India, Brazil, South Africa), which reflected the world as it was now — not as it had been in 1945.¶ But, as seen in the jostling over Syria, the tense polarization of the Cold War remains. “Part of the challenge the U.S. faces when working through multilateral institutions such as the G-20 is the fact that Russia and China essentially have a different worldview,” says Ash Jain, a fellow at the German Marshall Fund in Washington and a former member of the U.S. Secretary of State’s policy-planning staff under both the Bush and Obama administrations. Policymakers in the West keen to uphold an international liberal order have long been frustrated by the immovability of Russia and China, wielders of U.N. Security Council vetoes that — based on their own historic views — are more protective of the sovereignty of individual states, no matter the alleged transgressions of their governments. “We need to recognize that we’re in a world where there are competing nodes of power, and so trying to get consensus for a range of issues is going to be difficult,” says Jain.¶ To resolve that challenge, Jain proposed a solution under the aegis of the Council on Foreign Relations earlier this year: a new bloc, consisting of a number of “like-minded” democracies allied to the U.S. known as the D-10. Its imagined membership actually includes many of the countries that signed on to the U.S.-led joint statement on Syria at the G-20 — Australia, Canada, France, Italy, Japan, South Korea, the U.K. — missing only Germany and an independent spot for the E.U. Had this grouping been a formalized entity, says Jain, “Obama would have had an alternative venue from which to derive more legitimacy for his preferred option” regarding Syria.¶ The D-10, in Jain’s formulation, would operate behind the scenes, without the ceremony and pomp of a G-20 summit. It would be a forum, says Jain, in which the U.S. could “consult with allies in both Asia and Europe — the most capable global powers who are aligned [with Washington] in terms of common values — to lay out strategies and produce plans.” In other words, it would be a 21st century springboard for American leadership in the world.¶ While Jain says he has received encouraging feedback from diplomats in various D-10 countries, the bloc is nowhere close to getting off the ground. Calls for this sort of ideological grouping are not wholly new and face the inevitable criticism that they may alienate important global players. In an earlier term in office, Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe raised the prospect of an “arc of freedom” knitting together Asian democracies in closer cooperation — but the gesture proved limp, with countries like India and Australia reluctant to antagonize China, a pivotal trading partner. None of the democracies that are members of the BRICS — a group of budding regional powers first imagined by a Goldman Sachs economist, now including Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa — signed on to the joint statement regarding Syria at the G-20. None of them, tellingly, are included in Jain’s roster of D-10 member states either.¶ Jain argues that the existence of the D-10 would not undermine the role of existing institutions like the G20 but, rather, would function in parallel. “It’s just unrealistic to expect those who are part of the G-20 to see these global challenges the same way that the U.S. and its closest allies see them,” says Jain. What his proposal reflects is a deep-seated frustration among Washington’s political elite that the scope for American action on the world stage has narrowed — and that the legitimacy the U.S. needs to pursue its policies overseas is proving harder to muster. On Sunday, news reports suggested U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry could still take the issue of Syria back to that venerable old institution, the U.N. Security Council, a move the Obama Administration had not long ago seemed to dismiss. In the brave new world of 21st global realpolitik, there’s still no better option than the tried and tested.

#### Plan doesn’t spill over—no will

**Llana 2011** [Sara Miller, “A year of drift in US-Latin American relations”, Dec 23, 2011, Christian Science Monitor, http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Americas/Latin-America-Monitor/2011/1223/A-year-of-drift-in-US-Latin-American-relations//cc]

In March, US President Barack Obama took his first trip to Latin America, stopping off in Brazil, Chile, and El Salvador. In October, the US approved long-awaited free trade deals with Panama and Colombia. According to the 2011 Latinobarometro poll, carried out across 18 countries in the region, President Obama ranked as the most popular leader in the Americas.

This year should have been a stellar one for US-Latin America relations, a major step forward after years of setback. But instead, despite the many positive developments, the relationship is characterized by, if not disdain, then definite distance.

“I think it’s a curious moment,” says Michael Shifter, president of the Inter-American Dialogue in Washington. “There is no evidence of great acrimony in US-Latin American relations as there was four or five years ago. But at the same time, there is this sense of distancing and drift, especially between the US and South America.”

The greatest symbol of that is the regional body that was officially launched in December, called the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC), which includes 33 countries across the Americas but specifically excludes the US and Canada.

Many members of the body are strong allies of the US, but long-time foes such as Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez have said they hope it counters the other major regional body, the Organization of American States (OAS), based in Washington.

Such old-time arguments still flare. President Chavez, for example, has been weakened at home, as the country’s opposition strengthens ahead of 2012 presidential elections. In theory, that is good for the US, and the rhetoric between the two has been low-key this year. But it just flared again, with Obama sharply criticizing the state of human rights in Venezuela and the country’s relationship with Iran.

“We're concerned about the government's actions, which have restricted the universal rights of the Venezuelan people, threatened basic democratic values, and failed to contribute to the security in the region," Obama wrote in response to questions posed by the Venezuelan newspaper El Universal.

He added that he believes Venezuela’s relationship with Iran has not served the interest of Venezuelans. “Ultimately, it is up to the Venezuelan people to determine what they gain from a relationship with a country that violates universal human rights and is isolated from much of the world,” President Obama said. “Here in the Americas, we take Iranian activities, including in Venezuela, very seriously and we will continue to monitor them closely.”

Chavez countered on state television: "Obama, take care of your own business, focus on governing your country, which you've turned into a disaster. Leave us alone.”

Venezuela’s relationship with Iran is among the most contentious foreign policies issues within the US-Latin American dynamic but other relationships rankle too. The Cuban government, for example, decreed three days of mourning this week in the wake of the death of North Korean leader Kim Jong-il. They joined Venezuela and Nicaragua in expressing condolences.

But in general, the positive has outweighed the negative this year. Perhaps the US’s strongest ally in the region right now is Mexico, where its strategy against organized crime, despite questionable success, is vociferously supported in Washington. The US continues to underline its support.

The trade deal signed with Panama and Colombia strengthens US economic ties to both countries. And the US has restored relations with the economic powerhouse in the region – Brazil. (Trouble had started to brew over former Brazilian president Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva’s relationship with Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.)

Still, on balance, the US is no closer to Latin America than it’s been since 9/11, when attention shifted to terrorism and away from the issues most Latin Americans care about, especially immigration. The region’s favorable view of the US has grown, from 58 percent in 2008 to 72 percent in 2011 (down slightly from a high of 74 percent in 2009), according to the 2011 Latinobarometro poll. The slight dip can be explained by a boost in expectations for Obama after former US President George W. Bush left office – he was widely reviled in Latin America. But even under Obama issues like immigration and drugs have been stuck. There is little hope of them getting “unstuck” in the upcoming US election year.

More than anything, however, is the simple fact that the US is no longer the sole player for Latin America. Obama's March trip was billed by the media as an effort to recapture US influence in Latin America. But Latin America has moved on. Countries are looking amongst themselves and much farther, particularly to China, to bolster their economies. They are forming their own relationships with countries, whether the US likes it or not. Of course US foreign policy matters here, but it matters so much less than it used to.

“There is just a sense that Latin America is pursuing its own agenda,” says Mr. Shifter.

#### Multiple alt causes

**Shifter, 8 –** Professor of Latin American Studies at Georgetown (Micheal, “U.S.-Latin American Relations: Recommendations for the New Administration”, Inter-American Dialogue, October 27, 2008, http://www.thedialogue.org/page.cfm?pageID=32&pubID=1625)

As if any further proof were needed, the ongoing financial crisis highlights the already diminished capacity of the United States to shape developments in the rest of the world. With its own house in disorder, the United States will struggle to get back on track as a responsible member of the international community.

Still, though the United States may be considerably chastened, it remains a superpower, whose decisions and actions have a huge global impact. When it falls to the next US administration to deal with the rapidly changing situation in the Middle East, Europe, Asia, or even Africa, it will likely reassess US interests and frame strategic choices in light of new realities.

But if the United States seriously undertakes such an effort for neighboring Latin America, it will mark the first time it has done so. For reasons of geography, history and power disparity, Latin America has typically been treated as a discrete compartment, separate from interest-based foreign relations.

Regardless of how one comes down on the issues of Cuba, immigration, drugs, and trade, the paternalistic impulse on the part of the United States has been unmistakable. Latin Americans find this tutorial attitude extremely irritating, and their objections have prompted a more collegial tone from the United States in certain cases. Unfortunately, it is still manifest in a variety of ways, from the overall diplomatic style to specific policies like drug cooperation decertification or suspending military training for countries that do not sign agreements that exempt US soldiers from prosecution under the International Criminal Court.

While domestic politics is never completely divorced from foreign policy, it has an inordinate and particularly distorting influence on Latin American policy. Hardliners and liberals alike rarely consider the effects policies and statements will have on US-Latin American relations or the ultimate impact for US interests. The decision to build a “wall” along the US-Mexico border, for example, may have been politically expedient but was deeply insulting, not only to Mexico, but to the entire region.

This ingrained reflex to dismiss Latin America as the “backyard” of the United States may have been understandable in a distant era, but today the region is wildly varied and defies lazy, superficial generalizations (e.g. “inflation is out of control” or “democracy is starting to take root”). Whether or not the United States recognizes it, the fact is that different parts of Latin America are moving in markedly different directions simultaneously.

#### US domestic politics prevents greater engagement with Latin America

**Gvosdev, 12 -** former editor of the National Interest, and a frequent foreign policy commentator in both the print and broadcast media. He is currently on the faculty of the U.S. Naval War College(Nikolas, “To Reset Latin America Policy, U.S. Must Think Big,” 4/20, World Politics Review, <http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/11867/the-realist-prism-to-reset-latin-america-policy-u-s-must-think-big>)

Part of the problem is that important U.S. domestic lobbies are opposed to key pieces of what would be needed to promote greater regional integration -- from environmentalists concerned both about Canada’s oil sands and new pipeline projects that would transport more of Alberta’s hydrocarbons to U.S. refineries and markets to a formidable anti-immigration lobby that would be very hesitant to support a freer flow of labor between the countries of the Western Hemisphere. Add post-Sept. 11 security concerns and a prevailing view among many U.S. voters that free trade agreements usually come at the expense of the American worker, and it becomes more apparent why no U.S. politician has emerged as a strong advocate for a Community of the Americas.

And while domestic politics are always going to be intertwined with foreign policy, U.S. messaging, particularly in Cartagena, seemed to convey just how much a domestic U.S. agenda is driving interaction with the rest of the region. Whether intended or not, Washington’s continued emphasis on framing foreign engagement as a way to boost U.S. job numbers does not provide much incentive for other states to embrace the U.S. agenda, as Obama similarly discovered during visits to India and other states in Southeast Asia. Meanwhile, the unwillingness to alter the U.S. position on Cuba set the tone in Cartagena, reinforcing the perception that U.S. strategy toward the region is seen through the prism of domestic politics -- in this case Florida’s electoral votes.

**Gorrel is empirically denied – nothing**

**Hotspots don’t escalate**

**Drenzer 10**- prof of pol sci at Fletcher (Daniel, 12/31, Foreign Policy, “Some desperately needed New Year’s resolutions for 2011” http://drezner.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2010/12/31/some\_new\_years\_resolutions\_for\_the\_foreign\_policy\_community\_in\_2011, da 1/5, mat)

[Fill in the blank] is an "existential threat". This term of art has been on the rise for decades, but it seemed omnipresent this past year. To be sure, lots of actors face a lot of threats out there in world politics. The bar has to be pretty high, however, for something to be an "existential threat." For my money, it means that the country or its modus operandi could be completely extinguished. Using this criteria, there are no existential threats to the United States in the international system. In 2010, this term was increasingly used by Israelis with respect to Iran. So, let's stipulate that if Iran were ever to acquire/develop, say, a dozen nuclear weapons, then the country would represent an existential threat to Israel. Commentators who do this, however, would also need to stipulate that Israel, in possessing 60-85 warheads, has represented an existential threat to Iran for decades.

### 1NC Transition

**Embargo lift causes global terror**

**Suchlicki 2k** (JAIME SUCHLICKI is Emilio Bacardi Moreau Professor of History and International Studies and the Director of the Institute for Cuban and Cuban-American Studies at the University of Miami. He was the founding Executive Director of the North-South Center. For the past decade he was also the editor of the prestigious Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs. He is currently the Latin American Editor for Transaction Publishers and the author of Cuba: From Columbus to Castro (1997), now in its fourth edition, and editor with Irving L. Horowitz of Cuban Communism (1999). He is also the author of Mexico: From Montezuma to NAFTA (1998). He is a highly regarded consultant to both the private and public sector on Cuba and Latin American affairs. The U.S. Embargo of Cuba Jaime Suchlicki University of Miami June 2000 <http://www6.miami.edu/iccas/USEmbargo.pdf>, nkj) Note: The first line of the card is saying an aff argument and then refuting it.

The Embargo has failed to overthrow Fidel Castro. Why not lift it now?

The embargo was never established to overthrow the Castro government. The embargo was established to punish the Castro government for the confiscation of American properties and to pressure it to slow down its move into the Communist camp. The embargo has been maintained to show that Marxist-Leninism does not work as an economic or political system and to use it as a tool to extract human rights, economic and political concessions from the current or future Cuban government. While not all embargoes have worked, the embargo imposed on the apartheid regime of South Africa and the military embargo of the Pinochet dictatorship in Chile did work and forced political changes in both countries. India’s sanctions on Nepal in 1989 contributed to political reforms there. The embargo of Iraq is forcing the Saddam Hussein dictatorship to provide some concessions to Western nations. Without major internal reforms in Cuba, the Castro government and the military, not the Cuban people, will be the main beneficiary of the lifting of the embargo. While some prosperity may trickle down to the Cuban people, state enterprises, many now under military control, will benefit most. The Castro regime will use this newly-acquired wealth to strengthen its hold on the Cuban people, to rebuild its military apparatus, and to engage again in supporting anti-American terrorist and violent groups in Latin America and elsewhere. To trade and invest is a country’s right not an obligation. The U.S. can trade with whomever they want. As soon as Cuba respects human rights, releases political prisoners, holds free and internationally supervised elections, the embargo should be lifted. To lift it now is to provide Castro with a gift he does not deserve.

**No retaliation**

**Bremmer 4—**IR prof, Columbia. Faculty member at Stanford’s Hoover Institution. Senior Fellow, World Policy Institute. PhD in pol sci, Stanford (Ian, 11/13, Suppose a new 9/11 hit America . . ., http://www.newstatesman.com/200409130005, AG)

What would happen if there were a new terrorist attack inside the United States on 11 September 2004? How would it affect the presidential election campaign? The conventional wisdom is that Americans - their patriotic defiance aroused - would rally to President George W Bush and make him an all but certain winner in November. But consider the differences between the context of the original 9/11 and that of any attack which might occur this autumn. In 2001, the public reaction was one of disbelief and incomprehension. Many Americans realised for the first time that large-scale terrorist attacks on US soil were not only conceivable; they were, perhaps, inevitable. A majority focused for the first time on the threat from al-Qaeda, on the Taliban and on the extent to which Saudis were involved in terrorism. This time, the public response would move much more quickly from shock to anger; debate over how America should respond would begin immediately. Yet it is difficult to imagine how the Bush administration could focus its response on an external enemy. Should the US send 50,000 troops to the Afghan-Pakistani border to intensify the hunt for Osama Bin Laden and "step up" efforts to attack the heart of al-Qaeda? Many would wonder if that wasn't what the administration pledged to do after the attacks three years ago. The president would face intensified criticism from those who have argued all along that Iraq was a distraction from "the real war on terror". And what if a significant number of the terrorists responsible for the pre-election attack were again Saudis? The Bush administration could hardly take military action against the Saudi government at a time when crude-oil prices are already more than $45 a barrel and global supply is stretched to the limit. While the Saudi royal family might support a co-ordinated attack against terrorist camps, real or imagined, near the Yemeni border - where recent searches for al-Qaeda have concentrated - that would seem like a trivial, insufficient retaliation for an attack on the US mainland. Remember how the Republicans criticised Bill Clinton's administration for ineffectually "bouncing the rubble" in Afghanistan after the al-Qaeda attacks on the US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in the 1990s. So what kind of response might be credible? Washington's concerns about Iran are rising. The 9/11 commission report noted evidence of co-operation between Iran and al-Qaeda operatives, if not direct Iranian advance knowledge of the 9/11 hijacking plot. Over the past few weeks, US officials have been more explicit, too, in declaring Iran's nuclear programme "unacceptable". However, in the absence of an official Iranian claim of responsibility for this hypothetical terrorist attack, the domestic opposition to such a war and the international outcry it would provoke would make quick action against Iran unthinkable.

**No terrorism**

**Gerges 12** 1/3—Prof of IR @ London School of Economics (“The Rise and Fall of Al-Qaeda: Debunking the Terrorism Narrative”, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/fawaz-gerges/the-rise-and-fall-of-alqa\_b\_1182003.html, CMR)

The popular uprisings in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Syria, Yemen and Bahrain have not only shaken the foundation of the authoritarian order in the Middle East, but they have also hammered **a deadly nail** in the coffin of a terrorism narrative which has painted Al-Qaeda as the West's greatest threat. At least, they should have. Yet despite Osama bin Laden's killing in May, the dwindling of his group to the palest shadow of its former self and the protest of millions across the Arab world for whom the group never represented, Al-Qaeda holds a grasp on the Western **imagination**. Few Americans and Westerners realize the degree to which their fear of terrorism is misplaced, making closure over to the costly War on Terror difficult, if not impossible. Shrouded in myth and **inflated** by **a self-sustaining industry of** so-called **terrorism "experts"** and a well-funded national security industrial complex whose numbers swelled to nearly one million, the power of Al-Qaeda can only be eradicated when the fantasies around the group are laid to rest. Myth 1: Al-Qaeda has been operational for more than two decades Contrary to the conventional terrorism narrative, Al-Qaeda has not been a functional organization with the goal of targeting the West for the past 20 years. By the time the American forces expelled bin Laden and his associates from their base in Afghanistan at the end of 2001, Al-Qaeda, as we know it today, was only five years old. At the end of the Afghan war in 1989, none of the leading figures -- Sheikh Abdullah Azzam, Ayman al-Zawahiri, nor bin Laden -- called for targeting the United States or the West. Even after the catalyst for change in bin Laden's thinking -- the American military intervention in the Gulf in 1990 and its permanent stationing of troops in Saudi Arabia -- the group did not translate this hostility into concrete action. Rather, it was during bin Laden's time in Sudan in the mid-1990s where he combined business practices with ideological indoctrination. Myth 2: Al-Qaeda has lots of boots on the ground At its height of its power in the late 1990s, Al-Qaeda had between 1,000 and 3,000 members. Transnational jihadism of the Al-Qaeda variety has, in fact, **never had a large constituency**, nor a solid base of popular support: Al-Qaeda has never been a viable social movement, but truly a fringe group without mass appeal among Muslim opinion. Contrary to received wisdom, September 11 did not turn out to be Al-Qaeda's baptism by fire, a force multiplier, a game changer. There was no river of young recruits to rise up and join the fight against the head of kufr (impiety) -- the U.S. -- as had happened with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in the late 1970s. Western intelligence officials believe that there are **fewer than 200** surviving members of Al-Qaeda, based **mainly in Pakistan and Afghanistan** and mostly unskilled composed of cooks, drivers, bodyguards and food soldiers. Myth Three: Al Qaeda has the same philosophy as other militant Islamist organizations While distinctions are rarely made between domestic jihadis and transnational Al-Qaeda types, or between Al-Qaeda and politically based Islamists, such as the Muslim Brotherhood, Hamas or Hizbullah, Al-Qaeda, with deep historical roots in Muslim societies, is an ideological orphan within the military Islamist family, an ambitious venture founded and led by a small vanguard. Grouping all these organizations together glosses over a history of ideological struggles within militant Islamist groups and even among Al Qaeda's inner sanctum of leaders over the concept of transnational jihad. From its origins in the late 1950s until the mid-1990s, a period of almost forty years, the militant Islamist movement known as "jihadism" was inward-looking, obsessed with replacing "renegade" secular Muslim rulers with Qur'anic-based states or states governed by the sharia (Islamic law). In the 1990s bin Laden and Zawahiri twisted these ideologies to suit their purposes of fighting the 'far enemy' -- the U.S. and its close Western allies -- which they believed would attract enough followers to build an army and momentum enough for their nearer battles. Myth Four: While Al-Qaeda Central has suffered a defeat with the loss of bin Laden, local 'branches' of Al-Qaeda in Yemen, Iraq, Pakistan, Somalia and Indonesia will continue to try to attack the U.S. and the West The **material links** and connections between local branches and Al-Qaeda Central are **tenuous at best**: far from being an institutionally coherent social movement, Al-Qaeda is a loose collection of small groups and factions that tend to be guided by charismatic individuals and are **more local** **than transnational** in outlook. Most victims are therefore Muslim civilians. Further, these branches tend to be as much a liability for the long term strategic interests of Al-Qaeda Central as they are assets. Abu Musab Zarqawi, the emir of Al-Qaeda in Iraq, proved to be Al-Qaeda Central's worst enemy. He refused to take orders from bin Laden or Zawahiri and, in fact, acted against their wishes, according to his own desires. Like Zarqawi, local groups or franchises -- like Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (**AQAP**) or Al-Qaeda of the Islamic Maghreb -- which the terrorism narrative often paints as being closely aligned and commanded by Al-Qaeda Central in fact have proven repeatedly that they **run by their own local** and contextualized **agendas**, **not** those set among the inner sanctum of **Al-Qaeda Central.** Myth Five: The War on Terror has made Americans safer and has decreased the likelihood of attacks on the country There is a clear causal link between incidences of homegrown terrorism in the West and the post-9/11 wars fought in Afghanistan and Iraq, and more recently in Pakistan and Yemen. Far from weeding out individual terrorists drone by drone to put an end to Al-Qaeda and its violence, the American offensive since 9/11 has **fed into the Al-Qaeda narrative** which paints the West as a Judeo-Christian crusader and, ironically, **inspired a new generation of homegrown radicals**. Despite their apparent tactical success, U.S. counterterrorism measures like drone attacks further fuel anti-American sentiments and **calls for vengeance**. Yet neither the U.S. national security apparatus nor terrorism experts acknowledge a link between the new phenomenon of bottom-up extremism and the U.S. War on Terror, particularly in Afghanistan-Pakistan. Further, despite the phenomenal expansion of the intelligence machine as part of the War on Terror, this machine has failed to detect the few serious attacks and plots against the U.S. homeland, such as the Fort Hood, Texas, shooting that left thirteen dead, the so-called underwear bomber plot, or the 2009 Christmas Day bomb attempt, which was thwarted not by one of the almost one million individuals with top-secret clearances employed to find lone terrorists but by an alert airline passenger who saw smoke coming from a seatmate. In the Times Square bombing, an alert vendor called the police after he saw smoke coming out of a parked SUV. Even when the U.S. pays more than $5 billion for 1 million employees with security clearances to hunt members of Al-Qaeda, **absolutely security cannot exist**. The security of the West is organically linked to that of the rest of the world. And U.S. leaders must think twice before pursuing counterterrorism measures which alienate Muslim public opinion and breed homegrown terrorists. \*\*\* **The war with Al-Qaeda is over**. Western leaders must level with their citizens: Al-Qaeda poses **only a security irritant**, not a serious threat. Terrorism cannot be eradicated with drone attacks or even massive military interventions, all of which are, in any case, costly. Rather than battling against a mythic foe, the U.S. and Western powers should expedite the withdrawal of soldiers from Muslim territories where their presence is a painful reminder of the European colonial legacy of domination and subjugation.

**Their impacts are exaggerated—terrorism isn’t an extinction risk**

**Gerges ’11** [Fawaz A, Professor of Middle East Studies and International Relations at the London School of Economics, “The Rise and Fall of Al-Qaeda”, page number below, CMR]

Politically based violence and terrorism is a social plague **no more** or less **destructive** than other social ailments. Instead of investing politically based violence and terrorism with civilizational and **existential meanings**, it is important to understand what created the wave of transnational jihad, a wave that surged in the late 1990s and has recently broken into smaller and weaker ripples. While these ripples might remain dangerous, **they will most likely scatter and dissipate**.

As I have tried to argue, there is a substantial disconnect between the dominant terrorism narrative based on perception, which portrays al-Qaeda and others who subscribe to its ideology as a strategic, existential threat- and **the reality of the threat**, which is significantly **small**er and primarily tactical. This divide between perception and reality foments unnecessary fear and lubricates a costly national security-industrial complex that includes nearly a million individuals with high security clearances. Furthermore, I argue that the perception many Americans and Westerners have of al-Qaeda has taken hold of the public imagination and is not likely to change anytime soon. Evidence and reality no longer matter in a world built on **perception and illusion**. Every plot and incident is viewed as an affirmation of al-Qaeda's invincibility and reach: to the American leadership bin Laden and his successors appear to be 100 feet tall. [end page 192]

**No WMD terrorism – no motive or capability – prefer empirics**

**Mueller ’11**. John Mueller, Professor and Woody Hayes Chair of National Security Studies, Mershon Center for International Security Studies and Department of Political Science, “The Truth About al Qaeda”, 8/2/2011, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/68012/john-mueller/the-truth-about-al-qaeda?page=show, CMR

The chief lesson of 9/11 should have been that small bands of terrorists, using simple methods, can exploit loopholes in existing security systems. But instead, many preferred to engage in massive extrapolation: If 19 men could hijack four airplanes simultaneously, the thinking went, then surely al Qaeda would soon make an atomic bomb. As a misguided Turkish proverb holds, "If your enemy be an ant, imagine him to be an elephant." The new information unearthed in Osama bin Laden's hideout in Abbottabad, Pakistan, suggests that the United States has been doing so for a full decade. Whatever al Qaeda's threatening rhetoric and occasional nuclear fantasies, its potential as a menace, particularly as an atomic one, has been much inflated. The public has now endured a decade of dire warnings about the imminence of a terrorist atomic attack. In 2004, the former CIA spook Michael Scheuer proclaimed on television's 60 Minutes that it was "probably a near thing," and in 2007, the physicist Richard Garwin assessed the likelihood of a nuclear explosion in an American or a European city by terrorism or other means in the next ten years to be 87 percent. By 2008, Defense Secretary Robert Gates mused that what keeps every senior government leader awake at night is "the thought of a terrorist ending up with a weapon of mass destruction, especially nuclear." Few, it seems, found much solace in the fact that an al Qaeda computer seized in Afghanistan in 2001 indicated that the group's budget for research on weapons of mass destruction (almost all of it focused on primitive chemical weapons work) was some $2,000 to $4,000. In the wake of the killing of Osama bin Laden, officials now have more al Qaeda computers, which reportedly contain a wealth of information about the workings of the organization in the intervening decade. A multi-agency task force has completed its assessment, and according to first reports, it has found that al Qaeda members have primarily been engaged in dodging drone strikes and complaining about how cash-strapped they are. Some reports suggest they've also been looking at quite a bit of pornography. The full story is not out yet, but it seems **breathtakingly unlikely** that the miserable little group has had the time or inclination, let alone the money, to set up and staff a uranium-seizing operation, as well as a fancy, super-high-tech facility to fabricate a bomb. It is a process that requires trusting corrupted foreign collaborators and other criminals, obtaining and transporting highly guarded material, setting up a machine shop staffed with top scientists and technicians, and rolling the heavy, cumbersome, and untested finished product into position to be detonated by a skilled crew, all the while attracting no attention from outsiders. The documents also reveal that after fleeing Afghanistan, bin Laden maintained what one member of the task force calls an "obsession" with attacking the United States again, even though 9/11 was in many ways a disaster for the group. It led to a worldwide loss of support, a major attack on it and on its Taliban hosts, and a decade of furious and dedicated harassment. And indeed, bin Laden did repeatedly and publicly threaten an attack on the United States. He assured Americans in 2002 that "the youth of Islam are preparing things that will fill your hearts with fear"; and in 2006, he declared that his group had been able "to breach your security measures" and that "operations are under preparation, and you will see them on your own ground once they are finished." Al Qaeda's animated spokesman, Adam Gadahn, proclaimed in 2004 that "the streets of America shall run red with blood" and that "the next wave of attacks may come at any moment." The obsessive desire notwithstanding, such fulminations have clearly lacked substance. Although hundreds of millions of people enter the United States legally every year, and countless others illegally, no true al Qaeda cell has been found in the country since 9/11 and exceedingly few people have been uncovered who even have any sort of "link" to the organization. The closest effort at an al Qaeda operation within the country was a decidedly nonnuclear one by an Afghan-American, Najibullah Zazi, in 2009. Outraged at the U.S.-led war on his home country, Zazi attempted to join the Taliban but was persuaded by al Qaeda operatives in Pakistan to set off some bombs in the United States instead. Under surveillance from the start, he was soon arrested, and, however "radicalized," he has been talking to investigators ever since, turning traitor to his former colleagues. Whatever training Zazi received was inadequate; he repeatedly and desperately sought further instruction from his overseas instructors by phone. At one point, he purchased bomb material with a stolen credit card, guaranteeing that the purchase would attract attention and that security video recordings would be scrutinized. Apparently, his handlers were so strapped that they could not even advance him a bit of cash to purchase some hydrogen peroxide for making a bomb. For al Qaeda, then, the operation was a failure in every way -- except for the ego boost it got by inspiring the usual dire litany about the group's supposedly existential challenge to the United States, to the civilized world, to the modern state system. Indeed, no Muslim extremist has succeeded in detonating even a simple bomb in the United States in the last ten years, and except for the attacks on the London Underground in 2005, neither has any in the United Kingdom. It seems **wildly unlikely** that al Qaeda is remotely ready to go nuclear. Outside of war zones, the amount of killing carried out by al Qaeda and al Qaeda linkees, maybes, and wannabes throughout the entire world since 9/11 stands at perhaps a few hundred per year. That's a few hundred too many, of course, but it **scarcely presents an existential**, or elephantine**, threat**. And the likelihood that an American will be killed by a terrorist of any ilk stands at one in 3.5 million per year, even with 9/11 included. That probability will remain unchanged unless terrorists are able to increase their capabilities massively -- and obtaining nuclear weapons would allow them to do so. Although al Qaeda may have dreamed from time to time about getting such weapons, no other terrorist group has even gone so far as to indulge in such dreams, with the exception of the Japanese cult Aum Shinrikyo, which leased the mineral rights to an Australian sheep ranch that sat on uranium deposits, purchased some semi-relevant equipment, and tried to buy a finished bomb from the Russians. That experience, however, cannot be very encouraging to the would-be atomic terrorist. Even though it was flush with funds and undistracted by drone attacks (or even by much surveillance), Aum Shinrikyo abandoned its atomic efforts in frustration very early on. It then moved to biological weapons, another complete failure that inspired its leader to suggest that fears expressed in the United States of a biological attack were actually a ruse to tempt terrorist groups to pursue the weapons. The group did finally manage to release some sarin gas in a Tokyo subway that killed 13 and led to the group's terminal shutdown, as well as to 16 years (and counting) of pronouncements that WMD terrorism is the wave of the future. No elephants there, either.

**Ayson concludes neg**

**Ayson 10** (Robert, Professor of Strategic Studies and Director of the Centre for Strategic Studies: New Zealand at the Victoria University of Wellington, “After a Terrorist Nuclear Attack: Envisaging Catalytic Effects,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, Volume 33, Issue 7, July, 2010 Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via InformaWorld, nkj)

There is also the question of how other nuclear-armed states respond to the act of nuclear terrorism on another member of that special club. It could reasonably be expected that following a nuclear terrorist attack on the United States, both Russia and China would extend immediate sympathy and support to Washington and would work alongside the United States in the Security Council. But there is **just a chance**, **albeit a slim one**, where the support of Russia and/or China is less automatic in some cases than in others. For example, what would happen if the United States wished to discuss its right to retaliate against groups based in their territory? If, for some reason, Washington found the responses of Russia and China deeply underwhelming, (neither “for us or against us”) might it also suspect that they secretly were in cahoots with the group, increasing (again perhaps ever so slightly) the chances of a major exchange. If the terrorist group had some connections to groups in Russia and China, or existed in areas of the world over which Russia and China held sway, and if Washington felt that Moscow or Beijing were placing a curiously modest level of pressure on them, what conclusions might it then draw about their culpability?

A. Economic reforms are coming now in Cuba – causes long term stability-----GREEN

Sweig and Rockefeller, 2013 (Julia E. Sweig, Nelson and David Rockefeller Senior Fellow for Latin America Studies and Director for Latin America Studies, and Michael Bustamante “Cuba After Communism The Economic Reforms That Are Transforming the Island” <http://www.cfr.org/cuba/cuba-after-communism/p30991>)

#### Small-time diaspora capital may prove easier to regulate and rely on than funds from multinational corporations driven strictly by profits. Under the repatriation provisions of the island's new migration law, some Cubans may even retire to the island with their pensions and savings after decades of working abroad. Yet opening the doors for more young citizens to leave could prove risky for a quickly aging, low-birthrate society that has been suffering from a brain drain for some time. Besides, along with remittance dollars, Cuba urgently **needs** both medium and large investors. Ultimately, only larger outlays can help fix Cuba's most fundamental economic problem: its depleted productive base. Castro appears to recognize that attracting foreign investment, decentralizing the government, and further expanding the private sector **are the only ways to tackle this** long-term predicament. The government is unlikely to proceed with anything but caution, however. Officials are wary of **rocking the domestic political boat**, and citizens and party leaders alike **recoil** from the prospect of more **radical shock therapy**. Rising public protests in China and Vietnam against inequality and rampant corruption have only **reinforced the Cuban government's preference for gradualism.** Striking an adequate balance will be no easy task. In late 2012, Havana legalized the creation of transportation cooperatives -- private, profit-sharing entities owned and manage by their members -- to fix bottlenecks in agricultural distribution. Meanwhile, 100 state enterprises are now running their finances completely autonomously as part of a yearlong pilot program. The government is also reportedly considering ways to offer a wider array of potential foreign partners more advantageous terms for joint ventures. But the Communist Party is working through numerous contradictions -- recognizing a place for market economics, challenging old biases against entrepreneurs, and hinting at decentralizing the budget while incongruously insisting, in the words of its official 2011 guidelines, that "central planning, and not the market, will take precedence."¶ EASING OFF THE DADDY STATE¶ Curtailing the state's economic role while preserving political continuity **requires threading a delicate ideological needle**. Although the government expects to continue providing Cubans with key social services, such as health care and education, party leaders have reprimanded the island's citizens for otherwise depending too heavily on what one prominent official a few years ago called the "daddy state." In the eyes of many Cubans, this is deeply ironic. Cuba's revolutionary founders, who built up a paternalistic state in the service of equality, are now calling for that state's partial dismantlement. What's more, most Cubans already need to resort to the black market or assistance from family abroad to acquire many daily necessities.

B. The plan creates a political whirlwind that kills reforms and causes instability-----GREEN

Hernandez, 2012 (Cuba’s Leading Social Sciences professor and researcher at the University of Havana and the High Institute of International Relations; Director of U.S. studies at the Centro de Estudios sobre America; and a Senior Research Fellow at the Instituto cubano de Investigacion Cultural “Juan Marinello” in Havana. “Debating U.S-Cuban Relations”)

#### As far as costs are concerned, although many Cubans favor detente and appreciate its economic benefits, they also remain **worried about its political and ideological effects**. These could affect the national consensus in a period during which social and political cohesion is of strategic value. **A wave of U.S. capital flooding** a Cuban economy **that has not completed its reform process** could have some **counter­productive** effects. The U.S. government could try to steer the flow of capital to favor its political goals. Various groups— Cuban-American organizations, NGOs, other institutions, and the U.S. ideological apparatuses—would have more avenues to **influence** the Cuban domestic context.¶ Given the fundamental **asymmetry of power** between the two sides, once the words "let's play cards" are spoken, the "hands" will be quite unequal. If the United States were to reverse its policy and begin to "**make concessions**" in return for "equivalent Cuban responses," the government of the Island would find itself in an unprecedented tactical arid strategic situation. This won't be one more round but, rather, a whole new rule book. In other words, with **any increased chance** of an alternative form of relations, the risk profile of quid pro quo increases. For Cuba, to take on this challenge could mean to adopt a **conservative line** and play defensively only; or it could mean to invent a new proactive strategy for the game. Within such a new approach, the **ability to realign the available resources of political power would be decisive**. Classically, the sources of political power in a situation of asymmetric confrontation lie in **alliances** and in consensus. This issue is complex both for Cuba and for the United States. Besides allied powers, affinities within the international system, and sympathetic ideological currents, the dynamic of rapprochement not only highlights and energizes the role of "**rivals**" or "**opponents**" but also that of" **allies" within the "enemy's" own camp**. The identities of such allies of the United States in the region, in Europe, and also on the Island are obvious. The allies of Cuba are also well known, paradoxically including novel ones such as many business executives and military officials who had classically been the "**tips of the imperialist spear**."¶ In a scenario of re-encounter between the United States and Cuba, both governments face the challenge of overcoming old dogmas, dealing with changes in the respective **political consensus** of each, trying to **reshape those and restructure their alliances**. The main weakness Cuba must overcome is not its lesser military or physical power but its siege mentality. That of the United States is not its ineptitude in dealing effectively with "communist regimes" but its sense of superpower omnipotence.

# 2NC

## CP

## China

### 2NC – Overview (China econ) (0:50)

#### The DA outweighs and turns the case:

#### 1) Export markets – Aff causes anti-Chinese Asian bandwagoning – that collapses Chinese export markets and prevents them from achieving growth targets – that causes instability, repression, and migration – escalates to global collapse, loose nukes, and lashout.

#### 2) Framing – outweighs on magnitude – triggers global escalation and retaliation – prefer it – you can only die once and Chinese instability makes every global problem worse – tanks relations – solves and turns every impact in the 1AC

Cohen 9 (William S. Cohen is chairman and CEO of The Cohen Group, a strategic business consulting firm based in Washington, D.C. Secretary Cohen served as U.S. secretary of defense, Maurice R. Greenberg is chairman and CEO of C.V. Starr & Co., Inc. Mr. Greenberg retired four years ago as chairman and CEO of American International Group (AIG) after more than 40 years of leadership, creating the largest insurance company in history, “Smart Power in U.S.-China Relations,” http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/090309\_mcgiffert\_uschinasmartpower\_web.pdf)

The evolution of Sino-U.S. relations over the next months, years, and decades has the potential to have a greater impact on global security and prosperity than any other bilateral or multilateral arrangement. In this sense, many analysts consider the US.-China diplomatic relationship to be the most influential in the world. Without question, strong and stable U.S. alliances provide the foundation for the protection and promotion of U.S. and global interests. Yet within that broad framework, the trajectory of U.S.-China relations will determine the success, or failure, of efforts to address the toughest global challenges: global financial stability, energy security and climate change, nonproliferation, and terrorism, among other pressing issues. Shepherding that trajectory in the most constructive direction possible must therefore be a priority for Washington and Beijing. Virtually no major global challenge can be met without U.S.-China cooperation. The uncertainty of that future trajectory and the "strategic mistrust" between leaders in Washington and Beijing necessarily concerns many experts and policymakers in both countries. Although some U.S. analysts see China as a strategic competitor—deliberately vying with the United States for energy resources, military superiority, and international political influence alike— analysis by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) has generally found that China uses its soft power to pursue its own, largely economic, international agenda primarily to achieve its domestic objectives of economic growth and social stability.1 Although Beijing certainly has an eye on Washington, not all of its actions are undertaken as a counterpoint to the United States. In addition, CSIS research suggests that growing Chinese soft power in developing countries may have influenced recent U.S. decisions to engage more actively and reinvest in soft-power tools that have atrophied during the past decade. To the extent that there exists a competition between the United States and China, therefore, it may be mobilizing both countries to strengthen their ability to solve global problems. To be sure, U.S. and Chinese policy decisions toward the respective other power will be determined in large part by the choices that leaders make about their own nations interests at home and overseas, which in turn are shaped by their respective domestic contexts. Both parties must recognize—and accept—that the other will pursue a foreign policy approach that is in its own national interest. Yet, in a globalized world, challenges are increasingly transnational, and so too must be their solutions. As demonstrated by the rapid spread of SARS from China in 2003, pandemic flu can be spread rapidly through air and via international travel. Dust particulates from Asia settle in Lake Tahoe. An economic downturn in one country can and does trigger an economic slowdown in another. These challenges can no longer be addressed by either containment or isolation. What constitutes the national interest today necessarily encompasses a broader and more complex set of considerations than it did in the past As a general principle, the United States seeks to promote its national interest while it simultaneously pursues what the CSIS Commission on Smart Power called in its November 2007 report the "global good."3 This approach is not always practical or achievable, of course. But neither is it pure benevolence. Instead, a strategic pursuit of the global good accrues concrete benefits for the United States (and others) in the form of building confidence, legitimacy, and political influence in key countries and regions around the world in ways that enable the United States to better confront global and transnational challenges. In short, the global good comprises those things that all people and governments want but have traditionally not been able to attain in the absence of U.S. leadership. Despite historical, cultural, and political differences between the United States and China, Beijing's newfound ability, owing to its recent economic successes, to contribute to the global good is a matter for common ground between the two countries. Today there is increasing recognition that no major global challenge can be addressed effectively, much less resolved, without the active engagement of—and cooperation between—the United States and China. The United States and China—the worlds first- and third-largest economies—are inextricably linked, a fact made ever more evident in the midst of the current global financial crisis. Weak demand in both the United States and China, previously the twin engines of global growth, has contributed to the global economic downturn and threatens to ignite simmering trade tensions between the two countries. Nowhere is the interconnectedness of the United States and China more clear than in international finance. China has $2 trillion worth of largely U.S. dollar-denominated foreign exchange reserves and is the world's largest holder—by far—of U.S. government debt. Former treasury secretary Henry M. Paulson and others have suggested that the structural imbalances created by this dynamic fueled the current economic crisis. Yet. China will almost certainly be called on to purchase the lion's share of new U.S. debt instruments issued in connection with the U.S. stimulus and recovery package. Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton's February 23.2009, reassurance to Beijing that U.S. markets remain safe and her call for continued Chinese investment in the U.S. bond market as a means to help both countries, and the world, emerge from global recession underscored the shared interest—and central role—that both countries have in turning around the global economy quickly. Although China's considerable holdings of U.S. debt have been seen as a troubling problem, they are now being perceived as a necessary part of a global solution. Similarly, as the worlds two largest emitters of greenhouse gases, China and the United States share not only the collateral damage of energy-inefficient economic growth, but a primary responsibility to shape any ultimate global solutions to climate change. To date, cooperation has been elusive, owing as much to Washington's reluctance as to Beijing's intransigence. Painting China as the environmental bogeyman as an excuse for foot-dragging in policymaking is no longer an option; for its part, China, as the world's top polluter, must cease playing the developing-economy card. Yet energy security and climate change remain an area of genuine opportunity for joint achievement. Indeed, U.S.-China cooperation in this field is a sine qua non of any response to the energy and climate challenges. The sheer size of the Chinese economy means that collaboration with the United States could set the de facto global standards for etficiency and emissions in key economic sectors such as industry and transportation. Climate change also provides an area for cooperation in previously uncharted policy waters, as in emerging Arctic navigational and energy exploration opportunities. Washington and Beijing also share a deep and urgent interest in international peace and stability. The resumption of U.S.-China military contacts is a positive development. As two nuclear powers with worldwide economic and strategic interests, both countries want to minimize instability and enhance maritime security, as seen by parallel antipiracy missions in the waters otT Somalia. Joint efforts in support of United Nations peacekeeping, nonproliferation, and counterterrorism offer critical areas for bilateral and multilateral cooperation. Certainly, regional and global security institutions such as the Six-Party Talks concerning North Korea or the UN Security Council require the active engagement of both Washington and Beijing. Even more broadly, crisis management in geographic regions of mutual strategic interest like the Korean peninsula, Iran, or Burma require much more Sino-U.S. communication if the two countries are to avoid miscalculation and maximize opportunities to minimize human sutfering. Increasing the number of mid-level military-to-military exchanges would help in this regard. The United States and China could do more to cooperate on law enforcement to combat drug trafficking and organized crime in Western China. Afghanistan is competing with Burma as the main provider of narcotics to China; Washington could use its influence with the International Security Assistance Force in Kabul to develop a joint antinarcotics program. This could potentially build networks and joint capabilities that might be useful for U.S.-China cooperation on the issue of Pakistan. In addition, Washington should also encourage NATO-China cooperation along the Afghan border. Collaborating under the auspices of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) might provide an additional framework for Beijing and Washington to address Central Asian security issues in a cooperative manner. 1he SCO, which includes Pakistan as an observer and will convene a multinational conference on Afghanistan in March 2009, has long made curbing narcoterrorism in Afghanistan a priority. In addition, the VS. Drug Enforcement Agency and the Chinese Anti-Narcotics Bureau should expand cooperation on interdiction and prosecution of heroin and meth traffickers. To be sure, there are a number of areas of serious divergence between Washington and Beijing. This should surprise no one. The United States has disagreements with even its allies. Two large powers with vastly different histories, cultures, and political systems are bound to have challenges. History has shown, however, that the most effective way of addressing issues is for the U.S. and Chinese governments to engage in quiet diplomacy rather than public recrimination. In the U.S.-China context, there is often little to be gained—and much to be lost in terms of trust and respect—by a polarizing debate. Any differences, moreover, must not necessarily impede Sino-U.S. cooperation when both sides share strong mutual interests. I;. Scott Fitzgerald wrote that "the test of a first-rate intelligence is the ability to hold two opposed ideas in the mind at the same time, and still retain the ability to function."3 Effective policy toward China by the United States, and vice versa, will require this kind of dual-minded intelligence. Moreover, working together on areas of mutual and global interest will help promote strategic trust between China and the United States, facilitating possible cooperation in other areas. Even limited cooperation on specific areas will help construct additional mechanisms for bilateral communication on issues of irreconcilable disagreement. In fact, many of the toughest challenges in U.S.-China relations in recent years have been the result of unforeseen events, such as the accidental bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade in May 1999 and the EP-3 reconnaissance plane collision in April 2001. Building trust and finding workable solutions to tough problems is the premise behind the Obama administrations foreign policy of smart power, as articulated by Secretary of State Clinton. Smart power is based on, as Secretary Clinton outlined in her confirmation hearing, the fundamental belief that 'We must use... the full range of tools at our disposal—diplomatic, economic, military, political and cultural—picking the right tool, or combination of tools, for each situation."' As the CS1S Commission on Smart Power noted in November 2007, "Smart Power is neither hard nor soft—it is the skillful combination of both It is an approach that underscores the necessity of a strong military, but also invests heavily in alliances, partnerships and institutions at all levels... .°5 As such, smart power necessarily mandates a major investment in a U.S.-China partnership on key issues. 'The concept enjoys broad support among the Chinese and American people and, by promoting the global good, it reaps concrete results around the world. There should be no expectation that Washington and Beijing will or should agree on all, or even most, questions. But the American and Chinese people should expect their leaders to come together on those vital issues that require their cooperation. U.S.-China partnership, though not inevitable, is indispensable.

### 2NC – Turns Cuban econ (reforms)

#### Turns and solves Cuban transition – Chinese investment ensures reforms

Hearn 12 (Dr. Adrian H. Hearn is Australian Research Council (ARC) Future Fellow at the University of Sydney and co-chair of the Latin American Studies Association “China, Global Governance and the Future of Cuba,” http://journals.sub.uni-hamburg.de/giga/jcca/article/viewFile/498/496)

Sino-Cuban cooperation is indeed driven by a political strategy, but it is focused less on undermining the United States than on the longterm (and less newsworthy) goal of upgrading and coordinating Cuba’s industrial capacities. Although Chinese “assistance” to Cuba is managed through governmental channels, it has been accompanied by advice from Beijing about the benefits of incorporating a greater degree of private initiative into the existing state-led system. Under the leadership of Raúl Castro since 2008, the Cuban government has begun to heed this advice as it seeks to open the island’s economy in a controlled manner. The next section examines recent advances in Sino-Cuban cooperation, including bilateral efforts to plan the latter’s industrial evolution and implement market reforms. These developments suggest that the Cuban government is distancing itself from Fidel Castro’s 50-year-long rejection of capitalism, and moreover, that China is committed to guiding the Western hemisphere’s only communist nation toward reconciliation with international conventions.

### 2NC – Turns multilateralism

#### China collapse turns multilat – causes diplomatic confrontations

Orszag 13 (Peter Orszag is vice chairman of corporate and investment banking at Citigroup Inc. and a former director of the Office of Management and Budget in the Obama administration.“In China, Slowdown Is a Bigger Danger Than Growth” http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-01-15/in-china-slowdown-is-a-bigger-danger-than-growth.html)

What would be the consequences if China falls into the trap? According to Yasheng Huang, a professor of management at MIT, slower growth could destabilize China’s internal political economy. That, in turn, could prove to be the far larger risk for other nations. Greater Danger In a similar vein, China specialist Susan Shirk of the University of California at San Diego warns that it is China’s “internal fragility, not its growing strength, that presents the greatest danger.” And Aaron Friedberg, a professor of politics and international affairs at Princeton University, writes that a less prosperous China “may be a less effective competitor in certain respects, but it could also prove to be less predictable, more aggressive, and hence even more dangerous and difficult for the United States and its allies to manage.” Friedberg says weak leaders in China might be tempted to rally popular support by confronting other countries. Slower growth in China is not inevitable, but it is a greater -- and more dangerous -- possibility than many in the U.S. may realize.

### 2NC – Turns Cuban econ (infrastructure)

#### China key to Cuban infrastructure

Hearn 12 – Senior Research Fellow at the University of Sydney, and Kiriyama Research Fellow at the University of San Francisco Center for the Pacific Rim (Adrian H, “China, Global Governance and the Future of Cuba”, Journal of Current Chinese Affairs, 2012, <http://journals.sub.uni-hamburg.de/giga/jcca/article/viewFile/498/496)//KG>

China’s relations with Cuba date back to 1847, when the first of more than 150,000 Chinese indentured labourers arrived in Havana’s port of Regla. These people and their descendants actively took part in Cuba’s two wars of independence (1868–78 and 1895–98) and in the social movement that culminated in the Cuban Revolution of 1959. On 2 September 1960, Fidel Castro declared that Cuba would sever ties with Taiwan; this was done within a month, on 28 September, making Cuba the first Latin American country to establish diplomatic relations with the People’s Republic of China. Since their inception, Sino-Cuban economic relations have been managed exclusively through governmental channels. State-to-state cooperation has focused on building critical infrastructure as a basis for Cuban economic growth. Bilateral projects have targeted the upgrading of Cuban manufacturing, the gradual opening of markets, the coordination of industrial sectors, and more recently the controlled introduction of private entrepreneurship. As Chinese enterprises become increasingly comfortable with the rules of market exchange, Cuba’s slow implementation of reforms has generated bilateral tensions. However, since Raúl Castro replaced his brother as Cuba’s president, the pace of change has quickened, and China’s domestic experience with economic reform has assumed growing relevance for the island. China’s interest in developing Cuban manufacturing capacities and markets extends back to collapse of the Soviet Union. Following an initial shipment of 500,000 Chinese bicycles to Cuba in the early 1990s, Mao Xianglin, a former envoy of the Central Committee of the CCP, visited Cuba in 1997 to assist in the establishment of a bicycle factory with Chinese capital and technical expertise. The success of the initiative led to a similar export-to-production scheme for electric fans. Mao described this as an “incremental” strategy that Chinese businesses have since employed across a range of sectors in Cuba: I would hesitate to say that our Cuban manufacturing operations are entirely commercial, because what we’re doing is broader than that. We’re trying to help Cuba to incrementally upgrade its technical ability. If our products prove popular and useful then we assist by setting up factories. […] Using Chinese expertise, Cuba could come to produce electronic goods for sale to Latin America (Mao 2007). Chinese technical and financial assistance to Cuba demonstrates the sincerity of these words. During a 2001 visit to Cuba, Chinese President Jiang Zemin offered an interest-free credit line of 6.5 million USD and a loan of 200 million USD to modernise local telecommunications with Chinese products, and a 150 million USD credit to buy Chinese televisions (Erikson and Minson 2006: 14). Following the successful sale of Chinese washing machines, televisions, air conditioners, and refrigerators to Cuba, Hu Jintao signed 16 accords in 2004 pledging Chinese support for the domestic manufacture of these and other goods. This promise has materialised in a facility next to Havana’s Lenin Park, where television sets and other light consumer products are assembled. Indicating the success of the scheme, in November 2009 the Cuban Ministry of Information and Communication’s Grupo de la Electrónica entered into a joint venture with Chinese electronics giant Haier to domestically manufacture computer components and assemble household consumer goods (Cubaencuentro 2009). In addition to distributing the resulting televisions and refrigerators to the population through neighbourhood committees, Raúl Castro has opened new opportunities for Chinese exporters to test the Cuban market by lifting restrictions on the sale of DVD players, mobile phones, computers, and other Chinese-made products.

#### Infrastructure key to the Cuban economy

Kadlec 13 – journalist and author who has written extensively about baby boomers, personal finance, the economy and financial education for TIME, Money, CBS and USA Today among others (Dan, “Lessons in Socialism: How Cuba Can Become Relevant Again”, Time: Business and Money, 2-6-13, <http://business.time.com/2013/02/06/lessons-in-socialism-how-cuba-can-become-relevant-again/)//KG>

Socialism here has managed to raise the living standards of the destitute, the bottom 20%. But virtually all others have fled or been dragged lower. Whatever leadership succeeds Fidel and Raul, it will have to confront the basic question of whether raising the living standards of the very poorest is worth the toll it has taken on the rest, as well as the toll it’s taken on the country’s infrastructure and even its fertile landscape—much of which is now grown over with weeds. Even dictators want some level of popular support. Castro earned his by lifting the poorest and stirring nationalist emotions in a historically colonized land. But the physical decay is so extreme that it is difficult to imagine any new leader succeeding without reinvigorating an economy that has been bled dry. Perhaps the post-Castro government will consider whether a more open economic policy might lift all boats. Even the poor benefit from greater growth, as empowered capitalists have started to show in China. Traveling in and around Havana offers stark lessons in the futility of socialism. Billboards are non-existent; there is nothing to advertise except “La Revolución” and “Más Socialismo,” largely self-explanatory terms you find painted on fences and printed on banners on many city blocks, promoting the government. Castro elevated health care, education, and the arts. But he did so in part by diverting pesos from sorely needed infrastructure rebuilding. All of Havana is literally crumbling. Stunning facades have fallen in heaps. Throughout this city, brilliant but severely worn architecture lies masked behind the drying laundry of impoverished families crowded into space that at one time bustled with trade and the activities of the well-to-do.

### 2NC – Link overview (0:40)

#### Aff crowds out China:

#### 1) New hemispheric tone – causes bandwagoning to the US which disrupts Chinese trade blocs and creates an uncertain investment environment.

#### 2) Perception – shared history and culture mean countries will switch sides if we show interest – proximity supercharges the link

Ben Ami 13 (Shlomo Ben Ami, a former Israeli foreign minister who now serves as Vice President of the Toledo International Center for Peace “Is the US Losing Latin America?” http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/the-new-nature-of-us-influence-in-latin-america-by-shlomo-ben-ami)

Gone are the days when military muscle and the politics of subversion could secure US influence – in Latin America or anywhere else. A world power today is one that can combine economic vigor and a popular culture with global outreach on the basis of shared interests. The US is better positioned than any other power in this respect, particularly when it comes to applying these advantages in its immediate vicinity.

#### 3) Empirics – Columbia pushed China out after we funded their war on FARC – affecting ideology is key – spills over to regional market access

Ellis 2011(R. Evan, Associate professor with the William J. Perry Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies “Chinese Soft Power in Latin America: A Case Study”, NDU Press, Issue 60, 1st Quarter, http://www.ndu.edu/press/lib/images/jfq-60/JFQ60\_85-91\_Ellis.pdf)//VP

It is also important to clarify that soft power is based on perceptions and emotion (that is, inferences), and not necessarily on objective reality. Although China's current trade with and investment position in Latin America are still limited compared to those of the United States,3 its influence in the region is based not so much on the current size of those activities, but rather on hopes or fears in the region of what it could be in the future. Because perception drives soft power, the nature of the PRC impact on each country in Latin America is shaped by its particular situation, hopes, fears, and prevailing ideology. The "Bolivarian socialist" regime of Hugo Chávez in Venezuela sees China as a powerful ally in its crusade against Western "imperialism," while countries such as Peru, Chile, and Colombia view the PRC in more traditional terms as an important investor and trading partner within the context of global free market capitalism. The core of Chinese soft power in Latin America, as in the rest of the world, is the widespread perception that the PRC, because of its sustained high rates of economic growth and technology development, will present tremendous business opportunities in the future, and will be a power to be reckoned with globally. In general, this perception can be divided into seven areas: hopes for future access to Chinese markets hopes for future Chinese investment influence of Chinese entities and infrastructure in Latin America hopes for the PRC to serve as a counterweight to the United States and Western institutions China as a development model affinity for Chinese culture and work ethic China as "the wave of the future." In each of these cases, the soft power of the PRC can be identified as operating through distinct sets of actors: the political leadership of countries, the business community, students and youth, and the general population.

### 2NC – Link (generic zero-sum)

#### Relations are zero-sum:

#### 1) Financing locus – US proximity means we step in

Menendez 13 (Fernando Menéndez, an economist and principal of Cordoba Group International LLC, 3-28-13, China US Focus, “The Counterbalance in America’s Backyard”, web)

From the perspective of Latin America’s foreign policy makers, China is undeniably a welcome economic, and potentially political, counterbalance to the U.S., especially given the objectives of some Latin American countries. Despite its preoccupation with the Middle East and its recent economic troubles, the U.S. remains a predominant actor in the region, and only the presence of a country capable of projecting superior economic and political power could significantly shift the balance of forces away from the current hegemon. Moreover, unlike the former Soviet Union – once described as a third world country with nuclear weapons – China has the economic resources to create an alternative locus of financing, trade and development. China’s foreign policy has long sought stable and positive relations with the U.S. in order to ensure optimal conditions for domestic economic growth. Economic considerations often proved paramount to its foreign policy, avoiding tensions where possible. Nevertheless, as China projects itself in the Americas, conflicts with the United States are likely. As the U.S. loses market share, faces higher costs for raw materials, as American investors find fewer opportunities, and especially if Latin American nations try to entangle China in regional tensions, U.S. political and military moves in East Asia may raise China’s cost of doing business in the Americas. Similarly, perceived or actual ties between some Chinese companies and the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) will undoubtedly raise concerns from America’s national security apparatus.

#### 2) US decline proves

Mallen 13(<http://www.ibtimes.com/latin-america-increases-relations-china-what-does-mean-us-1317981> Latin America Increases Relations With China: What Does That Mean For The US? By Patricia Rey Mallén on June 28 2013 nkj)

As if to confirm the declining hegemony of the United States as the ruling global superpower, China is gaining influence in its hemispheric "backyard," Secretary of State John Kerry's unintentionally insulting designation for Latin America. China has had its sights on Latin America for the past decade and is now positioning itself as a competitive trade partner in the region. The populous, rapidly developing Asian nation covets oil, soybeans and gold, of which Latin America has plenty, and has been slowly but steadily increasing its presence and its trade with several countries there. The U.S., whose history of blocking outside political influence in Latin America going back to the Monroe Doctrine, has been directing its attention elsewhere, as Michael Cerna of the China Research Center observed. “[The U.S.'] attention of late has been focused on Iraq and Afghanistan, and Latin America fell lower and lower on America’s list of priorities. China has been all too willing to fill any void,” Cerna said. Related Will Nicaragua’s New Canal Overshadow Panama’s? A Tale Of Two Trips: Latin America Reacts To Xi and Biden's Visits Between 2000 and 2009, China increased its two-way trade with Latin America by 660 percent, from $13 billion at the beginning of the 21st century to more than $120 billion nine years later. Latin American exports to China reached $41.3 billion, almost 7 percent of the region's total exports. China’s share of the region’s trade was less than 10 percent in 2000; by 2009, the number had jumped to 12 percent. As impressive as that growth is, the numbers still pale in comparison to the U.S.' stats in its commercial relationship with Latin America. The U.S. still holds more than half of the total trade, adding up to $560 billion in 2008. Notably, though, America’s trade participation in Latin America has remained static, while China is closing the gap more and more each year -- having already surpassed the U.S. in some countries, including powerhouse Brazil. Concomitant with this burgeoning interest from the Far East, Latin America is undergoing an economic rebirth. After decades of devastating economic crises, the region is experiencing unprecedented growth: On average, annual GDP growth for Latin American countries will be 3.7 percent this year, according to United Nations estimates, almost double the average for the rest of the world. That has prompted several countries to form quasi-governmental entities to further promote the progress of the region. One such entity is the recently formed Pacific Alliance. Born with the specific goal of increasing relations with Asia, its members include Mexico, Colombia, Chile and Peru, which together represent half of the region’s total exports and 35 percent of its GDP. In a meeting in Colombian capital Bogotá last month, the Pacific Alliance signed an agreement to open its member countries' economies to Asian markets; the U.S., despite an invitation, did not attend. Though a recent trip to the region by Vice President Joe Biden seems to run counter to the Pacific Alliance snub, China’s President Xi Jinping has also visited recently, and likewise met with Latin American leaders, illustrating how the two global powers are going after the same prize. U.S. Vice President Joe Biden (c.) visited the Santa Marta slum in Rio de Janeiro in May. REUTERS/Victor R. Caivano/Pool Biden traveled to Colombia, Trinidad and Tobago and Brazil in May, with the last leg of his trip coinciding with the beginning of Xi’s in Trinidad, before jumping to Costa Rica and Mexico. Both leaders met with several Latin American presidents and discussed trade and cooperation. The outcomes of their trips were very different, however. Xi’s trip was the first visit from a Chinese official to the region in almost a decade. Trinidad and Tobago’s main newspaper, Newsday, called the visit a “historic occasion” and a “visit from China to a good friend.” Prime Minister Kamla Persad-Bissessar said she was committed to boosting relations with China and accepted an invitation to Beijing for November of this year. In Costa Rica, Xi signed a $400 million loan to build a cross-country road and reaffirmed relations with its main ally in the region. Costa Rica is the only country in Latin America that sides with China in the mainland-Taiwanese dispute and does not recognize the island as a nation. Even more significant was Xi’s visit to Mexico. President Enrique Peña Nieto welcomed his Chinese counterpart, whom he had visited in Beijing in April, and made his intentions clear: Mexico wants closer trade relations with China, with whom it has a gap of $45 billion in export and import -- an important development considering that Mexico is, for now, America's biggest trade partner in the world. China's President Xi Jinping (l.) and first lady Peng Liyuan walk together during a visit at the archaeological site of Chichen Itza in the peninsula of Yucatan June 6, 2013. Xi and his wife were on a three-day official visit to Mexico. REUTERS/Victor Ruiz Garcia Biden’s visit was not as successful. His meeting in Trinidad and Tobago was called “brutal and tense” by Persad-Bissessar, and Colombian journalist Andrés Oppenheimer deemed the trip a sympathy visit after Secretary John Kerry called Latin America “Washington’s backyard” in a much-berated slip last April. While Biden had pleasant meetings in Rio and Bogotá, no agreements were signed during his trip. Perhaps the biggest development in China’s investment in the area is the recent decision by the Nicaraguan congress to allow a Chinese company to build a canal through the country. Although still in the proposal stages, the project would bring profound change to the geopolitics of the region -- and even the world. If built, the canal could significantly affect commerce through the Panama Canal, which, though it is now part of Panama's domain, was built by the U.S. and remains a symbol of the nation's historical dominance in the region. That dominance is in decline. After decades of uncontested U.S. influence in the region, some Latin American leaders have started making decidedly anti-American policies. The most notable was the late Venezuelan Comandante Hugo Chávez, who was very vocal about his disdain for the U.S., but he is far from the only one. Bolivia's President Evo Morales, for instance, kicked out USAID after Kerry's verbal slip, and has gone so far as to ban Coca-Cola from the country. But now it's Ecuador bumping heads with its northern neighbor, mostly in regard to Ecuador granting entry to NSA-secrets leaker Edward Snowden. President Rafael Correa openly said that they would welcome the whistle-blower because he was a "free man," no matter what the U.S. said. Disagreements between the governments have led to the cancellation of a special trade agreement, which Ecuador has called "an instrument of blackmail." The SS Kroonland transits the newly opened Panama Canal on Feb. 2, 1915, via the Culebra Cut. The canal has long symbolized U.S. dominance in the region. Underwood & Underwood (public domain) Beyond the lack of understanding with its former main trade partner, why is Latin America so smitten with China? Kevin Gallagher, a professor of international relations at Boston University, says China speaks to the region’s newfound confidence. “China is offering attractive deals to Latin American economies while the United States continues to lecture and dictate,” Gallagher wrote for The Globalist. “For too long, the United States has relied on a rather imperial mechanism, just telling Latin America what it needs,” he added. “Compare that to China’s approach: It offers Latin America what it wants.” Gallagher argued that the U.S.’ biggest offer to Latin America is the Trans-Pacific Partnership, which offers access to the U.S. market on three conditions: deregulate financial markets, adopt intellectual property provisions that give preferences to U.S. firms, and allow U.S. firms to sue governments for violating any of its conditions. China, on the other hand, has been providing more financing to Latin America than the World Bank, the Inter-American Development Bank and the U.S. Export-Import Bank combined since 2003, with no previous conditions and very few strings attached. “Latin America is very sensitive to any notions of conditionality due to painful past experiences with the IMF and the World Bank,” Gallagher said. “China makes sure that its policy is not based on conditionalities.” Gallagher said the U.S. should awake from its past slumber and stop taking Latin America for granted. Shlomo Ben-Ami, vice president of the Toledo International Center for Peace and former Israeli foreign minister, takes a different stance. He argues that China's advancement in the region does not automatically equate with American loss of preeminence. U.S. exports to Latin America continue to rise (by 94 percent over the past six years), as do imports (87 percent in the same period), and America continues to be the biggest foreign investor in the area. Perhaps even more crucial are America's cultural and historical ties to the region, Ben-Ami said. “Given the extraordinary growth of Latinos’ influence in the U.S., it is almost inconceivable that America could lose its unique status in the region to China,” he said. Still, Gallagher and Ben-Ami agree that the U.S. needs to step up, both economically and diplomatically, to compete with new influences in a part of the world that was until recently widely considered America’s domain. “Gone are the days when military muscle and the politics of subversion could secure U.S. influence -- in Latin America or anywhere else,” Ben-Ami said. “It is high time for the U.S. government to undertake a true rethink of its economic policy toward Latin America,” Gallagher observed. “Very soon, it might be too late.”

#### 3) Resources and markets prove – influence is key

Regenstreif 13(The looming U.S.-China rivalry over Latin America By Gary Regenstreif JUNE 12, 2013 <http://blogs.reuters.com/great-debate/2013/06/12/the-looming-u-s-china-rivalry-over-latin-america/> nkj)

Though the U.S. and Chinese presidents heralded a “new model” of cooperation at their weekend summit, a growing competition looks more likely. The whirlwind of activity before President Barack Obama met with President Xi Jinping in the California desert revealed that Beijing and Washington’s sights are set on a similar prize — and face differing challenges to attain it. Their focus is Latin America and the prize is increased trade and investment opportunities in a region where economic reforms have pulled millions out of poverty and into the middle class. Latin America is rich in the commodities and energy that both China and the United States need, largely stable politically and eager to do deals. Consider the travel itinerary: Obama visited Mexico and Costa Rica last month. Vice President Joe Biden recently went to Colombia, Trinidad and Tobago and Brazil. Chile’s president paid Obama a visit last week, Peru’s leader arrived Tuesday and Brazil’s is due in October. Meanwhile, just after Biden left Trinidad, Xi arrived, part of a tour that also took him to Costa Rica and Mexico to promote trade and cooperation. Both U.S. and Chinese officials, however, are finding a more self-confident Latin America, able to leverage its new strength to forge better agreements and find multiple trading partners. That will likely force Washington to work harder to maintain its leading trade position against China — which has money to burn in the region. “There is a more energetic [U.S.] tone, a more optimistic mood about economic agenda in second term than [the] first time,” Michael Shifter, president of the Inter-American Dialogue, a Washington policy group, told me. “There’s something happening in the region and the U.S. wants to be part of it. Whether there’s a well-thought-out vision or policy remains a question. But there is more of an affirmation of the region and a willingness to engage.” The United States, Latin America’s largest trading partner throughout much of its history, still retains this position. Washington has now signed free trade agreements with more than a third of the hemisphere’s nations and annually exchanges more than $800 billion in goods and services with Latin America — more than three times the region’s commerce with China. In Obama’s first term, however, the administration was widely viewed as neglecting Latin America. And China has moved in fast. China built its annual trade with the region from virtually nothing in 2000 to about $260 billion in 2012. In 2009, it overtook the United States as the largest trading partner of Brazil, the region’s powerhouse — largely through massive purchases of iron ore and soy. Other data is telling: In 1995, for example, the United States accounted for 37 percent of Brazil’s foreign direct investment. That dropped to 10 percent in 2011, according to the Council of the Americas, which seeks to foster hemispheric ties. Washington’s renewed ardor is at least partly because of the fear that China will repeat in Latin America the economic success it has built in Africa. China has been able to present itself as a benevolent partner there, which has played well against the West’s history of meddling in domestic affairs. “It’s about influence and leverage,” said Eric Farnsworth, vice president of the Council of the Americas, “…The region matured and expects to be treated in real partnership rather than [in the] patronizing way it happened in the past.”

#### 4) Security contracts – relations ensure military alliances which deter China

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[Alan. Senior Analyst at the American Security Council. “Countering China's Reach in Latin America” 2012. <http://www.ascfusa.org/content_pages/view/crisisinamericas>]

Second, the U.S. must stop taking the Western Hemisphere for granted, and instead must reengage in its own neighborhood economically, politically and militarily.¶ ¶ That means no more allowing trade deals—and the partners counting on them—to languish. Plans for a hemispheric free trade zone have faltered and foundered. The trade-expansion agreements with Panama and Colombia were left in limbo for years, before President Obama finally signed them into law in 2011.¶ ¶ Reengagement means reviving U.S. diplomacy. The Wall Street Journal reports that due to political wrangling in Washington, the State Department position focused on the Western Hemisphere has been staffed by an interim for nearly a year, while six Western Hemisphere ambassadorial posts (Uruguay, Venezuela, Ecuador, El Salvador, Nicaragua and Barbados) remain empty. Reengagement means reversing plans to slash defense spending. The Joint Forces Command noted in 2008 that China has “a deep respect for U.S. military power.” We cannot overstate how important this has been to keeping the peace. But with the United States in the midst of massive military retrenchment, one wonders how long that reservoir of respect will last.¶ ¶ Reengagement also means revitalizing security ties. A good model to follow might be what’s happening in China’s backyard. To deter China and prevent an accidental war, the U.S. is reviving its security partnerships all across the Asia-Pacific region. Perhaps it’s time to do the same in Latin America. We should remember that many Latin American countries—from Mexico and Panama to Colombia and Chile—border the Pacific. Given Beijing’s actions, it makes sense to bring these Latin American partners on the Pacific Rim into the alliance of alliances that is already stabilizing the Asia-Pacific region.

#### 5) Trade agreements prove

Johnson 5

[Stephen. Senior Latin American Policy Analyst at Heritage. “Balancing China's Growing Influence in Latin America” 10/24/5 <http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2005/10/balancing-chinas-growing-influence-in-latin-america>]

In the 1960s, the Soviet Union defied America's Monroe Doctrine by supporting Fidel Castro's mili­tary buildup in Cuba. Later, it supported insurgencies in Central America. This triggered a competition among existing right-wing dictatorships, Marxist authoritarianism, and the U.S. democratic model. In the end, democracy and open markets won. Pro­moted by the United States, these principles have generally made Latin American states more viable politically, economically, and commercially.¶ Today, another communist state-the People's Republic of China (PRC)-is seeking trade, diplo­matic, and military ties in Latin America and the Car­ibbean. The region is rich in natural resources and developing markets for manufactured goods and even arms. China does not currently pose a direct military threat in Latin America and has steadily embraced market concepts, but it represents serious competi­tion that could dilute U.S. influence. Washington could ignore this intrusion or attempt to contain it. Ignoring it leaves a vacuum for China to fill, while trying to contain it runs against America's own free market ideals. Instead, the United States can best look after its hemispheric interests and moderate China's presence by:¶ Consolidating trade relations with Latin America and removing protectionist U.S. trade barriers,¶ Emphasizing comprehensive relationships as opposed to narrow-interest diplomacy such as counternarcotics,¶ Minimizing unproductive restrictions on assis­tance to U.S. neighbors, and¶ Pressing harder for democratic and economic reforms, prioritizing support for these pur­poses, and reenergizing public diplomacy.

### 2NC – Link (perception)

#### Link’s perception based:

#### 1) Gravitational effect toward trade powers

Kreps and Flores-Macias 13 (Sarah E. Kreps, Assistant Professor of Government at Cornell University and Gustavo A. Flores-Macías, Assistant Professor of Government at Cornell University. “No Strings Attached? Evaluating China’s Trade Relations Abroad.” The Diplomat 17 May 2013. Web.) <http://thediplomat.com/china-power/no-strings-attached-evaluating-chinas-trade-relations-abroad/> EW

To be sure, China may not have a purposeful plan to bring their trade partners into alignment on foreign policy questions. Even if unintentional**,** however,this “gravitational effect” has a sound economic basis. Developing countries in Africa and Latin America are comparatively much more dependent on China than China is on these countries. In a ten year period, for example, Sudan’s trade with China rose from 1 to 10% of its Gross Domestic Product. That pattern is even starker in a country like Angola, for which trade with China represented 25% of its GDP in 2006. While China certainly needs access to the resources in these countries, the individual countries are far less important to China than China is to these countries. The asymmetry in needs gives China a bargaining advantage that translates into foreign policy outcomes even if not by explicit design. Whether by design or not, the convergence with China’s foreign policy goals is important on at least two levels. First, developing countries in Africa and Latin America may be lulled by the prospect of partnering with a country such as China that does not have an explicit political agenda, as did the United States and Soviet Union during the Cold War, but this appears to be an illusion. Whether this reaches the level of “new colonialism” as former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton referred to it remains to be seen, but the economic asymmetries that undergird the relationship make that prospect more likely.A second set of implications deals with the United States. During the same period in which China’s trade with Africa and Latin America and foreign policy convergence have increased, the United States and China have actually diverged in their overall UNGA voting behavior. This suggests something of a zero sum dynamic in which China’s growing trade relations make it easier to attract allies in international forums while US influence is diminishing. Taken together, these trends call for greater engagement on behalf of the United States in the developing world. Since the September 2001 attacks, Washington has dealt with Africa and Latin America through benign neglect and shifted its attention elsewhere. If foreign policy alignment does follow from tighter commercial relations, the US ought to reinvigorate its trade and diplomatic agenda as an important means of projecting influence abroad.

#### 2) Trade blocs prove

**Valencia 6/24** (Robert, Contributing Writer at Global Voices Online and the World Policy Institute, 6/24/13, “US and China: The Fight for Latin America,” http://www.worldpolicy.org/blog/2013/06/24/us-and-china-fight-latin-america)//DR. H

During the first weekend of June, U.S. President Barack Obama and Chinese President Xi Jinping met in California to discuss cyber espionage and territorial claims in the Pacific Rim. While tension on these topics has hogged the headlines, the fight for influence in another area could be even more important—Latin America. Other emerging markets in Africa, where China has an overwhelming influence due to foreign direct investment in mining and oil, also offer economic opportunities, but Latin America has an abundance of natural resources, greater purchasing power, and geographic proximity to the United States, which has long considered Latin America as its “backyard.”

The key question now is will Latin American countries lean more toward China or the United States, or will it find a way to balance the two against each other? Right now, Latin American countries are increasingly confident thanks to burgeoning economic and political integration by way of trading blocs, and they're demanding to be treated as an equal player.

As a sign of its growing importance, China and the United States have courted Latin America more than usual. In May, President Barack Obama visited Mexico and Costa Rica while Vice President Joe Biden visited Colombia, Brazil, and Trinidad and Tobago. Shortly after these trips, President Xi went to Mexico and Costa Rica to foster economic cooperation.

China’s active involvement in Latin American geopolitics can be traced back to 2009. Chinalco, China’s largest mining company, signed a $2.2 billion deal with Peru to build the Toromocho mine and a $70 million wharf in the Callao port. Since then, Peru has sent 18.3 percent of its exports to China, making China Peru’s largest trading partner. China’s imports to Peru, however, rank second with 13.7 percent of the market while the United States holds first place with 24.5 percent.

China has the upper hand with the Latin American leftist countries in terms of infrastructure and technology. In 2009, Chinese telephone manufacturer ZTE played an instrumental role in assembling the first mobile phone in Venezuela known as “El Vergatario” (Venezuela slang for optimal). Former President Hugo Chávez introduced this new phone to low-income families making it the world’s cheapest phone ($6.99 for a handset). Additionally, China landed rail construction projects in Argentina and Venezuela and has become a major buyer of farm products and metal in South America. Between 2011 and 2012, China purchased nearly 58.02 million tons of soy from Argentina, up from 52 million in 2011 and 2010.

#### 3) Soft balancing

Dosch and Goodman, 12 (Jörn, Professor of International Relations and Deputy Head of School (Research) at Monash University, Professor of Chinese Politics at the University of Sydney, “China and Latin America: Complementarity, Competition, and Globalization,” Journal of Current Chinese Affairs 1/2012: 3-19, page 11-12, Online, http://journals.sub.uni-hamburg.de/giga/jcca/article/viewFile/493/491, accessed 7/18/13) PE

Overall, there can be little doubt that particularly some of the leftwing – and as it seems, by default, more Washington-critical – Latin American governments perceive a partnership with Beijing as a welcome means of soft-balancing or hedging against traditional US hegemony in the region. While Latin American governments may rightly complain about both a frequent lack of serious attention on the part of the United States and the latter’s rather narrowly defined national security interests in its relations with its hemispheric neighbours, why should they be interested in replacing a decades-long dependency on the United States by a new dependency on China? Is there any convincing economic reason for Latin American countries to play the China card in an attempt to balance against the United States? China is an increasingly important factor in Latin America, but it is one among many. David Shambaugh (2008) accurately stresses that Latin American countries “embrace China as part of their new multidirectional diplomacy”. Multidirectional is the key word here. All Latin American governments have diversified their foreign relations. Their main interest is moderating US hegemony, not substituting it. As part of this strategy and particularly in times of economic hardship such as in the wake of the global economic crisis of 2008–09, every trade and investment opportunity is welcome. States in the era of globalisation are best described as rational opportunity maximisers. This applies to Latin America as much as to East Asia; it is true for Vietnam or South Korea in the same way as for Peru or Mexico. The result of opportunity-maximising in Asia–Latin America relations is a growing and fast-tightening (but not yet deeply institutionalised) trans- Pacific network comprising trade, investment, political and even security links in both bilateral and (increasingly) multilateral contexts. China is a founding member of the Forum for East Asia–Latin America Cooperation (FEALAC), a permanent observer at the Organization of American States (OAS) and has expanded its diplomatic ties to the Group of Rio, the Andean Community, and the Caribbean Community (CARICOM).

### 2NC – CCP collapse (0:30)

#### **Chinese growth prevents global economic collapse, war over Taiwan and CCP collapse**

Lewis 8 [Dan, Research Director – Economic Research Council, “The Nightmare of a Chinese Economic Collapse,” World Finance, 5/13, http://www.worldfinance.com/news/home/finalbell/article117.html]

In 2001, Gordon Chang authored a global bestseller "The Coming Collapse of China." To suggest that the world’s largest nation of 1.3 billion people is on the brink of collapse is understandably for many, a deeply unnerving theme. And many seasoned “China Hands” rejected Chang’s thesis outright. In a very real sense, they were of course right. China’s expansion has continued over the last six years without a hitch. After notching up a staggering 10.7 percent growth last year, it is now the 4th largest economy in the world with a nominal GDP of $2.68trn. Yet there are two Chinas that concern us here; the 800 million who live in the cities, coastal and southern regions and the 500 million who live in the countryside and are mainly engaged in agriculture. The latter – which we in the West hear very little about – are still very poor and much less happy. Their poverty and misery do not necessarily spell an impending cataclysm – after all, that is how they have always have been. But it does illustrate the inequity of Chinese monetary policy. For many years, the Chinese yen has been held at an artificially low value to boost manufacturing exports. This has clearly worked for one side of the economy, but not for the purchasing power of consumers and the rural poor, some of who are getting even poorer. The central reason for this has been the inability of Chinese monetary policy to adequately support both Chinas. Meanwhile, rural unrest in China is on the rise – fuelled not only by an accelerating income gap with the coastal cities, but by an oft-reported appropriation of their land for little or no compensation by the state. According to Professor David B. Smith, one of the City’s most accurate and respected economists in recent years, potentially far more serious though is the impact that Chinese monetary policy could have on many Western nations such as the UK. Quite simply, China’s undervalued currency has enabled Western governments to maintain artificially strong currencies, reduce inflation and keep interest rates lower than they might otherwise be. We should therefore be very worried about how vulnerable Western economic growth is to an upward revaluation of the Chinese yuan. Should that revaluation happen to appease China’s rural poor, at a stroke, the dollar, sterling and the euro would quickly depreciate, rates in those currencies would have to rise substantially and the yield on government bonds would follow suit. This would add greatly to the debt servicing cost of budget deficits in the USA, the UK and much of euro land. A reduction in demand for imported Chinese goods would quickly entail a decline in China’s economic growth rate. That is alarming. It has been calculated that to keep China’s society stable – ie to manage the transition from a rural to an urban society without devastating unemployment - the minimum growth rate is 7.2 percent. Anything less than that and unemployment will rise and the massive shift in population from the country to the cities becomes unsustainable. This is when real discontent with communist party rule becomes vocal and hard to ignore. It doesn’t end there. That will at best bring a global recession. The crucial point is that communist authoritarian states have at least had some success in keeping a lid on ethnic tensions – so far. But when multi-ethnic communist countries fall apart from economic stress and the implosion of central power, history suggests that they don’t become successful democracies overnight. Far from it. There’s a very real chance that China might go the way of Yugoloslavia or the Soviet Union – chaos, civil unrest and internecine war. In the very worst case scenario, a Chinese government might seek to maintain national cohesion by going to war with Taiwan – whom America is pledged to defend.

#### Regime instability causes lashout and nuclear war

Renxing, 05 (Sen, staff writer, The Epoch Times, (a privately owned Falon-Gong linked newspaper) August 3, 2005, “CCP Gambles Insanely to Avoid Death” <http://www.theepochtimes.com/news/5-8-3/30931.html>)

Since the Party’s life is “above all else,” it would not be surprising if the CCP resorts to the use of biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons in its attempt to postpone its life. The CCP, that disregards human life, would not hesitate to kill two hundred million Americans, coupled with seven or eight hundred million Chinese, to achieve its ends. The “speech,” free of all disguises, lets the public see the CCP for what it really is: with evil filling its every cell, the CCP intends to fight all of mankind in its desperate attempt to cling to life. And that is the theme of the “speech.” The theme is murderous and utterly evil. We did witness in China beggars who demanded money from people by threatening to stab themselves with knives or prick their throats on long nails. But we have never, until now, seen a rogue who blackmails the world to die with it by wielding biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons. Anyhow, the bloody confession affirmed the CCP’s bloodiness: a monstrous murderer, who has killed 80 million Chinese people, now plans to hold one billion people hostage and gamble with their lives.

### 2NC – AT: No China econ UQ

#### China is at a crtical transition point, they need long-term sustained growth to keep up the world economy

Xinhua 7/15

“Three international organizations: China's economy has reached critical period of transition” Xinhua <http://www.best-news.us/news-4907485-Three-international-organizations:-China-39s-economy-has-reached-critical-period-of-transition.html> SCTM

Xinhua Beijing, July 15 (Xinhua) (Reporter Hanjie An Bei) 15, National Bureau of Statistics released the first half of China's economy grew 7.6 percent, the Xinhua News Agency reporters Di Yishi and Jian Lianxian interviewed the IMF [microblogging], the Asian Development Bank, World Bank [microblogging] three international institutions relevant experts.¶ Look growth: Economic growth of 7.6% in the world what it means?¶ 'The U.S. economy is expected to grow 1.7 percent this year, the euro zone average negative growth, Japan may reach 2%, Russia is expected to increase 2% ......' In the International Monetary Fund (IMF) Research Department chief economist Olivier Blanchard Seoul seems that China's current economic growth is undoubtedly a major highlight of the global economy.¶ 'The economic growth of 7.6% in line with expectations.' Asian Development Bank Resident Representative Zhuang Jian, senior economist, told reporters that although the year in the second quarter, China's economic growth slowed down continuously reproduced, but the decline is ¶ Around the world, the world economy is still slow growth, and presented 'three-speed' growth pattern: China to lead the emerging market countries continue to maintain the 'fastest growing legion' advantage, the U.S. economy is steadily recovering, the vast majority of European countries are still struggling with difficult times.¶ At the same time, China, Brazil, India and other emerging economies, growth is slowing collective confirms an important signal: After years of rapid growth, the emerging economies are gradually entering the 'deceleration zone.'¶ Blanchard also noted that China's economic growth slowdown. Few days ago, IMF updated forecasts for the global economy of the agency predicted that China's economic growth this year of 7.8%, compared with April predictive value of cut 0.3 percentage points . 'China is becoming an economic slowdown affecting the global economy is one of the three new risks.' Blanchard said.¶ On Risk: China should avoid pursuing short-term economic growth superficial¶ National Bureau of Statistics data show that the first half of the investment in China's economic growth is still the largest engine, contribution to GDP ratio reached 53.9%.¶ Blanchard said that a large investment in China's economic growth, but a lot of investment from the shadow banking, which makes the Chinese macro-control policy-makers face a dilemma: If you continue to maintain high investment, it will exacerbate overcapacity and credit risk, but if the tightening credit control investment will result in slowdown in economic growth.¶ 'China should pay more attention to the quality of investment, to avoid the pursuit of short-term economic growth superficial.' Zhuang Jian said.¶ Zhuang Jian pointed out that the investment plays an important role in developing countries, China's current development is inseparable from the support of investment, but the investment structure and quality is very important.¶ 'If there is insufficient economic structure adjustment and upgrading of industrial structure, continue to increase investment will only make the problem more severe overcapacity will further exacerbate the local debt and credit risks.' He said.¶ In this regard, Blanchard believes that although China's economy is still at risk, but the macro-control policy makers, there is still enough space for policy control to prevent rapid decline in economic growth.¶ Seeking good way: China's economy has slowed down to a critical period of structural adjustment¶ In a globalized world, China's economy can achieve sustained and healthy development of the global economy is essential.¶ Blanchard noted that the global economy to achieve sustainable and balanced development, the major economies are facing the task of structural adjustment reforms. For China, a policy to focus on improving growth potential and increase spending on economic growth driven role. 'If say when the opportunity to achieve this transformation, it may be right now. '¶ 'China's economy continues to years of rapid growth, has been the need to slow down to adjust the structure to the way a critical stage.' Zhuang Jian pointed out the factors supporting China's economic growth is changing, China urgently looking for a new economic growth point, and widespread Consensus is to slow down the growth rate, in both the economic growth, more emphasis on improving the quality and efficiency of economic growth.

## Multilat

### 2NC – AT: Multilateralism

#### Even if the aff gives US leadership some credibility, it can’t solve all multilateralism – that requires domestic concessions to international treaties like Kyoto and CTBT which we haven’t done.

#### Framing issue: they have to win Congress likes multilat before they win it’ll be effective. It’s not a monolithic entity.

#### They don’t solve:

#### a) Domestic opposition – that’s Grandin – foreign policy’s held hostage to the ag lobby which proves only the CP solves.

#### b) Consensus – G/20 and Syria prove – the US can’t get other countries on board and Russia’s revisionism causes policy obstructionism – they have a deciding vote on the security council which means US engagement alone is insufficient.

#### I’m gonna go through both their 1AC internal links – if they lose these, they lose try or die framing and their impacts.

#### a) The Dickerson evidence doesn’t make an exclusive claim or address domestic issues – the idea that the GOP would be cooperative in terms of Obama’s foreign policy is laughable – empirics prove they block treaties and business interests hinder effective ratification – even if treaties pass, domestic fragmentation makes us look like we don’t care which turns multilat – domestic uniformity is key and they don’t credibly solve.

#### b) The Grandin ev is our advantage CP – indicates a litany of other things solve – that was above.

#### c) The Sabatini piece of ev whose name I forget doesn’t make an exclusive claim – he only says “the US must include Latin America in its strategic calculations” which the CP solves. There’s no sufficiency threshold and they haven’t made a reverse causal claim that not lifting the embargo actively decimates other strategies for multilat.

#### And it fails:

#### 1) Implementation – it’s good in theory but not practice

**Multilat fails**

**Holmes 10—**VP, foreign policy and defense studies, Heritage. Frmr Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs. While at the State Department, Holmes was responsible for developing policy and coordinating U.S. engagement at the United Nations and 46 other international organizations. Member of the CFR. Frmr adjunct prof of history, Georgetown. PhD in history, Georgetown (Kim, Smart Multilateralism and the United Nations, 21 Sept. 2010, http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2010/09/smart-multilateralism-when-and-when-not-to-rely-on-the-united-nations, AMiles)

The need for multilateralism is obvious. Nations share concerns about many problems and issues for which coordinated efforts could be mutually beneficial. Yet only rarely do all governments agree on the nature of a problem and the means to address it. At times, negotiations result in a less-than-perfect, but still acceptable, course of action. Disagreements can also lead to no action or the use of force or other confrontational measures. One of the purposes of multilateralism is to minimize the number and intensity of such confrontations. The process itself, however, is fraught with political challenges that can undermine potential solutions and even lead to other problems. For the United States, multilateralism faces its greatest challenge at the United Nations, where U.S. diplomats seek cooperative action among member nations on serious international problems. Therein lies the tension. The United Nations is first and foremost a political body made up of 192 states that rarely agree on any one issue. Even fundamental issues, such as protecting and observing human rights, a key purpose of the U.N. that all member states pledge to uphold when they join it, have become matters of intense debate. A key reason for this difficulty is the fact that the voices and votes of totalitarian and authoritarian regimes have equal weight to those of free nations at the U.N. The all-too-frequent clash of worldviews between liberty and authoritarian socialism has stymied multilateralism more than facilitated it, frequently **leading to institutional paralysis** when a unified response to grave threats to peace and security or human rights and fundamental freedoms was needed. U.S. secretary of state John Foster Dulles, who attended the San Francisco meetings that established the U.N., acknowledged this Achilles’ heel in 1954, when he told reporters: “The United Nations was not set up to be a reformatory. It was assumed that you would be good before you got in and not that being in would make you good.”[1] Fifty-five years later, the ideological fray at the U.N. has turned the terms “democracy” and “freedom” on their heads. Autocracies that deny democratic liberties at home are all too keen to call the Security Council “undemocratic” because in their view not every region, country, or bloc is sufficiently represented. During my time at the State Department, I was told repeatedly by other diplomats at the U.N. that the very concept of “freedom” is taboo because the term is “too ideologically charged.” In this environment, how can the United States or any freedom-loving country advance the purposes set forth in the U.N. Charter, including “encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all,”[2] when the word “freedom” itself is considered too controversial? More money will not do it. No other nation contributes more to the U.N.’s regular budget, its peacekeeping budget, or the budgets of its myriad affiliated organizations and activities than the United States. America has continued its generous support even though Americans increasingly view the U.N. as inefficient and ineffective at best and fraudulent, wasteful, anti-American, and beyond reform at worst.[3] If the United States is to advance its many interests in the world, it needs to pursue multilateral diplomacy in a smarter, more pragmatic manner. This is especially true when Washington is considering actions taken through the United Nations. A decision to engage multilaterally should meet two criteria: First, it should be in America’s interests, and second, it will serve to advance liberty. Unless the United States can achieve both these ends acting within the U.N. system, it should find ways to work around it. Such “smart multilateralism” is not easy, particularly in multilateral settings. It requires politically savvy leaders who can overcome decades-old bureaucratic inertia at the State Department and in international organizations. **It requires the political will and diplomatic skill** of people who are dedicated to advancing U.S. interests in difficult environments, especially where progress will likely be slow and incremental. It requires a belief in the cause of liberty, gleaned from a thorough study of our nation’s history and the U.S. Constitution, and a deep appreciation for the values and principles that have made America great. Smart multilateralism requires a fundamental awareness of the strengths and weaknesses, capabilities and failings, of the U.N. and other multilateral negotiating forums, so that the United States does not overreach. Perhaps the most critical decision is whether or not to take a matter to the U.N. in the first place. It would be better to restrict U.S. engagement at the U.N. to situations in which success is possible or engagement will strengthen America’s influence and reputation. Selective engagement increases the potential for success, and success breeds success. When America is perceived to be a skillful and judicious multilateral player, it finds it easier to press its case. Smart multilateralism thus requires well-formulated and clear policy positions and a willingness to hold countries accountable when their votes do not align with our interests. Finally, smart multilateralism is not the same thing as “smart power,” a term that Secretary of State Hillary Clinton has used. Suzanne Nossell, a former diplomat at the U.S. Mission to the U.N. in New York, coined that term in 2004 and described it in an article in Foreign Affairs.[4] Smart power is seen as a takeoff of “soft power,” which suggests that America’s leaders downplay the nation’s military might as well as its historic role in establishing an international system based on the values of liberty and democracy, and de-emphasize its immense economic and military (“hard”) power. Smart power seeks to persuade other countries from a position of assumed equality among nations. This assumption has become the Achilles’ heel of the U.N. system and other Cold War–era organizations. Smart multilateralism does not make that same mistake. Challenges to Effective U.S. Multilateralism The United States belongs to dozens of multilateral organizations, from large and well-known organizations such as NATO, the World Trade Organization (WTO), and the International Monetary Fund to relatively small niche organizations such as the Universal Postal Union and the International Bureau of Weights and Measures. The 2009 congressional budget justification[5] for the U.S. Department of State included line items for U.S. contributions to some fifty distinct international organizations and budgets.[6] The United Nations and its affiliated bodies receive the lion’s share of these contributions. While the World Bank and International Monetary Fund weight voting based on contributions, most of these organizations subscribe to the notion of the equality of nations’ votes. With a few exceptions such as Taiwan,[7] all nations—no matter how small or large, free or repressed, rich or poor—have a seat at the U.N. table. Every nation’s vote is equal, despite great differences in geographic size, population, military or economic power, and financial contributions. This one-country, one-vote principle makes the U.N. an extremely difficult venue in which to wage successful multilateral diplomacy. In this environment, multilateralism becomes a double-edged sword. It can sometimes speed up global responses to global problems, as with the avian flu outbreak and the Asian tsunami. At other times, it can slow or prevent timely responses, as with halting Iran’s nuclear weapons program and stopping genocide in Darfur. Too often, multilateralism at the U.N. is the political means by which other countries and regional blocs constrain or block action. Groups of small nations can join together to outvote the great powers on key issues, and this situation can often lead to bizarre outcomes and compromises. Even seemingly noncontroversial issues, such as improving auditing of U.N. expenditures, require days of skillful, almost nonstop negotiations. The U.N. is simply too poorly primed for American multilateralism. It is a vast labyrinth of agencies, offices, committees, commissions, programs, and funds, often with overlapping and duplicative missions.[8] Lines of accountability and responsibility for specific issues or efforts are complex, confused, and often indecipherable. For example, dozens of U.N. bodies focus on development, the environment, and children’s and women’s issues. Coordination is minimal. Reliable means to assess the effectiveness of the bodies’ independent activities is practically nonexistent. Although institutional fiefdoms and bureaucratic interests strongly influence the formulation of U.N. policy, programs, and resolutions, the most powerful actors remain the member states. Each tries to persuade the U.N. as an institution to advocate and adopt its positions on the matters most important to it. The chaos of conflicting priorities rarely results in consensus for decisive action. The most common result is inaction or a lowest-common-denominator outcome. Too often, the United States also finds that other countries’ positions on an issue have been predetermined in their regional or political groupings. These groupings include the European Union; the G-77, or Group of 77 (which is really a caucus of some 130 countries, including China, Iran, and Cuba); the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM); the African Union (AU); the Arab League; and the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC). Some countries participate in several of these blocs. Added to this mix is heavy lobbying by “civil society” special interest groups, especially on contentious causes, which helps to explain why the United States faces an uphill battle in successfully husbanding any policy proposal through the U.N. system. Perhaps the most stunning example came under President Bill Clinton, when the United States was trying to negotiate changes to the Rome Statute, which established the International Criminal Court (ICC), so that the United States could sign it. Intense lobbying by nongovernmental organizations at the proceedings culminated in dramatic cheering when 120 countries voted in favor of the statute despite U.S. objections.[9] Of course, the most difficult forum for negotiating multilateral solutions is the Security Council, where the most serious security matters are raised and the greatest failures of multilateralism have occurred. During the Cold War, the Soviet Union largely shut down the council with its veto. As a result, the United States conducted most of its international affairs outside of the U.N., yet very few complaints of unilateralism were heard. That changed when the Soviet Union dissolved, and the hope was that the U.N. would at last become a force for good in the world. Instead, new rivalries have emerged that undermine its effectiveness. Perhaps the most frustrating development for U.S. multilateralism at the U.N. in the post–Cold War era has been the inability of the United States to develop a shared position with some of its best friends in Europe. Often, the allies say that they cannot negotiate with the United States until the European Union has taken a “common European position.” Yet after that common position has been adopted, individual European countries claim far less flexibility to negotiate. The EU also has been known to strong-arm its allies as well as its member states to oppose U.S. positions. For example, on the issue of genocide in Darfur, I witnessed the EU’s most visible leaders pressing the United States to accept the ICC as the international judicial authority to try war crimes committed in Sudan, rather than setting up an ad hoc tribunal. Furthermore, they leaned on Romania to go along with their position, even threatening Romania with punitive action if it did not. Countries hostile to the United States and to economic and political freedoms can and do take full advantage of this crack in the West’s once-unified front. Sometimes, though, the United States is its own worst enemy. Intense interagency discussions must take place before the State Department sends out any instruction cable to its negotiators at the U.N. and diplomats in capitals. Such delays can be costly because they give other countries time to sway votes against the U.S. position, leaving U.S. negotiators with little time to convince others to change their minds. For U.S. negotiators, this process can blur not only the clarity of purpose, but also policy objectives. Even after the State Department, Defense Department, and National Security Council hammer out a policy, U.S. diplomats are sometimes simply unable to advance it. Many who are fairly new to the negotiations must deal with counterparts from other countries who have worked the same issue in international settings for years. Some U.S. diplomats would rather settle for consensus than work for an outcome in which the U.S. will be isolated and which places America alongside pariah states such as Zimbabwe or Sudan, even if those countries voted with the United States for starkly different reasons.

#### 2) GOP and partisanship block functional effectiveness

**Rogin 10**—Worked at the House International Relations Committee, the Embassy of Japan, and the Brookings Institution. Graduate of George Washington University's Elliott School of International Affairs (11 Nov 2010, Josh, Obama's Top 10 Foreign-Policy Headaches, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/11/10/10\_foreign\_policy\_issues\_that\_just\_got\_harder\_for\_obama, AMiles)

Now that Republicans have taken back the House of Representatives and seem to be preparing to thwart U.S. President Barack Obama's domestic-policy agenda, the White House may be tempted to look to foreign policy to achieve some victories in the coming year, as well as a means of achieving a measure of cooperation with a seemingly intransigent GOP.

But if that is the administration's strategy, **it's likely to fall flat. On most, if not all, of Obama's top foreign-policy action items, a more powerful, less accommodating Congress appears ready to throw additional roadblocks in his way.**

As a top GOP congressional aide told FP's The Cable, "You are going to see more aggressiveness to push an agenda and not to defer to the administration."

#### 3) Chinese belligerence

**Schneider, 11** 1/27 – assistant professor of Chinese at University of Massachusetts, Amherst (David K., “China and the Realities of Power in Asia,” http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/Current-Affairs/ISN-Insights/Detail?lng=en&id=126468&contextid734=126468&contextid735=126467&tabid=126467, JMP)

US-China relations over the past two years have been a tale of two diplomacies. Secretary of State Clinton and Deputy Secretary Steinberg have been promoting a new American leadership designed to create "a new global architecture" that will "help integrate emerging powers into an international community with clear obligations and expectations." American diplomacy, according to this vision, will help China and the other emerging nations to overcome the mistrust and suspicion that blocks international cooperation and burden sharing. The rise of a new global middle class and a shared sense of common threat and common interest will open new opportunities to make China and other emerging powers global and regional "anchors of stability" that cooperate, under American leadership, to uphold international law and universal rights. Yet, sharp ground-level exchanges over Iran, naval activities in the Yellow, East, and South China Seas and the valuation of the yuan are clear signs that the interests of the two powers are growing **increasingly divergent**. The **inevitable failure** to realize this vision of great power condominium will not be due to mistrust, an inability to see common interests, or, as many suggest, the interference of domestic politics on both sides, but rather to the changing, and clashing, long-term realities of power in Asia. A concert of great powers can work only if all parties agree on the political composition of the global order, and are satisfied with the distribution of military and economic power. This was the case in the European order from the end of the Napoleonic Wars in 1815 to the beginning of the Crimean War in 1853 - Metternich's Concert of Europe. Contemporary Asia is in no way similar. Beijing and Washington do not share a common vision of the global political order. A critical mass of non-democratic governments, especially around its periphery, is geopolitically vital for China. These political imperatives underlie Beijing's consistent refusal to cooperate with the United States' proposed P5+1 alignment against the Iranian nuclear program. Maximum control over events in Central Asia has for centuries been essential to China's security. Threats to China's stability and even political existence traditionally have come from this region. The Han, Tang, Song and Qing dynasties were all fatally weakened upon the loss of this region to non-Chinese tribes and Arab powers. In the twentieth century, tensions and clashes with Soviet power along China's northern and western borders were a major factor in driving Beijing toward strategic entente with America in the 1970's. Ever since the demise of the USSR, Beijing has been striving to integrate Central Asia into its political and economic orbit, with the strategic objective of preventing the penetration of any political influences that might destabilize Xinjiang and Tibet, or leave China vulnerable to military coercion. Iran is the geopolitical anchor of this system. Sanctions that might lead to regime change in Tehran would threaten that order, and thereby, eventually, China's own internal security. Similar political realities have undermined another Washington attempt at a concert of powers, the Six Party Talks concerning the North Korean nuclear program. The Korean Peninsula is the strategic key to Manchuria and to China's coastal security. The 1894 Sino-Japanese War was a contest between the two powers for influence in Korea. China's loss led to a weakened Qing position in Manchuria and along the coast that invited further aggression from Japan, Russia and the European powers. In the Korean War in the 1950s, China spent, by some estimates, over a million lives to keep North Korea in existence and in the Sino-Soviet sphere. Beijing is unlikely to take any action to undermine a regime that acts as a buffer against the United States, South Korea and Japan. Recent events show the opposite. China has boosted its economic aid and investment programs in North Korea, and Beijing has been particularly reluctant to use its considerable leverage over Pyongyang to force concessions on its nuclear weapons program. Indeed, Kim Jong Il's recent visit to China, just as he is working to effect a smooth leadership transition, indicates that Beijing will remain deeply invested in the present North Korean regime. In military terms, China is clearly a revisionist power, profoundly dissatisfied with the present Asian security system, a reality that will **seriously limit prospects for any architecture of collective security.** America projects power in Asia through military alliances with Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Philippines, Australia, New Zealand, as well as through a new strategic relationship with India, and a system of bases in South Korea, Japan, Guam, and Diego Garcia that keeps the sea lanes open, maintains stability on the Korean Peninsula, the Taiwan Strait, the South China Sea, the Indian Ocean, and, in a larger frame, between China and Japan. The People's Republic has always viewed this reality as strategic encirclement. China's challenge to this order is accelerating with its new-found economic power. Beijing has declared the South China Sea a "core national interest" and has moved to enforce its territorial claims to the Senkaku Islands (Diaoyutai Islands in Chinese), and the Spratly Islands, and to other economic resources in the Western Pacific, particularly oil. All of these actions are provocations against American allies and friends in the Pacific. Beijing is moreover beginning to back up these moves with the development and deployment of the naval power necessary to make them credible and lasting. China is developing a new anti-ship ballistic missile that can hit ships as far away as 1,000 miles, and is far more effective than a cruise missile. New weapons, plans to field a blue-water navy, complete with aircraft carriers, and new maritime relationships with Pakistan, Sri Lanka and Bangladesh, are vivid signs that Beijing intends to assert itself not just as a regional hegemon, but as a naval power capable of operating all the way from the North Pacific to the Arabian Sea. Despite talk of joint U.S.-Chinese management of the global economy, Beijing has not embraced liberal capitalism. Markets are tools of the state being used to boost the efficiency of an otherwise inefficient socialist system, and not yet the foundation of a liberal, free market, economy. Full Chinese compatibility with world trade and financial norms would require interest rate liberalization, the free flow of capital, deregulation and privatization, protection of property rights, market exchange rates, and international trade and financial liberalization. Beijing has yet to fully harmonize with any of these norms. China's interest rates are determined by the state; the stock and capital markets are not fully open; the state still commands the largest sectors of heavy industry, transportation, communications and banking-what Lenin called the "commanding heights;" property rights do not inhere in the individual; land rights are not fully transferable; the yuan exchange rate is pegged to the dollar; and, although a WTO member, Beijing has proposed and negotiated with regional and other powers a number of trade agreements that do not adhere to WTO principles.

#### 4) Agreements will be watered down

**Feaver 10—**pol sci, Duke. PhD in government, Harvard (Peter, Assessing a benchmark in Obama’s 'yes, but' strategy, 1 June 2010, http://shadow.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2010/06/01/assessing\_a\_benchmark\_in\_obama\_s\_yes\_but\_strategy, AMiles)

The end of the NonProliferation Treaty Review conference provides an opportunity to assess how well President Obama's "Yes, But" strategy is working. My provisional assessment: not as well as I might have hoped. Recall that Obama's foreign policy efforts of the past 16 months can be summarized as one long effort to neutralize the talking points of countries unwilling to partner more vigorously with the United States on urgent international security priorities (like countering the Iranian regime's nuclear weapons program). **Despite a determined and focused effort at forging effective multilateralism**, the **Bush** administration **enjoyed only mixed success on the thorniest problems**. The Obama team came in believing that more could have been achieved if the United States had made more concessions up front to address the talking points of complaints/excuses would-be partners offered as rationalizations for not doing more. Yes, Iran's pursuit of a nuclear weapon is a problem, but what about Israel's? The Bush administration tended to view these talking points skeptically as a distraction and was not willing to pay much of a price in order to buy a rhetorical marker to offer in rebuttal. By contrast, the Obama Administration embraced them and devoted themselves to buying markers to deploy in response: Yes, but we have gone further than any other U.S. administration effort to publicly delegitimize the nuclear program of our ally Israel, so what about it, why don't you do more to help us on Iran? The just completed NPT Review conference was in some sense the ultimate benchmark for assessing the "Yes, But" strategy. The last review conference in 2005 collapsed in mutual recriminations with states unwilling to accept the Bush administration's prioritization of nonproliferation threats and responses. The Obama administration was determined to do better and by one measure they did: instead of diplomats storming out of the room, the 2010 NPT Review conference produced a document the states were willing to sign. This allowed the administration to boast, "We've got the NPT back on track." But in exchange for this, the United States endorsed an action plan that contains provisions Obama's National Security Advisor Jim Jones has characterized as "deplorable." As the Post describes it: "The United States got few of the specific goals it sought at the conference, such as penalties for nations that secretly develop nuclear weapons, then quit the pact (think North Korea). Language calling on countries to allow tougher nuclear inspections was greatly watered down." It is an action plan that singles out Israel by name for criticism but does not criticize Iran. The hypocrisy in the action plan was so great that apparently many countries were surprised when Obama's negotiators swallowed it. Obama's surprise last-minute concession temporarily wrong-footed the Iranian delegation. I do not know whether this compromise is the best that could have been negotiated in 2010. I do suspect, however, that something like it was achievable in 2005 -- meaning that if the Bush Administration had been willing to sign a "deplorable" compromise it could have done so in 2005. If I am right about that, then perhaps **the "Yes, But" strategy failed**. As the Post story put it: "Still, U.S. officials appeared frustrated that the Obama administration did not get more credit for its record. It has signed a new arms-reduction treaty with Russia, hosted a 47-nation summit on nuclear security and lessened the role of nuclear weapons in U.S. defense policy. "The disarmament stuff Obama did, **they just pocketed,**" said David Albright, president of the Institute for Science and International Security. Non-nuclear countries, he said, "didn't give anything back."" The "Yes, But" strategy was supposed to elicit better cooperation and more effective multilateralism -- what Obama's NSS has called "An international order advanced by U.S. leadership that promotes peace, security, and opportunity through stronger cooperation to meet global challenges." This benchmark would be met if the preliminary concessions sealed deals at lower prices. But if even after all the preliminary concessions our would-be partners still demand top dollar for their grudging acquiescence, it is hard to see what the "Yes, But" strategy won us.

# 1NR

### Ptx

Daowtc

**He has conceded that US economic collapse causes war—cause us to curtail our foreign policy causing proliferation and hostile powers to escalate nuclear wars—turns every impact because our diplomatic posture is key to solve every impact**

Conceded u that Obama can get debt passed

uniqueness controls the direction of the link--if something probabalistically won't pass--the plan can't make it pass less--this is key to cost-benefit analysis--if there's a 100% chance of the link but a 1% chance of uniqueness there's only a 50.5% chance that they have a disad--ignores a host of other issues--even if the plan is contoversial it won't stop CIR from passing.

#### This will destroy the U.S. and global economy and collapse trade

Davidson, 9/10 (Adam - co-founder of NPR’s “Planet Money” 9/10/2013, “Our Debt to Society,” <http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/15/magazine/our-debt-to-society.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0)>)

This is the definition of a deficit, and it illustrates why the government needs to borrow money almost every day to pay its bills. Of course, all that daily borrowing adds up, and we are rapidly approaching what is called the X-Date — the day, somewhere in the next six weeks, when the government, by law, cannot borrow another penny. Congress has imposed a strict limit on how much debt the federal government can accumulate, but for nearly 90 years, it has raised the ceiling well before it was reached. But since a large number of Tea Party-aligned Republicans entered the House of Representatives, in 2011, raising that debt ceiling has become a matter of fierce debate. This summer, House Republicans have promised, in Speaker John Boehner’s words, “a whale of a fight” before they raise the debt ceiling — if they even raise it at all.

If the debt ceiling isn’t lifted again this fall, some serious financial decisions will have to be made. Perhaps the government can skimp on its foreign aid or furlough all of NASA, but eventually the big-ticket items, like Social Security and Medicare, will have to be cut. At some point, the government won’t be able to pay interest on its bonds and will enter what’s known as sovereign default, the ultimate national financial disaster achieved by countries like Zimbabwe, Ecuador and Argentina (and now Greece). In the case of the United States, though, it won’t be an isolated national crisis. If the American government can’t stand behind the dollar, the world’s benchmark currency, then the global financial system will very likely enter a new era in which there is much less trade and much less economic growth. It would be, by most accounts, the largest self-imposed financial disaster in history.

Nearly everyone involved predicts that someone will blink before this disaster occurs. Yet a small number of House Republicans (one political analyst told me it’s no more than 20) appear willing to see what happens if the debt ceiling isn’t raised — at least for a bit. This could be used as leverage to force Democrats to drastically cut government spending and eliminate President Obama’s signature health-care-reform plan. In fact, Representative Tom Price, a Georgia Republican, told me that the whole problem could be avoided if the president agreed to drastically cut spending and lower taxes. Still, it is hard to put this act of game theory into historic context. Plenty of countries — and some cities, like Detroit — have defaulted on their financial obligations, but only because their governments ran out of money to pay their bills. No wealthy country has ever voluntarily decided — in the middle of an economic recovery, no less — to default. And there’s certainly no record of that happening to the country that controls the global reserve currency.

Like many, I assumed a self-imposed U.S. debt crisis might unfold like most involuntary ones. If the debt ceiling isn’t raised by X-Day, I figured, the world’s investors would begin to see America as an unstable investment and rush to sell their Treasury bonds. The U.S. government, desperate to hold on to investment, would then raise interest rates far higher, hurtling up rates on credit cards, student loans, mortgages and corporate borrowing — which would effectively put a clamp on all trade and spending. The U.S. economy would collapse far worse than anything we’ve seen in the past several years.

Instead, Robert Auwaerter, head of bond investing for Vanguard, the world’s largest mutual-fund company, told me that the collapse might be more insidious. “You know what happens when the market gets upset?” he said. “There’s a flight to quality. Investors buy Treasury bonds. It’s a bit perverse.” In other words, if the U.S. comes within shouting distance of a default (which Auwaerter is confident won’t happen), the world’s investors — absent a safer alternative, given the recent fates of the euro and the yen — might actually buy even more Treasury bonds. Indeed, interest rates would fall and the bond markets would soar.

While this possibility might not sound so bad, it’s really far more damaging than the apocalyptic one I imagined. Rather than resulting in a sudden crisis, failure to raise the debt ceiling would lead to a slow bleed. Scott Mather, head of the global portfolio at Pimco, the world’s largest private bond fund, explained that while governments and institutions might go on a U.S.-bond buying frenzy in the wake of a debt-ceiling panic, they would eventually recognize that the U.S. government was not going through an odd, temporary bit of insanity. They would eventually conclude that it had become permanently less reliable. Mather imagines institutional investors and governments turning to a basket of currencies, putting their savings in a mix of U.S., European, Canadian, Australian and Japanese bonds. Over the course of decades, the U.S. would lose its unique role in the global economy.

The U.S. benefits enormously from its status as global reserve currency and safe haven. Our interest and mortgage rates are lower; companies are able to borrow money to finance their new products more cheaply. As a result, there is much more economic activity and more wealth in America than there would be otherwise. If that status erodes, the U.S. economy’s peaks will be lower and recessions deeper; future generations will have fewer job opportunities and suffer more when the economy falters. And, Mather points out, no other country would benefit from America’s diminished status. When you make the base risk-free asset more risky, the entire global economy becomes riskier and costlier.

#### Entertaining GOP negotiating demands will drag the process out and trigger economic collapse

Lobello, 8/27 --- business editor at TheWeek.com (Carmel, 8/27/2013, “How the looming debt ceiling fight could screw up the U.S. economy; Yup, this is happening — again,” <http://theweek.com/article/index/248775/how-the-looming-debt-ceiling-fight-could-screw-up-the-us-economy)>)

Ready for more debt-ceiling drama?

The Treasury Department said Monday it would hit its borrowing limit in mid-October, which means that Congress will need to raise its $16.7 trillion debt ceiling to pay the nation's bills.

The sooner-than-expected deadline comes at an inconvenient moment, because Congress is already facing a budget deadline for the stopgap "continuing resolution" that finances the federal government, which is set to run out September 30. Failure to come to an agreement would trigger a government shutdown.

Having two big deadlines fall two weeks apart could be a recipe for disaster. Republicans, led by Speaker John Boehner (R-Ohio), have been musing about the possibility of using the debt ceiling, instead of a government shutdown, as leverage to delay the implementation of ObamaCare.

But as Ezra Klein put it in The Washington Post, "Trading a government shutdown for a debt-ceiling breach is like trading the flu for septic shock":

Anything Republicans might fear about a government shutdown is far more terrifying amidst a debt-ceiling breach. The former is an inconvenience. The latter is a global financial crisis. It’s the difference between what happened in 1995, when the government did shutdown, and what happened in 2008, when global markets realized a bedrock investment they thought was safe (housing in that case, U.S. treasuries in this one) was full of risk. [The Washington Post]

Indeed, a debt ceiling debate in 2011 that went on to the last possible minute had real economic consequences, leading Standard & Poor's to downgrade the United States' credit rating. The move "left a clear and deep dent in US economic and market data," said Matt Phillips at Quartz.

Investors pulled huge amounts of cash from the stock market, and consumer confidence was hurt as well. When the same problem cropped up again in May 2012, because Congress failed to reach a long-term deal, Betsey Stevenson and Justin Wolfers in Bloomberg explained how confidence plummeted the first time around:

[Confidence] went into freefall as the political stalemate worsened through July. Over the entire episode, confidence declined more than it did following the collapse of Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. in 2008. After July 31, when the deal to break the impasse was announced, consumer confidence stabilized and began a long, slow climb that brought it back to its starting point almost a year later. [Bloomberg]

This morning, Wolfers had this to say:

Treasury Secretary Jack Lew visited CNBC Tuesday morning to reiterate President Obama's promise not to go down he same road. "The president has made it clear: We're not going to negotiate over the debt limit," Lew said.

He also explained why in a letter to Boehner Monday morning. "Protecting the full faith and credit of the United States is the responsibility of Congress, because only Congress can extend the nation's borrowing authority," he wrote. "Failure to meet that responsibility would cause irreparable harm to the American economy."

### ---2nc Trade Off / Political Capital Key

#### Obama’s capital is key to raise debt ceiling

Bull & Younglai, 9/5 (Alister Bull and Rachelle Younglai, 9/5/2013, “Analysis: Battle over Fed - Summers' opponents seek to sway Obama,” <http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/09/05/us-usa-fed-summers-analysis-idUSBRE98414R20130905)>)

Still, some Washington veterans are perplexed that Obama is apparently willing to bypass Yellen, who is also viewed as well qualified, and are concerned that Obama risks an unnecessary congressional fight at a time when he could spend his political capital more wisely.

As well as battling for authorization to punish the use of chemical weapons by Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, the White House must currently also persuade lawmakers to raise the U.S. debt ceiling and forge an agreement to fund the federal government for the fiscal year beginning in October.

"Does Barack Obama want to play political football with the Congress on everything all fall?" asked David Rothkopf, a former Clinton administration official who is now president of Garten Rothkopf, an international advisory firm.

#### ( ) Syria proves our link --- a fight on another issue like it would have sucked capital away from debt ceiling

Frenzel, 9/6 --- Guest Scholar in Economic Studies at the Brookings Institution (9/6/2013, Bill, “By Dropping Syria In Congress' Lap, Obama Creates The Worst Of The Bad Old Days,” <http://www.forbes.com/sites/billfrenzel/2013/09/06/by-dropping-syria-in-congress-lap-obama-creates-the-worst-of-the-bad-old-days/)>)

Unfortunately, there is much more to this vote than a President forcing the Congress to ratify his decision. The Syria question is also consuming the President’s political capital at a time when he may be running a bit short anyway. He’s not a lame duck yet, but in a year he will be. Capital spent on Syria is capital not available for looming domestic problems.

Worse, the decision comes at a time when Congressional energies ought to be focused on the FY14 CR, the sequester repair, and the Debt Ceiling extension. Congress is already a polarized battleground. Syria, because it is different, may relieve tensions. More likely, it will crank up animosities and resentments between parties, branches and houses. Surely, it will burn valuable negotiating time.

Syria is an important foreign policy/national security issue. But it’s a mouse compared to the elephantine domestic fiscal problem. It now seems probable that the Syria vote may delay and confuse settlement of the budget question, and exacerbate existing budget tensions.

If those conditions lead to a smaller budget agreement, and another year or two of kicking that same old can down the road, those unintended consequences would dwarf whatever happens in Syria as a result of well-intentioned U.S. anti-poison-gas efforts.

### --Ext Compart

**E) Models—prefer them to empty rhetoric**

**Lebo, 10** (Matthew J. Lebo, Associate Professor, Department of Political Science, Stony Brook University, and Andrew O'Geen, PhD Candidate, Department of Political Science, Stony Brook University, Journal of Politics, “The President’s Role in the Partisan Congressional Arena” forthcoming, google)

Keeping this centrality in mind, we use established theories of congressional parties to model the president’s role as an actor within the constraints of the partisan environment of Congress. We also find a role for the president's approval level, a variable of some controversy in the presidential success literature. Further, we are interested in both the causes and consequences of success. We develop a theory that views the president’s record as a key component of the party politics that are so **important to** both **the passage of legislation** and the electoral outcomes that follow. Specifically, theories of partisan politics in Congress argue that cross-pressured legislators will side with their parties in order to enhance the collective reputation of their party (Cox and McCubbins 1993, 2005), but no empirical research has answered the question: "of what are collective reputations made?" We demonstrate that it is **the success of the president** – **not parties in Congress** – that predicts rewards and punishments to parties in Congress. This allows us to neatly fit the president into existing theories of party competition in Congress while our analyses on presidential success enable us to fit existing theories of party politics into the literature on the presidency.

**--Political capital is finite and key to the agenda – issues spillover**

BRYAN W. **MARSHALL** Miami University, **AND** BRANDON C. **PRINS** University of Tennessee & Howard H. Baker, Jr. Center for Public Policy Power or Posturing? Policy Availability and Congressional Influence on U.S. Presidential Decisions to Use Force Presidential Studies Quarterly 41, no. 3 (September) 20**11**

We argue that the more important effect of Congress occurs because presidents anticipate how the use of force may affect the larger congressional environment in which they inevitably have to operate (Brulé, Marshall, and Prins 2010). It may be true that presidents consider the chances that Congress will react to a specific use of force with countervailing tools, but even more importantly they anticipate the likelihood that a foreign conflict may damage (or advantage) their political fortunes elsewhere—in essence, the presidential calculus to use force factors in how such actions might shape their ability to achieve legislative priorities. To be clear, presidents can and do choose to use force and press for legislative initiatives in Congress. Taking unilateral actions in foreign policy does not preclude the president from working the legislative process on Capitol Hill. However, **political capital is finite** so spending resources in **one area** lessens what the president can bring to bear in **other areas**. That is, presidents consider the congressional environment in their decision to use force because their success at promoting policy change in either foreign or domestic affairs is largely determined by their relationship with Congress. Presidents do not make such decisions devoid of calculations regarding congressional preferences and behavior or how such decisions may influence their ability to achieve legislative objectives. This is true in large part because presidential behavior is motivated by multiple goals that are **intimately tied to Congress**. Presidents place a premium on passing legislative initiatives. The passage of policy is integral to their goals of reelection and enhancing their place in history (Canes-Wrone 2001; Moe 1985). Therefore, presidents seek to build and protect their relationship with Congress.

**--Yes vote switching—even due to unrelated legislation**

**Simes ‘10** – \*publisher of the National Interest, Executive Director of The Nixon Center and Associate Publisher of The National Interest, served in the State Department from 2003 to 2005 [12/23, Dimitri and Paul Saunders, National Interest, “START of a Pyrrhic Victory?”, http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/start-pyrrhic-victory-4626, CMR]

Had the lame-duck session not already been so contentious, this need not have been a particular problem. Several Senate Republicans indicated openness to supporting the treaty earlier in the session, including Senator Lindsey Graham and Senator John McCain. Senator Jon Kyl—seen by many as leading Republican opposition to the agreement—was actually quite careful to avoid saying that he opposed New START until almost immediately prior to the vote. Our own conversations with Republican Senate sources during the lame duck session suggested that several additional Republicans could have voted to ratify New START under other circumstances; Senator Lamar Alexander is quoted in the press as saying that Republican anger over **unrelated legislation** cost five to ten votes. By the time the Senate reached New START, earlier conduct by Senate Democrats and the White House had **alienated** many Republicans who could have voted for the treaty. That the administration secured thirteen Republican votes (including some from retiring Senators) for the treaty now—and had many more potentially within its grasp—makes clear what many had believed all along: it **would not have been so difficult** for President Obama to win the fourteen Republican votes needed for ratification in the new Senate, if he had been prepared to wait and to **work more cooperatively** with Senate Republicans. Senator Kerry’s comment that “70 votes is yesterday’s 95” ignores the reality that he and the White House could have secured many more than 70 votes had they handled the process differently and attempts to shift the blame for the low vote count onto Republicans.

**Obama needs to use his political capital to get his agenda passed.**

**Cohen 9** a senior research fellow at the New America Foundation, is author of “Live From the Campaign Trail: The Greatest Presidential Campaign Speeches of the 20th Century and How They Shaped Modern America 6-22-09 (Michael, Politico, “Momentum key for health care bill” http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0609/23988.html)

Throughout the 2008 presidential campaign, the one criticism heard perhaps more than any other from Republicans was about the cult of veneration that had developed around Barack Obama. He was the “second coming,” the Democrats’ “messiah,” a preening “celebrity,” the political ads joked. But the GOP might have been on to something. For Democrats and their ambitious domestic agenda, it’s all about Obama. There is today a curious disconnect between support for the president’s policy prescriptions and the popularity of the man himself. Fewer than half of all Americans are on board with the president’s health care agenda (although they remain open to persuasion), a majority are uneasy about the burgeoning federal deficit, and voters remain dubious about the very notion that government can solve the country’s problems. But these concerns are not denting Obama’s approval ratings, which remain in the mid-60s. **It’s that trust that may be Obama and the Democrats’ most potent political tool in the legislative battles to come.** The Democrats’ advantage is heightened by the growing public disapproval of the opposition party. According to one recent poll, Republicans are actually less popular than former Vice President Dick Cheney. As for Democrats, 57 percent of the electorate views them in a favorable light. These polling numbers suggest a yawning “confidence chasm.” Even with concerns over the deficit, voters are still inclined to blame the country’s budget woes on Obama’s predecessor. With the political winds at their back, Democrats seemingly have a unique opportunity to pass a robust legislative package of domestic initiatives..Yet congressional Democrats seem unwilling to push their advantage. They are increasingly skittish over Republican criticisms of the growing budget gap and remain fearful that if economic prospects remain clouded, they will be vulnerable to Republican criticisms about supporting a Big-Government health care plan that grew the deficit and short-circuited the improving economy.  Obviously, if the economy is performing badly a year and a half from now, Democrats will most likely pay a political price at the polls. But passage of sweeping health care legislation that insures millions of Americans would not only fulfill Obama’s campaign message of change but would also serve as an effective political counterargument. And what if the economy starts to turn around by 2010? An improving economy combined with major health care reform would be a political game changer for Democrats. Indeed, a half-measure bill that leaves millions without access to care and fails to deliver on Obama’s pledge to change the way things are done in Washington could be the worst of both worlds. If Democrats are serious about health reform, why adopt an incrementalist approach when the political opportunity allows for something bigger and possibly better? Unease about the deficit is even more misplaced. Voter trepidation about the budget gap is in direct proportion to the state of the economy: The worse the economy, the greater the concern over the deficit. According to a recent New York Times poll, when asked the most important problem facing the country, 38 percent said the economy and only 2 percent cited the deficit. Whatever the state of the economy in 2010, would Democrats prefer to go to the voters and say, “I shrunk the deficit” or would they rather say, “I passed health care legislation that improves access and care for 50 million people — and, by the way, my opponent voted against it”? This is one argument that Cheney might have gotten right: Deficits don’t matter. Democrats are in an unparalleled political position: They have a sputtering and unpopular opposition and a young and well-liked president trusted by an electorate that is hungry for change. Even if Obama is pushing an agenda that may not be fully embraced by the American people, this is no time for caution. Instead, **Democrats must take full advantage of the Obama’s popularity — and the president must use the bully pulpit even more effectively to make the case for change**. Democrats, it is often joked, put too much focus on 10-point plans and detailed policy prescriptions. Once again, this seems to be the case. This is one time where their political — and policy — success depends far less on the details and more on building off the perception of change and possibility represented by Obama’s presidency. The most important thing for Democrats going forward will not be the latest deficit numbers but **the momentum of political change** they have the power to catalyze.

**Capital is key to the agenda**

**Light 99** – Senior Fellow at the Center for Public Service (Paul, the President’s Agenda, p. 34)

In chapter 2, I will consider just how capital affects the basic parameters of the domestic agenda. Though the internal resources are important contributors to timing and size, capital remains the cirtical factor. That conclusion will become essential in understanding the domestic agenda. Whatever the President’s personal expertise, character, or skills, capital is the most important resource. In the past, presidential scholars have focused on individual factors in discussing White House decisions, personality being the dominant factor. Yet, given low levels in presidential capital, even the most positive and most active executive could make little impact. A president can be skilled, charming, charismatic, a veritable legislative wizard, but if he does not have the basic congressional strength, his domestic agenda will be severely restricted – capital affects both the number and the content of the President’s priorities. Thus, it is capital that determines whether the President will have the opportunity to offer a detailed domestic program, whether he will be restricted to a series of limited initiatives and vetoes. Capital sets the basic parameters of the agenda, determining the size of the agenda and guiding the criteria for choice. Regardless of the President’s personality, capital is the central force behind the domestic agenda.

**Capital is key – it outweigh ideology, party support, or concessions**

**Light 99** – Senior Fellow at the Center for Public Service (Paul, the President’s Agenda, p. 24-25)

Call it push, pull, punch, juice, power, or clout – they all mean the same thing. The most basic and most important of all presidential resources is capital. Though the internal resources time, information, expertise, and energy all have an impact on the domestic agenda, the President is severely limited without capital. And capital is directly linked to the congressional parties. While there is little question that bargaining skills can affect both the composition and the success of the domestic agenda, without the necessary party support, no amount of expertise or charm can make a difference. Though bargaining is an important tool of presidential power, it does not take place in a neutral environment. Presidents bring certain advantages and disadvantages to the table.

**The plan wrecks Obama—that’s leogrande—prefer it; he’s an expert on cuba—cites empirics—the cuba lobby controls congress and will hold the bill hostage—obama has done everything to avoid cuba—it would destroy his agenda**

### AT W/W

**A) Not a win—the plan’s an unrelated bill—not Obama’s agenda**

**B) Illogical—if winners win were true, Obama wouldn’t have lost after his first win**

#### C) Prefer hyper-recent evidence

Brown & Sherman, 9/4 (CARRIE BUDOFF BROWN and JAKE SHERMAN, 9/4/2013, “President Obama’s political capital spreads thin,” <http://www.politico.com/story/2013/09/obamas-political-capital-spreads-thin-96306.html)>)

The West Wing says it’s too early to know how Obama’s surprise decision to seek congressional authorization will affect the rest of his agenda, but his advisers are betting that a win could usher in other domestic successes. A failed vote, however, would undoubtedly weaken him.

A senior administration official said the effort could build some trust between the White House and Republicans that might ease tensions in negotiations over the budget and other issues.

White House aides have long argued that success begets success. Their latest test of that theory was the broad bipartisan Senate vote for comprehensive immigration reform bill, which was supposed to compel the House to act. So far, it has not — and House Republicans don’t think the Syria vote will be any different.

“The idea that passing the authorization for use of military force in Syria would give the administration more leverage in future political debates is absurd,” one senior GOP leadership aide said. “They are currently spending political capital they don’t have.”

No matter how it plays out, the sudden emergence of a fight over Syria presents both political and logistical challenges for Congress and the White House.

House Republicans were already grumbling about the prospect of several perilous votes this fall — first on raising the debt limit and extending government funding, then on a package of reforms to the immigration system. White House aides began hearing skepticism from Republican leaders that they could force a debt limit hike through the chamber and then press for passage of even a pared-back immigration bill.

#### E) PC’s not renewable, is zero-sum, regenerates too slowly, and regeneration fails in practice

Ryan 9 Selwyn, Professor Emeritus and former Director, Institute of Social and Economic Research, University of the West Indies, “Obama and political capital,” 1/18 http://www.trinidadexpress.com/index.pl/article\_opinion?id=161426968

Like many, I expect much from Obama, who for the time being, is my political beast of burden with whom every other politician in the world is unfavourably compared. As a political scientist, I however know that given the structure of American and world politics, it would be **difficult for him to deliver half of what he has promised**, let alone all of it. Reality will **force him to make many "u" turns** and detours which may well land him in quick sand. Obama will, however, begin his stint with a **vast accumulation of political capital**, perhaps more than that held by any other modern leader. Seventy-eight per cent of Americans polled believe that his inauguration is one of the most historic the country will witness. Political capital is, however, a lumpy and **fast diminishing asset** in today's world of instant communication, which once misspent, is **rarely ever renewable**. The world is full of political leaders like George Bush and Tony Blair who had visions, promised a lot, and probably meant well, but who **did not know how to husband** the **political capital** with which they were provided as they assumed office. They squandered it as quickly as they emptied the contents of the public vaults. Many will be watching to see how Obama manages his assets and liabilities register. Watching with hope would be the white young lady who waved a placard in Obama's face inscribed with the plaintive words, "I Trust You." Despite the general optimism about Obama's ability to deliver, many groups have already begun to complain about being betrayed. Gays, union leaders, and women have been loud in their complaints about being by-passed or overlooked. Some radical blacks have also complained about being disrespected. Where and when is Joshua going to lead them to the promised land, they ask? When is he going to pull the troops out of Iraq? Civil rights groups also expect Obama to dis-establish Guantanamo as soon as he takes office to signal the formal break with Dick Cheney and Bush. They also want him to discontinue the policy which allows intelligence analysts to spy on American citizens without official authorisation. In fact, Obama startled supporters when he signalled that he might do an about-turn and continue this particular policy. We note that Bush is signalling Obama that keeping America safe from terrorists should be his top priority item and that he, Bush, had no regrets about violating the constitutional rights of Americans if he had to do so to keep them safe. Cheney has also said that he would do it again if he had to. The safety of the republic is after all the highest law. Other groups-sub-prime home owners, workers in the automobile sector, and the poor and unemployed generally all expect Obama to work miracles on their behalf, which of course he cannot do. Given the problems of the economy which has not yet bottomed out, **some promises have to be deferred** beyond the first term. Groups, however, expect that the promise made to them during the campaign must be kept. Part of the problem is that almost every significant social or ethnic group believes that it was instrumental in Obama's victory. White women felt that they took Obama over the line, as did blacks generally, Jews, Hispanics, Asians, rich white men, gays, and young college kids, to mention a few of those whose inputs were readily recognisable. Obama also has a vast constituency in almost every country in the world, all of whom expect him to save the globe and the planet. Clearly, he is the proverbial "Black Knight on a White Horse." One of the "realities" that Obama has to face is that **American politics is not a winner-take-all system**. It is pluralistic vertically and horizontally, and getting **anything done politically**, even when the President and the Congress are controlled by the same party, **requires groups to negotiate, bargain and engage in serious horse trading.** No one takes orders from the President who can only use moral or political suasion and promises of future support for policies or projects. The system was in fact deliberately engineered to prevent overbearing majorities from conspiring to tyrannise minorities. The system is not only institutionally diverse and plural, but socially and geographically so. As James Madison put it in Federalist No 10, one of the foundation documents of republicanism in America, basic institutions check other basic institutions, classes and interests check other classes and interests, and regions do the same. All are grounded in their own power bases which they use to fend off challengers. The coalitions change from issue to issue, and there is no such thing as party discipline which translated, means you do what I the leader say you do. Although Obama is fully aware of the political limitations of the office which he holds, he is fully aware of the vast stock of political capital which he currently has in the bank and he evidently plans to enlarge it by drawing from the stock held by other groups, dead and alive. He is clearly drawing heavily from the caparisoned cloaks of Lincoln and Roosevelt. Obama seems to believe that by playing the all-inclusive, multipartisan, non-ideological card, he can get most of his programmes through the Congress without having to spend capital by using vetoes, threats of veto, or appeals to his 15 million strong constituency in cyberspace (the latent "Obama Party").

Conceded u that Obama can get debt passed

uniqueness controls the direction of the link--if something probabalistically won't pass--the plan can't make it pass less--this is key to cost-benefit analysis--if there's a 100% chance of the link but a 1% chance of uniqueness there's only a 50.5% chance that they have a disad--ignores a host of other issues--even if the plan is contoversial it won't stop CIR from passing.

### 2NC Terror—No WMD

**No WMD terrorism—Al-Qaeda is weak and doesn’t have the resources or expertise– they’ve budgeted less than 2000 dollars to puruing WMD and are too busy watching porn – that’s Mueller – even if it’s possible, our evidence says the probability of an attack is “wildly unlikely” – their authors empirically exaggerate**

**Nuclear terrorism is “breathtakingly unlikely”—they couldn’t get the materials, scientists, or transport it across borders ]]]**

**Prefer our evidence**

**A) Their authors have empirically exaggerated the capabilities of terrorists**

**B) None of their evidence assumes the intentions of terrorists—if they wanted a WMD attack, they would budget more than 2000 dollars**

**C) Only our evidence assumes hard evidence from Al-Qaeda computers—their evidence is based on overblown statements**

Mueller

### 2NC Terror—Declining

**Terror’s declining—uprisings prove it’s falling out of popularity—framing issue—even though they may have some strength, they are focusing on local activities—prefer our evidence—Their authors have been hyping these threats since 9-11—all their impacts are empirically denied**

**Reject evidence that doesn’t account for**

**A) The actual intentions of terrorists—they’re a local, not transnational, group**

**B) A recent lack of funding**

**C) Recent losses of legitimacy and internal fragmentation—they’re focusing on personal survival**

**Conceded Gorrel is empirically denied – raul castro**

**Hotspots don’t escalate – the term existential threat has been overused – yes actors can face a bunch of threats but they have not isolated a clear bar in the 2ac about what constitutes escalation – they need to isolate specific risks to specific countries to access escalation – they clearly haven’t done that – that’s drenzer**

### 2NC Link Wall

#### The plan overwhelms Cuban internal stability --- multiple links –

#### Anti-Cuban Organizations – American capital influx empowers anti-Cuban political organizations – causes hardliners to adopt a conservative approach that sihfts reforms away from the status quo gradual policies – that’s Hernandez

Plan increases vacuum – shadow – lopez

Communication and people – plan causes media access and revolutionist ideals that loosens Raul’s control

Pascaul, 2010 (Carlos, US Ambassador to Mexico, Vice President and Director of Foreign Policy @ the Brookings Institute “Learning to Salsa New Steps in U.S.-Cuba Relations” <http://www.brookings.edu/research/books/2010/learningtosalsa>)

Relations with the United States are at a historical nadir, but improving them is not a priority, Alarcón said. In fact, Cuba would be challenged to come up with a good strategy if the next U.S. administration were inclined to improve relations. Raúl should carefully weigh whether and to what degree Cuba should seek better relations with the Americans or respond to a new administration’s decision to permit increased travel to Cuba. Although Cuba ultimately stands to gain access to the U.S. market from a normal bilateral relationship, the potential costs in terms of open flows of communication and people could weaken the government’s control over its population. Weaker U.S. sanctions and a more cordial relationship would also make it harder to scapegoat the United States and would shift the onus for economic and political reform to the Cuban leadership. More critical to Cuba than improved relations with the United States is for it to strengthen its relations with the major developing nations, especially Russia, Mexico, and Brazil Speaking for all those present, Machado Ventura thanked Raúl for his confidence in them and assured him of their absolute loyalty. Raúl could be confident because it was highly unlikely that domestic or international conditions would threaten his hold on power, but in any case¶ he should seek to establish his credibility as a leader on his own terms. One way to do so would be to reinforce the fusion of leadership at the highest levels of the Council of State, the Revolutionary Armed Forces, and the Cuban Communist Party. As for the international community, Cuba could count on Venezuelan oil subsidies in the short term, and in the longer term would have access to substantial new energy reserves from offshore oil and gas and the production of sugarcane ethanol. Raúl should concentrate his international efforts on promoting and diversifying Cuba’s economic relationships. Raúl’s greatest challenge will be the rise in expectations for further reforms among the Cuban population, which could be worsened if the new U.S. administration decides to loosen restrictions on travel and remittances. More contact with relatives and friends will result in demands for better jobs and increased freedoms. Remittances are already creating disparities among Cubans with and without access to hard currency.. Since Cuba cannot move quickly or undertake broad reforms, it should attempt to limit expectations Raúl has been skillful in allowing some social reforms; additional reforms, however, should be undertaken cautiously and with the full support of the Party and the armed forces.

That increase in communication and access makes status squo opposition movements effective --- achieves Cuban Instability

Pascaul, 2010 (Carlos, US Ambassador to Mexico, Vice President and Director of Foreign Policy @ the Brookings Institute “Learning to Salsa New Steps in U.S.-Cuba Relations” <http://www.brookings.edu/research/books/2010/learningtosalsa>)

Participants considered the wide range of actors that constitute the “established opposition” within Cuba today and debated whether these diverse groups could coalesce around a common denominator or vision. Despite the signing of several declarations of unity among leading opposition activists, for the most part the three traditional political fronts— Liberals, Social Democrats, and Christian Democrats— being shaped by the most prominent dissident groups continue to pursue their own uncoordinated and often conflicting visions of change. 5 The question of leadership remains a problem, with most opposition groups known for their individual leaders rather than the movements they represent. Such personality-driven activism has had the tendency, many believe, to keep the opposition fractured. Significant efforts have been undertaken to mobilize political opinion, the most well-known being the Varela Project— started in 1998 by Oswaldo Payá of the Christian Liberation Movement and named after Felix Varela, a Cuban religious leader— and its continuation, the Todos Cubanos (All Cubans) program. The Varela Project relied upon Article 88 of the Cuban Constitution of 1976, which provides for citizens to introduce legislation by petition containing at least 10,000 signatures. The principles of the Varela petition, demanding the rights to free expression and association, amnesty for nonviolent political prisoners, free enterprise, and electoral reforms, were seen as the first steps to create the necessary space for all Cubans to be able to freely participate in economic and political life on the island. The petition was an unprecedented example of successful political organizing and was presented to the National Assembly with a total of 25,404 signatures in 2002 and 2003. The Cuban legislature rejected the petition, and the Assembly’s Constitution and Legal Affairs Committee responded with its own counterinitiative: to amend the Cuban constitution to make the socialist nature of the Cuban state permanent. The government claimed that its own petition met with 99 percent voter approval. To further crush the Varela Project and the dissident movement at large, beginning on March 18, 2003, the Cuban government arrested, summarily tried, and jailed seventy-five civil society leaders, including independent journalists, librarians, and trade unionists. In spite of the continued existence of mobilizations such as the Varela Project, participants disagreed in their assessment of the dissident movement’s level of impact within Cuba today. Most agreed that because of the opposition’s lack of access to the mass media and their constant vilification in the state press, few Cubans are likely to recognize the dissident movement as a true symbolic or practical alternative. Some participants felt that international support may be the only thread propping the movement up. Others saw the opposition as a weak but nonetheless substantive movement with significant roots. The key issue confronting participants was whether a dissident-based opposition culture could provide the foundation for an opposition movement, or whether dissident groups in their current form would become less relevant in light of changing political and economic dynamics. In the end, a common concern emerged: with greater economic openings in the offing, more is now at stake for the dissident movement than at perhaps any other moment in its history.

Raul de-legitimization --- moving to the US causes uncertainty amongst elites and demand for rapid reform

Suchlicki, 2012 (Jaime, professor and director, Institute for Cuban and Cuban-American Studies, University of Miami, “Ignore Raúl Castro’s siren song” <http://www.miamiherald.com/2012/10/01/3025115/ignore-raul-castros-siren-song.html>)

Raúl’s legitimacy is based on his closeness to Fidel Castro’s policies of economic centralization and opposition to the U.S. He cannot now reject Fidel’s legacy and move closer to the U.S. A move in this direction would be fraught with danger. It would create uncertainty among the elites that govern Cuba and increase instability as some advocate rapid change while others cling to more orthodox policies. The Cuban population also could see this as an opportunity for mobilization to demand faster reforms.¶ Raúl is also unwilling to renounce the support and close collaboration of countries like Venezuela, China, Iran and Russia in exchange for an uncertain relationship with the U.S. At a time when the U.S. is seeking regime change in the Middle East, Raúl’s policies are more likely to remain closer to regimes that are not particularly friendly to the U.S. and that demand little from Cuba in return for generous aid.¶

Fear and speculation --- Cubans base their economic reforms off of the consequences of the U.S.S.R. --- fear of economic collapse will cause actions to spin out of control

Laverty and Stephens, 2011 (Collin, Center for Democracy in the Americas; Sarah, Executive director of the Center “Cuba’s New Resolve Econmoic Reform and Its Implications for U.S. Policy” <http://democracyinamericas.org/pdfs/CDA_Cubas_New_Resolve.pdf>)

When the U.S.S.R. collapsed and its former allies underwent rapid economic reforms, Cuba took note of the consequences in Russia and Eastern ¶ Europe—rapid price increases and hyper-inflation, high interest rates, and ¶ wide-scale privatization contributing to corruption, allocation of state assets ¶ to crony capitalists and inadequate institutional transparency. By contrast to ¶ the dismaying economic transition of the Soviet countries, Cuban citizens and ¶ policymakers also observed many successes of gradual, experimental approaches ¶ to economic reforms in Communist Vietnam and China.¶ Cubans are now nervous that, as has occurred in other transitioning ¶ societies, suddenly empowered or re-empowered economic groups will seek ¶ to increase their influence in political and economic decision-making. “The ¶ government needs to be careful so this thing doesn’t spin out of control,” ¶ worried one academic who spoke with CDA about the lessons of the Soviet ¶ Union and Eastern Europe. “We need to avoid the same mistakes.”¶ Despite public debates and consultations, they reasonably fear key ¶ decisions are being concentrated in a limited number of hands and will be ¶ implemented too quickly.

#### Too much engagement too fast causes instability—going too fast risks civil war

Perez 10 J.D. Yale Law School. Working with Koh former Dean of Yale Law and Legal Advisor to the State Department [David A. Perez, America's Cuba Policy: The Way Forward: A Policy Recommendation for the U.S. State Department, Spring, 2010, Harvard Latino Law Review, 13 Harv. Latino L. Rev. 187]

Policymakers in Washington must realize that Cubans will not wake up the day after Fidel Castro dies and experience broad-based attitudinal changes. Therefore, while economic reform is sure to preface political reform, the Cuban government will have to move slowly on the former so as not to alienate the population, which would truncate the latter. At first, a successor regime may think that choosing between Castroism and economic liberalization is a Faustian choice: economic doldrums with continuity versus economic revitalization with instability. Indeed, continuing Castroism embraces the history and normative values attached to the Revolution, but would forestall any economic recovery. On the other hand, liberalizing the economy by adopting market reforms would promote economic growth, but could also alienate large segments of the population still enamored by Castro's revolutionary zeal. For example, one possible market reform would be to lay off the excess workforce that has cluttered the state-controlled enterprises and rendered them inefficient and virtually useless. Embracing deep cuts in the public employment might be efficient, but it certainly will not be popular. For decades Cubans have enjoyed job security, universal education, and universal healthcare. If market reforms are interpreted as a wholesale rejection of the normative and ideological underpinnings that have dominated Cuban discourse for the last fifty years, they will no doubt alienate influential ideologues in the Communist Party, the military, the Ministry of the Interior, and many others in the general population.

When a state takes control of the economy, it also takes responsibility for it when it performs poorly. A strong state could surely implement these reforms and survive the ensuing backlash; but to do so would require deft political maneuvering, and a careful patience to not try to change everything all at once. A poorly managed state-led economic opening can quickly become unmanageable, and create instability. Given these concerns, a slow and methodical economic transition, rather than an overnight toppling of the [\*210] state-sector, would be a far more pragmatic approach for the Cuban government.

China and Vietnam have both introduced market reforms that dwarf any that the Cuban regime has introduced so far. Given that China has been on the path of liberalization for over thirty years yet the state still controls wide swaths of the economy, one might expect Cuba's economic transformation to also move lethargically—especially at first. The stronger the parallel with Asia becomes, the more methodical Cuba's opening will be. Expectations that assume a quick economic turnaround should be correspondingly adjusted. Thus, the United States should recognize that the Cuban government has little choice but to move at a relatively glacial speed, and instead work assiduously to make the economic transition as smooth as possible. To that end, it is absolutely crucial that our policies not be used as a way to settle political grudges. For example, if America moves to regain the properties taken by the Cuban government fifty years ago as a way to "encourage" market reforms, the entire effort will be short-circuited before it takes off the ground.

Some will argue that focusing on market liberalization, while putting political reforms to the side, endangers Cuba's long-term prospects for liberty and freedom. This is a valid concern. Nevertheless, in normative terms, market reforms will vastly improve the lives of the Cuban people. The improved living conditions will give fringe groups with few resources the ability to focus their own efforts on political reform from within. Improved economic conditions, if used as a prerequisite to political reform, may also prevent a costly civil war during the inevitably painful transition.

#### The regime fears fast economic opening as destroying its control

Colomer 2005- Research Professor in Political Science, Professor at the University of Barcelona

(Joseph M., “Who Could End the Embargo? A Game-Theoretical Perspective”, 2004-2005, 14 Transnat'l L. & Contemp. Probs. 163, heinonline)//KW

For the same reason, the worst possible outcome for Cuba would be the one produced by the opposite pairs of choices, embargo-democracy, as seems unnecessary to discuss. Issues may appear regarding Cuban rulers' second and third preferences. The free trade-democracy outcome would give Cuba the benefits of an open economy, but would fatally undermine the present rulers' control-what they call "independence" or "revolution." Actually, even under the present circumstances, and in spite of their claims against the U.S. embargo, Cuban rulers are wary of allowing more foreign investment, tourism, Cuban-Americans' direct cash remittances, and international communications (including the Internet) because they could enable anti- Castro opinion and pressures among Cuban population.

It thus seems realistic to assume that the present Cuban rulers-in other words, Fidel Castro-value the endurance of the revolutionary dictatorship more than the advantages of open trade and investment. While Cuban rulers may dream of a "Chinese way," with foreign trade and investments permitting them to maintain the dictatorship, they would rather maintain the dictatorship even at the cost of the embargo than risk their own position with a democratic opening. Usual slogans, such as "Revolution or death," clearly illustrate this position. A different ordering will be considered later, basically as a hypothetical preference change induced on Cuban rulers by either the further effects of the embargo or their weakened capability to maintain social control.

#### That will cause a crackdown and civil war

**Iglesias, 12** – Commander, US Navy. Paper submitted for the Master of Strategic Studies Degree at the the US Army War College (Carlos, “United States Security Policy Implications of a Post-Fidel Cuba” <http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA560408>) **GOC = Government of Cuba, FAR = Cuban military**

3) Democratic Uprising – A democratic uprising on the island presents a confounding paradox. While it would result in optimal strategic outcomes for the island and the U.S. in the long-term, it also poses the most significant near-term risk to the Cuban people and U.S. national interests.

The road to a “Free Cuba” has several potential paths. The least likely but most dangerous scenario would be a “Cuban Spring” popular uprising. The most likely and least dangerous would be a protracted economic and political evolution across a series of governments concluding in a democratic or quasi-democratic state. Such post-Castro era governments will most likely come from factions of the existing regime.45

Similar to 2011’s events in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya and the broader middle-east, a Cuban Spring could fracture the island’s existing power structure at best and might even15 overthrow the GOC altogether. For that to evolve, several key events would have to develop. The paramount requirement would be an internal security withdrawal from the civic space which would afford dissidents the political maneuver space to solicit and coalesce opposition support. To incentivize and coordinate support, continued liberalization of cellular and internet usage could be leveraged as popular informational linkages. Finally, if a critical civic mass was achieved by dissidents and their supporters, a singularly brutal or compelling event could unleash Cuba’s DNA which historically has endorsed violence to effect political change. At the extreme, the deeprooted hatred and resentments that the Revolution has pressurized over the last half century could erupt in political vendettas, infighting over societal restructuring, and strife over the political process.46

The MININT forces would lead any crackdown. However, if it failed to quell the uprisings, the FAR could be drawn into direct violence against the Cuban people. This would be unprecedented and could have devastating repercussions for the FAR and the regime. If the FAR did act against the people, it would shatter its reputation as the protector of the people; this would be eerily similar to the Egyptian Army’s evolving relations with the Egyptian people. The outcome of a violent upheaval could be tragic for Cubans and threatening to U.S. national interests. Regardless of the outcome, security and stability in post-Castro Cuba would remain at risk if not completely crushed. At the other end of the regime’s risk, time and likelihood spectrums is a slow decay away from Revolutionary socialism. Marxist-Leninist communism’s global bankruptcy has not gone unnoticed by Raúl or the rest of the ruling elite. A transition to “Socialism with a Cuban character” seems likely after Fidel’s death and will put the 16 country on a slippery path to liberalization. As discussed above, economic reforms will likely lead the transition. However, as the “proletariats” dependence on the state is displaced by economic self-reliance, so too will the demands for greater political freedom be disengaged from economic dependence. The benefits to Cuba are many, as they are to American national interests.